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Thread: The Trouble with Globalism

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    Lightbulb The Trouble with Globalism

    http://www.amconmag.com/06_02_03/feature.html

    June 2, 2003 issue
    Copyright © 2003 The American Conservative


    Nation Busting

    The trouble with globalism


    By Robert Locke

    Globalism is a central issue of our time, but its definition has become slippery. It is confused with globalization, an error that globalists deliberately encourage. The two are fundamentally different: globalization is an historical process, a fact of how things are, but globalism is an ideology, a set of opinions about how things ought to be.

    Globalism is the ideology that advocates the liquidation of nations. Its opposite is nationalism. Globalization, on the other hand, is not an ideology at all. Ultimately, it is just the growth of communications and trade, and it has been happening since 1492. The classic lie about globalization is its recency. For example, when did it first become possible to send $100 million from New York to London at the push of a button? 1976? 1966? 1956? No, 1866, when the trans-Atlantic telegraph opened.

    Globalism the ideology masquerades as globalization the fact in order to gain sympathy by feigning inevitability. Debates on its desirability are portrayed as futile. But if it is inevitable, why must its advocates push so aggressively?


    Globalism is a deliberate political choice, no more inevitable than socialism. Its key exemplars like the United Nations, free-trade extremism, the European Union, and mass immigration are political constructs that could be abolished tomorrow. This is not true of such aspects of globalization as the Internet, the passenger jet, or the 40-foot container.

    Globalization can exist without globalism. World trade as a percentage of world GNP was roughly as high in the pre-1914 heyday of the gold standard and European imperialism as it is today, but the Western world was then staunchly nationalist. The anti-nationalist spin that is put on trade today is not an intrinsic part of the exchange of goods and services with foreigners. Japan has based her economy on exports for 50 years without ceasing to be one of the most nationalistic and culturally distinctive nations on earth.

    The problem with globalism is not free markets but free-market extremism, a peculiar kind of right-wing Jacobinism that has no place in authentic conservatism. In the U.S, this means taking free trade beyond its common-sense limit of reciprocity with friendly nations and opening our markets to nations, like Japan, which keep their markets closed to us, and China, which nakedly proclaim their military hostility to us.

    Globalism is sometimes confused with internationalism in order to depict resistance to globalism as resistance to fruitful co-operation between nations. But internationalism, whatever mischief it may produce, is predicated on relations between nations, precluding their outright dissolution. Unfortunately, it is a small and intellectually seductive jump from believing in co-operation between nations to believing that the co-operative arrangements can be abstracted to function on their own without the nations that produced them. Many former internationalists are now globalists.

    Globalism appeals to the libertarian Right because this group mistakenly equates the liquidation of nations with a reduction in the power of their governments. But this does not follow. Open borders, for example, benefit immigrants at the expense of citizens and nourish big government by importing poverty and other social pathologies. Worse, the decline of national governments, as Britain has learned under the European Union, is often accompanied by the growth of more distant, more autocratic, and less accountable authorities. The erosion of a nation can easily proceed hand-in-hand with the cancerous bloat of its government: just look at the suffocation of Russia under the dead hand of the Soviet state.

    Because of the ascendancy of neoconservatism during the time that globalism has flowered, it has been suggested, both by paleoconservatives and by certain elements on the Left, that the two are identical. But although neoconservatism is almost always globalist, it is not intrinsically identical with globalism. Neoconservatism is conservatism corrupted by globalism.

    Neoconservatives adopted globalist ideas because they made sense for winning the Cold War. They did not, however, adapt when that war ended, and these ideas have run riot now that the constraints imposed by that war have gone. The desirability of exporting capitalism and a worldwide military presence are both Cold War ideas. They once served a vital American interest by undermining the Soviet Union, but they do nothing for us now. Exporting capitalism today merely enhances foreign nations’ competitiveness against us. This had some consolations when it made Japan the bastion of capitalism in East Asia. It has none today, when her long-term geopolitical interests are not identical with ours and she is financing the economic growth of an openly hostile China.

    It took two World Wars and a Cold War to undo America’s allegiance to George Washington’s warning against “entangling alliances” and to drag us into a worldwide military presence, but given that the founders had no experience of ideological aggression like Marxism, this was rational under the circumstances. Those circumstances are, however, over. Al-Qaeda is not the USSR. Furthermore, because of its religious character, a return to America’s Christian particularism—rather than the construction of the kind of counter-universalism we arrayed against the universalist pretensions of Marxism—is the needed strategy against it.

    It is sophistry to invent messianic objectives for American foreign policy in order to rationalize an obsolete habit of projecting power. Sometimes military presence abroad is called for, but our default presumption in favor of projecting power into any available vacuum has led us into pointless involvements in places like Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti. It is one thing to project power in order to shape the international order in favor of real American security interests but quite another to do so out of some ideological mission to replicate our system all over the world.

    Reproducing the American system worldwide ultimately implies world government, as intellectually honest globalists like Clinton Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott have admitted. Globalism is often equated with world government, but this is a half-truth. Though the drive to create world government rationalizes globalism, destroying the nation-state can go on whether or not world government is built on its carcass. The drive to create world government could fail, and, having dismantled viable nation-states, globalists could leave the world in chaos.

    Globalism also emerged because both Right and Left responded to the Cold War by interpreting their missions as a supranational battle of ideas rather than the well-being of the concrete American nation. As a result, at the end of the Cold War, both the dumber elements of the world Right and the smarter elements of the world Left came to the same conclusion: the nation-state was obsolete as a vehicle for furthering their ideas. The Right wanted more capitalism, the Left wanted more equality, and the nation-state, a natural bulwark against extremism of either kind, stood in the way of both. So they set about undermining it.

    The smart Left has admitted to itself—whether the dumb Left that forms its rent-a-mob gets it—that capitalism cannot be overthrown. If the inevitability of capitalism makes economic equality within nations unattainable, the next-best thing is economic equality between nations. To see free-trade extremism build up the incomes of the Chinese at the same time as it impoverishes American manufacturing workers is immensely satisfying to them. Some have openly said so.

    Because the smart Left has abandoned socialism, it no longer wants the strong nation-states that central planning implied. It now sees the existence of separate nations as an unacceptable redoubt of human inequality. Separate nations give peoples with histories of brilliant political and economic achievement, like Englishmen and Americans, the free and prosperous lives that their forebears have earned while at the same time consigning peoples of inferior ancestral achievement to lesser existences. Therefore, erasing the distinctions between nations—the “borderless world”—is the new leftist egalitarian project. Mass immigration into the First World from the Third is a key part of this project, because it forces the citizens of the First World to share their superior way of life. Globalism’s socialist roots are clear in that it denies that nations are the property of their citizens, property they are not obliged to share with foreigners.

    The “technocratic” Left, which is just the power-hungry Left grown sophisticated, sees global institutions as a way to achieve policies that could never be imposed by national governments subject to democratic accountability. Because national sovereignty is the key barrier to achieving this, globalism attacks national sovereignty.

    National cultural identity gives peoples an emotional attachment to their national sovereignty, so globalism attacks national cultural identity too. In America, this assault takes the form of PC assaults on American history and the revision of American culture to a universalist culture. In Britain, it takes the form of guilt over long-vanished and frequently defensible colonialism. In Germany, it equates any German nationalism with the Third Reich. In the Third World, it takes the form of imported American junk culture.

    Globalism is contemptuous of any culture that cannot be bought and sold. It wants a homogeneous commercial pop culture designed to narcotize docile consumers and make the rootless cosmopolitanism that it produces seem sophisticated. Philosophically, globalism views culture as an arbitrary particularity or as mere entertainment.

    Globalism does not value the distinct cultures of the world: it is only interested in Third-World cultures as a means to subvert the historic cultures of the First World. Its cultural incoherence, which postmodernism tries to systematize and aestheticize, is a product of its split between the right-globalist impulse to make culture commercial and the left-globalist impulse to make it subversive.

    If this subversive itch sounds familiar, that is because globalism is the key successor to Marxism. It claims to represent the inevitable outcome of the laws of economics and a more efficient form of economic organization. It claims to serve the well-being of the populace but requires an elite cadre of experts to impose it. It claims to be independent of any particular nation, but it depends utterly on one nation’s military power to enforce its system. And rather than coinciding with the “withering away of the state,” it in fact requires the expansion of government power.

    Globalism gratifies the same mental pathologies as Marxism and is therefore perfect for disillusioned intellectuals looking for a new home. It claims to be an empirical theory but is in fact a “beautiful idea” invented in the abstract, which can only be maintained by ruthlessly concealing or rationalizing away inconvenient facts. It offers its devotees the opportunity to believe that they are a special in-group that is more advanced than everyone else. And like Marxism, globalism has a genius for inspiring disloyalty to one’s country.

    Like Marxists, globalists realize they need global military domination to impose their vision, so they set about manipulating America into providing it. Their basic doctrine is that the United States must project power wherever it is lacking and maintain indefinite global military supremacy. This is sold as a means to maintain American security, but in fact the agenda is to uphold the globalized world order. Their ultimate intellectual coup is to redefine American security not as our ability to protect ourselves from harm—globalists have no interest in defending our actual borders—but as the security of the globalist system (which we are falsely told is just America writ large) worldwide.

    Ironically, globalism is often depicted as a mask of American self-interest. It is indeed used as a rationalization for some assertions of American power, but it also inexorably dissolves the very bases of this power because the United States, as the most open society on earth, is singularly vulnerable to its corrosive forces. We can call this the “neocontradiction.” For example, American free trade with China builds up China’s industrial base, yet we presume we will always be so much richer than China that we will endlessly be able to afford to contain her military expansionism. Worse, this same trade depletes our own industrial base and economy, reducing tax revenues and forcing us to borrow from Japan to pay for expensive military deployments. This arrangement gives Japan a quiet veto on our use of force.

    Advocates of indefinite American global hegemony project American economic dominance into the future with the insouciance of a British colonial secretary circa 1889. They cannot ask hard questions about the significance of relative economic power because globalism seduces America’s power elite precisely because of this unstated assumption that America will effortlessly dominate a globalized world.

    They are in for a rude awakening, and soon. If the dollar falls by half—the standard estimate for what it would take to bring our unsustainable trade deficit back into balance—we will have to double our contributions to international organizations in order to maintain our clout. In fact, all our international spending will have to double to retain our position.

    If America’s share of world GNP, now at 25 percent, falls to 12 or 13 percent, which is what this decline implies, we will no longer have the weight in the world economy to play as large a role in setting its rules as we now do. The prestige and credibility of the so-called American model of economics will decline too. The world will not listen to the idealistic economics of a declining nation.

    The longer we premise our foreign policy on being the sole superpower, the harder our fall will be. The sooner we abandon this delusion, the easier will be our return to our natural status as a large, prosperous, and powerful nation— among others. The sooner we face the inevitability of a multi-polar world, the more of a head start we can have in arranging our place within its inevitably complex web of alliances.

    Here at home, globalist neocons assume continued Republican dominance even though their devotion to mass immigration is destroying the Republican Party by importing Democratic voters. But because, for globalists, ideologies are more real than empirical facts, those globalists continue to spin contorted verbal rationalizations to cover up this fact of political demography.

    Foreigners, please understand that the aspects of American policy you find obnoxious are really aspects of globalism. Therefore, you should be anti-globalist, not anti-American, just as America was anti-communist, not anti-Russian.

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    Post Globalization

    I am gathering information on the globalism/nationalism-controversy for a school project, and a website I'm trying to set up. Any essays, websites, or personal thoughts on this subject will be greatly appreciated, especially if they are from an anti-globalist perspective.
    Thanks in advance,

    Siegfried Aurelius

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    Hi Siegfried

    You might want to consider vdare.com. It looks at the American situation and mass immigration from a "nationalist" perspective rather than "internationalist" (I prefer to use the terms "preservationist" and "universalist").

    It seems of late the world has become quite divided between the preservationists and universalists. Literally it is tearing the world apart.

    Myself, I think that all peoples should have the right to self determination and to organize as a group should they wish..whether that group is Black, Asian, Jewish, subgroups, and yes, White...to define the group's identity and to have and retain homelands. Relationships would be based primarily on the healthy individual (that is individuals with healthy self worth...who accept themselves and are able to accept others....who have high tolerance..who, when correction is necessary, engage in constructive criticism, to build or make whole, rather than bashing which is helpful to no one....being free to the utmost to express themselves and respecting others right to do the same -that is freedom up to the point of, but not past, harm to one's self, or harm to others-).

    The group, as it is made up of those individuals, would , in turn, reflect
    the same healthy characteristics as its members. Relationships between the groups would work on the same principles as that of between individuals..ie mutual respect...tolerance (again, tolerance as everything, has its limits)...respect by the members of one's own group for the group that they make up..and respect by those members for other groups. The only place violence has a place among groups is for self defense...and as the individuals that make up those groups become healthier..that violation between groups that causes violence ought to decrease.

    The "universalists" ought to have a place as well. As they do not have much care for the idea of groups and the right to retention of ancestral homelands, they ought to not mind possibly leasing land from a cash starved nation (hmmm...the more temperate southern climes of Siberia come immediately to mind :drsuess). If that does not prove possible, nations may allow a place for them in the lands they live in now separate from the group. Allowing a place for both preservationists and universalists ought to be possible; it does not have to be a win/lose situation for either.

    It is true the "three children" of humanity...Asians...Europeons...and Africans...have had a problem of abusiveness to one another at times in the past, some perhaps more than others (to be sure good was done as well). One must asks, is not the answer to correct the abusive behaviour rather than destroy one or more of these "children" as is happening now particularly as regards Europe and Europeons? Does anyone have the right to tamper with what took nature tens of thousands of years to develop? Should not the people that the changes/destruction is happening to be asked if that is what they want? Have they been asked? Have you been asked?

    Hope your efforts are succesful Siegfried.

    Cheers
    Gladstone

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    Post MacDonald's VDare.com Article

    http://www.vdare.com/misc/macdonald_neoconservatism.htm

    September 18, 2003

    Thinking About Neoconservatism

    By Kevin MacDonald

    Over the last year, there’s been a torrent of articles on neoconservatism raising (usually implicitly) some vexing issues: Are neoconservatives different from other conservatives? Is neoconservatism a Jewish movement? Is it “anti-Semitic” to say so?

    The dispute between the neocons and more traditional conservatives — “paleoconservatives” — is especially important because the latter now find themselves on the outside, looking in on the conservative power structure.

    Hopefully, some of the venom has been taken out of this argument by the remarkable recent article by neoconservative “godfather” Irving Kristol (“The Neoconservative Persuasion,” Weekly Standard, August 25, 2003). With commendable frankness, Kristol admitted that

    “the historical task and political purpose of neoconservatism would seem to be this: to convert the Republican party, and American conservatism in general, against their respective wills, into a new kind of conservative politics suitable to governing a modern democracy.”

    And, equally frankly, Kristol eschewed any attempt to justify U.S. support for Israel in terms of American national interest:

    “[L]arge nations, whose identity is ideological, like the Soviet Union of yesteryear and the United States of today, inevitably have ideological interests in addition to more material concerns… That is why we feel it necessary to defend Israel today, when its survival is threatened. No complicated geopolitical calculations of national interest are necessary.”

    If the US is an “ideological” nation, this can only mean that the motivations of neoconservative ideology are a legitimate subject of intellectual inquiry.

    For example, it is certainly true that the neocons’ foreign policy fits well with a plausible version of Jewish interests, but is arguably only tenuously related to the interests of the U.S. Also, neocons oppose the isolationism of important sections of traditional American conservatism. And neocon attitudes on issues like race and immigration differ profoundly from those of traditional mainstream conservatives — but resemble closely the common attitudes of the wider American Jewish community.

    Count me among those who accept that the Jewish commitment of leading neoconservatives has become a critical influence on U.S. policies, and that the effectiveness of the neoconservatives is greatly enhanced by their alliance with the organized Jewish community. In my opinion, this conclusion is based on solid data and reasonable inferences. But like any other theory, of course, it is subject to reasoned discussion and disproof.

    We shouldn’t be surprised by the importance of ethnicity in human affairs. Nor should we be intimidated by charges of anti-Semitism. We should be able to discuss these issues openly and honestly. This is a practical matter, not a moral one.

    Ethnic politics in the U.S. are certainly not limited to Jewish activism. They are an absolutely normal phenomenon throughout history and around the world.

    But for well over half a century, with rare exceptions, Jewish influence has been off-limits for rational discussion. Now, however, as the U.S. acquires an empire in the Middle East, this ban must inevitably fall away.

    My views on these issues are shaped by my research on several other influential Jewish-dominated intellectual and political movements, including the Boasian school of anthropology, Freudian psychoanalysis, the Frankfurt School of Social Research, Marxism and several other movements of the radical left, as well as the movement to change the ethnic balance of the United States by allowing mass, non-traditional immigration.

    My conclusion: Contemporary neoconservatism fits into the general pattern of Jewish intellectual and political activism I have identified in my work.

    I am not, of course, saying that all Jews, or even most Jews, supported these movements. Nor did these movements work in concert: some were intensely hostile to one another. I am saying, however, that the key figures in these movements identified in some sense as Jews and viewed their participation as in some sense advancing Jewish interests.

    In all of the Jewish intellectual and political movements I studied, there is a strong Jewish identity among the core figures. All center on charismatic Jewish leaders—people such as Boas, Trotsky and Freud— who are revered as messianic, god-like figures.

    Neoconservatism’s key founders trace their intellectual ancestry to the “New York Intellectuals,” a group that originated as followers of Trotskyite theoretician Max Schactman in the 1930s and centered around influential journals like Partisan Review and Commentary (which is in fact published by the American Jewish Committee). In the case of neoconservatives, their early identity as radical leftist disciples shifted as there began to be evidence of anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union. Key figures in leading them out of the political left were philosopher Sidney Hook and Elliot Cohen, editor of Commentary. Such men as Hook, Irving Kristol, Norman Podhoretz, Nathan Glazer and Seymour Martin Lipset, were deeply concerned about anti-Semitism and other Jewish issues. Many of them worked closely with Jewish activist organizations. After the 1950s, they became increasingly disenchanted with leftism. Their overriding concern was the welfare of Israel.

    By the 1970s, the neocons were taking an aggressive stance against the Soviet Union, which they saw as a bastion of anti-Semitism and opposition to Israel. Richard Perle was the prime organizer of Congressional support for the 1974 Jackson-Vanik Amendment which angered the Soviet Union by linking bilateral trade issues to freedom of emigration, primarily of Jews from the Soviet Union to Israel and the United States.

    Current key leaders include an astonishing number of individuals well placed to influence the Bush Administration: (Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, Douglas Feith, I. Lewis Libby, Elliott Abrams, David Wurmser, Abram Shulsky), interlocking media and thinktankdom (Bill Kristol, Michael Ledeen, Stephen Bryen, John Podhoretz, Daniel Pipes), and the academic world (Richard Pipes, Donald Kagan).

    As the neoconservatives lost faith in radical leftism, several key neocons became attracted to the writings of Leo Strauss, a classicist and political philosopher at the University of Chicago. Strauss had a very strong Jewish identity and viewed his philosophy as a means of ensuring Jewish survival in the Diaspora. As he put it in a 1962 Hillel House lecture, later republished in Leo Strauss: Political Philosopher and Jewish Thinker:

    “I believe I can say, without any exaggeration, that since a very, very early time the main theme of my reflections has been what is called the ‘Jewish ‘Question’.”

    Strauss has become a cult figure—the quintessential rabbinical guru with devoted disciples.

    While Strauss and his followers have come to be known as neoconservatives — and have even claimed to be simply “conservatives”— there is nothing conservative about their goals. This is most obviously the case in foreign policy, where they are attempting to rearrange the entire Middle East in the interests of Israel. But it is also the case with domestic policy, where acceptance of rule by an aristocratic elite would require a complete political transformation. Strauss believed that this aristocracy would be compatible with Jewish interests.

    Strauss notoriously described the need for an external exoteric language directed at outsiders, and an internal esoteric language directed at ingroup members. In other words, the masses had to be deceived.

    But actually this is a general feature of the movements I have studied. They invariably frame issues in language that appeals to non-Jews, rather than explicitly in terms of Jewish interests. The most common rhetoric used by Jewish intellectual and political movements has been the language of moral universalism and the language of science—languages that appeal to the educated elites of the modern Western world. But beneath the rhetoric it is easy to find statements expressing the Jewish agendas of the principal actors.

    For example, anthropologists under the leadership of Boas viewed their crusade against the concept of “race” as, in turn, combating anti-Semitism. They also saw their theories as promoting the ideology of cultural pluralism, which served perceived Jewish interests because the U.S. would be seen as consisting of many co-equal cultures rather than as a European Christian society.

    Similarly, psychoanalysts commonly used their theories to portray anti-Jewish attitudes as symptoms of psychiatric disorder.

    Conversely, the earlier generation of American Jewish Trotskyites ignored the horrors of the Soviet Union until the emergence there of state-sponsored anti-Semitism.

    Neoconservatives have certainly appealed to American patriotic platitudes in advocating war throughout the Middle East—gushing about spreading American democracy and freedom to the area, while leaving unmentioned their own strong ethnic ties and family links to Israel.

    Michael Lind has called attention to the neoconservatives’ “odd bursts of ideological enthusiasm for ‘democracy’”— odd because these calls for democracy and freedom throughout the Middle East are also coupled with support for the Likud Party and other like-minded groups in Israel that are driven by a vision of an ethnocentric, expansionist Israel that, to outside observers at least, bears an unmistakable (albeit unmentionable) resemblance to apartheid South Africa.

    These inconsistencies of the neoconservatives are not odd or surprising. The Straussian idea is to achieve the aims of the elite ingroup by using language designed for mass appeal. War for “democracy and freedom” sells much better than a war explicitly aimed at achieving the foreign policy goals of Israel.

    Neoconservatives have responded to charges that their foreign policy has a Jewish agenda by labeling any such analysis as “anti-Semitic.” Similar charges have been echoed by powerful activist Jewish organizations like the ADL and the Simon Wiesenthal Center.

    But at the very least, Jewish neoconservatives like Paul Wolfowitz, who were deeply involved in pushing for the war in Iraq, should frankly discuss how their close family and personal ties to Israel have affected their attitudes on US foreign policy in the Middle East.

    Wolfowitz, however, has refused to discuss this issue beyond terming such suggestions “disgraceful.”

    A common argument is that neoconservatism is not Jewish because of the presence of various non-Jews amongst their ranks.

    But in fact, the ability to recruit prominent non-Jews, while nevertheless maintaining a Jewish core and a commitment to Jewish interests, has been a hallmark—perhaps the key hallmark—of influential Jewish intellectual and political movements throughout the 20th century. Freud commented famously on the need for a non-Jew to represent psychoanalysis, a role played by Ernest Jones and C. G. Jung. Margaret Mead and Ruth Benedict were the public face of Boasian anthropology. And, although Jews represented over half the membership of both the Socialist Party and the Communist Party USA at various times, neither party ever had Jews as presidential candidates and no Jew held the top position in the Communist Party USA after 1929.

    In all the Jewish intellectual and political movements I reviewed, non-Jews have been accepted and given highly-visible roles. Today, those roles are played most prominently by Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld whose ties with neoconservatives go back many years. It makes excellent psychological sense to have the spokespeople for any movement resemble the people they are trying to convince.

    In fact, neoconservatism is rather unusual in the degree to which policy formulation — as opposed to implementation — is so predominantly Jewish. Perhaps this reflects U.S. conditions in the late 20th century.

    All the Jewish intellectual and political movements I studied were typified by a deep sense of orthodoxy—a sense of “us versus them.” Dissenters are expelled, usually amid character assassination and other recriminations.

    This has certainly been a feature of the neocon movement. The classic recent example of this “We vs. They” world is David Frum’s attack on “unpatriotic conservatives” as anti-Semites. Any conservative who opposes the Iraq war as contrary to U.S. interests and who notes the pro-Israeli motivation of many of the important players, is not to be argued with, but eradicated. “We turn our backs on them.” This is not the spirit out of which the Anglo-American parliamentary tradition was developed, and in fact was not endorsed by other non-Jewish pro-war conservatives.

    Jewish intellectual and political movements have typically had ready access to prestigious mainstream media channels, and this is certainly true for the neocons. The anchoring by the Washington Post of the columns of Charles Krauthammer and Robert Kagan and by the New York Times of William Safire's illustrates this. But probably more important recently has been the invariable summoning of neoconservatives to represent the “conservative” line on the TV Networks. Is it unreasonable to suppose that this may be somewhat influenced by the famously heavy Jewish role in these operations?

    Immigration policy provides a valuable acid test for the proposition that neoconservatism is actually a vehicle for perceived Jewish ethnic interests. I believe I have been able to demonstrate that pro-immigration elements in American public life have, for over a century, been largely led, funded, energized and organized by the Jewish community [PDF file]. American Jews have taken this line, with a few isolated exceptions, because they have believed, as Leonard S. Glickman, president and CEO of the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, has bluntly stated, “The more diverse American society is the safer [Jews] are.” Having run out of Russian Jews, the HIAS is now deeply involved in recruiting refugees from Africa.

    When, in the middle 1990s an immigration reform movement arose amongst American conservatives, the reaction of the neoconservatives ranged from cold to hostile. No positive voice was permitted on the Op-Ed page of the Wall Street Journal, by then a neoconservative domain. (Perhaps significantly, a more recent exception has been a relatively favorable review of the anti-illegal immigration book Mexifornia— whose author, the military historian Victor Davis Hanson, has distinguished himself by the extreme hawkishness of his views on the Middle East.) The main vehicle of immigration reform sentiment, National Review, once a bastion of traditional conservative thought, was quite quickly captured by neoconservatives and its opposition to immigration reduced to nominal.

    Prior to the post-9/11 U.S. invasion of the Middle East, this suppression of the immigration reform impulse among conservatives was probably the single most important contribution of the neoconservatives to the course of U.S. history.

    It may yet prove to be the most disastrous.

    Kevin MacDonald is Professor of Psychology at California State University-Long Beach.

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    Post Radical Traditionalism and the New World Order

    http://jkalb.freeshell.org/texts/Rad...tionalism.html

    Publication of the following essay is pending. The writer, James Kalb, would be grateful for any comments. The issues the essay raises can be discussed on our discussion board, Pro et Contra. Your participation is welcome.
    ---------------

    Radical Traditionalism and the New World Order

    The attempt to base social order on human will dominates public life today to the point that objective moral order has become unthinkable. Technological hedonism, the rational organization of all things to give each man what he wants, is universally accepted as the guiding ideal.

    The current situation has grown up in stages. The First World War marked the end of tradition and religion as stated principles of order. The conception of legitimacy that vanished then depended on a religious establishment that could no longer serve as the basis of politics. Thrones fell because their authority was no longer viewed as divinely ordered or simply part of the way things were. Instead, government had to base itself entirely on the will of the governed. In the absence of God, the will of Man became the source of law.

    What followed displayed the implications of Man's enthronement. The Second World War was the victory of egalitarian hedonism over the particularities that make men and societies what they are -- race, nation, the state as an aesthetic or organic whole that gives sense and life to its parts. That victory was inevitable. Divorced from cosmic order, the defining particularities for which the Axis fought could not ground an enduring social order because they were arbitrary. A particularism that stood for nothing larger than itself lacked direction. Equal satisfaction of wants seemed rational and compelling in comparison. Allied victory therefore meant the end of the European Right, and since 1945 the absolute supremacy of economics, of the principle that social order exists to get men what they want rather than express an essence or ideal, has been basic to Western public life.

    The fall of the Berlin Wall marked the end of order based on collective rather than individual purposes. The death of socialism was the triumph of the principle that society is a matter of technical rationality, that the purpose of social order is to satisfy the arbitrary desires of men simply as individuals. That triumph was also inevitable. Once wants had become the standard of goodness, and whatever could not be reduced to concrete desire had been put radically in doubt, men became dubious of "the will of the people" and other invisible attributes of collectivities. They wanted proof before giving up their particular desires, and found the shopping mall a more compelling vision than New Soviet Man.

    1989 also meant loss of faith in history, refuted by the triumph in history of a radically individualistic and therefore ahistorical principle. History had abolished its own significance. As a result of these developments -- the death of God, the reduction of the human essence to appetite and technological reason, the dissolution of "the people," the end of history as a meaningful process -- no conception of the common good can be publicly accepted today. Values are thought to be a matter of individual wants, and the only moral principles recognized as authoritative are formal principles for the furtherance and mutual accommodation of individual wills.

    Understood theologically, this situation implies a religion of individual man as the source of value, the doctrines of which are equality, autonomy, and hedonism. Understood politically, it implies the twin sovereignty of world markets and transnational bureaucracies as rational means for maximizing equal satisfaction of desire. Responsible leaders in Church, State and elsewhere now view cooperative effort toward such a new order as their foremost responsibility. Dissent is all but criminal, since the alternative is thought to be poverty, tyranny and bloody chaos.

    The ruling outlook combines low goals with boundless ambition. It makes control of the world for men's arbitrary purposes the goal of morality and politics. The social and (to the extent possible) natural order are to be transformed into a single rational system wholly subject to man's will. Body and soul are to be subjugated to desire. Human mastery is to become boundless. More and more we control things physically. Beyond that, the understandings that determine what things are for us are molded by symbolism, social relationships, and biochemistry. Men today believe they can manipulate such factors, and so expect that physical and social technology will permit comprehensive reconstruction of reality, in part social, in part physical, in part through managed reinterpretation.

    Because the world is to be recreated for man's pleasure, human power, and thus the means of power -- money, position, manipulative skill -- are all that truly matter. Educated and serious men today treat politics and economics as supreme ordering principles, and see serious rejection of technocracy as ignorant or disingenuous. For them, denial of man's omnipotence can only be nihilism or obfuscation. Whatever men say they want, their real purpose must be to get their own way, and their claimed opposition to hedonism is simply a rhetorical maneuver motivated by the desire to supplant what others want with what they want themselves.

    So well-accepted have technocratic presumptions become that non-interference has come to seem only another form of manipulation. All situations are interpreted as human constructions that can be reconstructed intentionally, and failure to reconstruct is seen as support for the existing situation over known alternatives. Failure to reconstruct race relations, for example, is "institutional racism," an instance of the more general vice of "social injustice" -- failure to remake all things in line with egalitarian hedonism. Even traditionalists fall into viewing the world as a human construction, and seeing acceptance of tradition as a decision to construct the world in a particular way. From such a perspective traditionalism becomes pointless, since it depends on our need for wisdom greater than our own, and its adherents become unable to explain their views even to themselves.

    While the modern standpoint makes it impossible to see the world as traditionalists do, that standpoint is not inevitable. In spite of its self-understanding, the antitraditional point of view is neither scientific nor rational. The attempt to make the world a closed circle beginning and ending with the human will is based not on knowledge but on desire and fear that lead to denial of such obvious truths as man's inability to create himself.

    Antitraditionalists shrug off objections to their position because they are afraid that acceptance of human limitations -- denial of man's divinity -- would lead to despair or to subjection to an authority other than themselves. The traditionalist does not share that fear, because he recognizes purposes larger than his own will, and believes that the world is neither alien nor senseless. He is therefore willing to deal with things as they are. He accepts that we cannot master the world, that any knowledge we can possess falls short of it, and that good, evil and the other things that make it what it is do not depend on us but we on them. He therefore recognizes that our power is limited, and technology, including social technology, can not be omnipotent. Since the exact sciences owe their power to limitation, to narrowing the range of issues they are willing to consider, a science, let alone technology, of the whole is impossible.

    We need tradition because we are not self-sufficient and cannot fully know the whole upon which we depend. Tradition makes possible the relationship to the whole that is needed for our thoughts and actions to be well-founded, because it makes possible a stable way of life that takes into account fundamental things that are too subtle or comprehensive to deal with directly. We cannot invent or manipulate our relationship to the whole. Nor can any abstract system be comprehensive enough to define a world adequate to human life. A useable relationship to the whole must grow out of the thoughts, experiences and inspirations of many men and generations, accumulated, refined, and made coherent by tradition. To act rationally requires loyalty to a particular community and its ways; through that loyalty things we need that would otherwise escape us become accessible as habits, attitudes and symbols.

    Tradition deals with things that are greater than we can grasp, and we can only accept it as a gift from those who came before us. It orients all human action, the work of natural scientists as much as anything else, and it cannot be manipulated, reconstructed or made scientific. Habits, attitudes and symbols are concrete, so traditions differ and each must rely on his own. The differences are no argument against relying on any particular tradition. Reliance is unavoidable, because we can think, know and act only from a particular traditional standpoint; other sources of guidance, such as social science, philosophy and personal opinion, are far too conflicting and fragmentary to create a general point of view anyone could live by.

    Fortunately, the differences among the great religious and moral traditions are much less important than what they have in common, especially when opposed to the technocratic outlook. The traditions deal with one issue, how to make moral and spiritual order concrete in human life, technocracy with quite another, the satisfaction of desire. It is the former that touches us more deeply. Desire as such is a notoriously deceitful guide, and we look for something more solid. We would rather live by stable goods than endure the self-betrayal of an amoral life, however successful socially and materially.

    We insist on making sense of our actions, and recognize their sense in relation to a larger and ultimately universal system that does not depend on us. Bringing what we do into relation with such an overarching scheme is our most comprehensive and enduring goal. Men's willingness to sacrifice pleasure to meaning, to the demands of a more inclusive system that gives sense to particulars, shows up in low ways, for example the sacrifice of practical interests to revenge, but in others as well. When a man identifies with his family or country, or with his understanding of what it is to be noble and good, it becomes rational for him to sacrifice for those things because the sacrifice becomes a sacrifice of lesser to greater interests.

    The view that our relation to the universal is fundamental raises the issue of the conflict between "universalism" and the concrete goods men live by. The objection to universalism must be properly understood. It is not that universals are useless or unreal, or that we should ignore them. As universal assertions themselves, such claims are self-defeating. What makes universalism destructive is simple identification of the universal with a single way of life, and consequent suppression of goods that do not fit a particular concrete scheme. That is an error that results not from recognition of universals but from ignoring their nature.

    Rejection of universals as such is not a cure for universalism but a symptom of the disease -- disregard of the nature of things -- that leads to it. Men dislike universals because they set limits to the human will. If all men are mortal, then Socrates, if he is a man, is mortal whether he likes it or not. Men also dislike particulars, because particulars are incomplete, and thus require choice and exertion. They therefore try to avoid the opposition of universal and particular, the dualism of One and Many, by denying one of the opposing principles. By denying that and other dualisms they hope to avoid conflicts and get all they want without risk or exertion.

    Which principle they deny depends on whether it seems more important to do nothing or to get their own way in everything. In the West today men take getting their way in particular matters too seriously to think of denying the Many. In contrast, denial of the One is common; as a denial of the transcendent, and thus of things that irremediably exceed our understanding and control, it is characteristic of modernity. The denial is futile. The practical demands of life force us to deal with things comprehensively, and to do so we must have a grasp of principles by which the world becomes a whole. Reasoned choice requires interrelated stable meanings that only universals can provide; if universals did not exist they would have to be invented. In the end we must recognize, at least in practice, a hierarchy of principles that culminates in the One, or at least something we treat as such.

    That recognition need not mean "universalism" or tyranny. Universals are necessary for even tolerance to make sense. We become tolerant when we recognize others as fellow men sharing a common human nature, whose goods express more general goods that in some way are also goods for us. If there were men with whom we lacked all common ground, whom we found hopelessly opaque, what significance could they have for us? We would have no reason to treat them differently than rocks, trees and other objects we encounter and use for our own purposes.

    Since universals are indispensable, a man who turns his back on what is universal will make up his own universals. Since he has abolished the One, his recourse is to take some particular thing -- a race, class, party, or system of thought, or a particular good such as power, happiness or equality -- and treat it as the ultimate standard to which all things must be referred. The man who wants to abolish universals thus turns in the end to a tyrannical universalism in which something that is not a universal is forced to do duty as such. The more he opposes transcendent standards the more he insists on some other final standard, a negative formal standard like radical skepticism or a crudely pragmatic one like success, and applies it everywhere. Only by doing so can he escape the transcendent.

    The motive for treating particulars as universals is that doing so appears to abolish one of the permanent difficulties of human life, the need to pay adequate regard to both the One and the Many, necessity and choice, the eternal and the temporal. The need to accept seemingly irreconcilable principles is a standing demonstration that man is not the measure, and we do not like it. Men can hope to control particulars, and by treating them as universals they imagine they can dominate the world. If race or economics is everything then eugenics or nationalizing industry is the key to utopia. Modern ideologies are the consequence.

    The actuality, of course, is that attempting to treat particulars as universals leads to madness and oppression rather than liberation. If the validity of universals like "man" is denied, men will be dealt with not as men but in accordance with the simple will of the powerful. Since treatment of particulars as universal is radically at odds with the nature of things it is extraordinarily destructive. The great totalitarianisms of the past eighty years are a demonstration. Attempts to create a universal whole subject to man's will make those who hold power into gods; what becomes absolute is not Man, from the anti-transcendental point of view a mere abstraction, but the particular men at the top. Nazis, Bolsheviks and contemporary liberals reject the transcendent in favor of concrete realities such as race, class and human wants, supposedly to eliminate obfuscation and deal frankly with things as they are. In fact, denial of the transcendent plunges them and their followers into a maze of unreality that deprives things of their nature and forces them to comply with standards foreign to them.

    The lesson of modern totalitarianism is that we cannot do without the One. When it is driven out it returns in a distorted and tyrannical form. The alternative to destructive universalism is not denial of universals but traditionalism. In essence, traditionalism is recognition that we need universals but cannot simply possess them. We must approach them indirectly, through acceptance of the attitudes, practices and symbols that make up a concrete way of life. Traditionalism is acceptance of the nature of things. It recognizes that in general we already know what we need to know; if we did not, life would quickly come to an end, just as a sick man would die right away if his body were not mostly healthy. We need learning less than recollection; tradition is a form of recollection, an all-inclusive form that helps us live well in the most comprehensive way possible.

    Traditionalism thus opposes totalitarianism on all points. It accepts the supreme reality and importance of the One, and consequently the reality of human limitations. It sees that we cannot impose order on the world but must accept the order already present. It therefore begins not with a New Order but with acceptance of the fundamental goodness of what exists, especially what is common and enduring, and with respect for particular men and peoples.

    The claims of tradition are thus compelling, but how to satisfy them under current conditions is not obvious. How can a man live by inherited understandings when tradition itself has been disestablished? The whole tendency of public life today is antitraditional. All dominant voices -- popular entertainers, advertisers, journalists, politicians, experts, educators -- deny traditional authority. Science and liberal democracy, the guiding lights of the day, are thought to have superseded it. Rejection of tradition is taught in the schools, presumed in public discussions, expounded and praised by all reputable authorities; it is believed to combine idealism and realism to the highest degree. Opposition is thought irrational, and uniformly fails.

    We need tradition because we are social, and follow it out of loyalty, but for those very reasons find it difficult to live in a manner at odds with public consensus. If the settled social understanding is antitraditional, to what does a man appeal when he appeals to tradition? Tradition exists largely in the form of social understandings, and traditionalism has come to appear willful and self-contradictory. Nor is modern rejection of tradition merely a matter of sentiment. The organization of much of life today opposes tradition. Tradition is largely habitual and preconscious, and must be learned through example and contact. It becomes difficult to pass on in a world that tries to replace enduring personal loyalties with formal institutions, rational self-interest, and universal communications networks.

    Such changes in social organization have affected basic philosophical conceptions in ways that reduce talk about tradition, loyalty, integrity and the like to window-dressing. Traditional society is grounded on settled common understandings: what men and women are, what a friend is, what constitutes a Christmas dinner or a well-spent life. In a society based on contract and bureaucracy the function of such conceptions evaporates. Shifting human purposes and technical considerations become what count, and things come to depend on what men make of them at the moment rather than anything enduring.

    To put the matter in general terms, tradition is concerned with essential qualities, modernity with technical factors and temporary relationships. The change in outlook cripples not only traditionalism but any sort of opposition to the spirit of the times. If things are only what men make of them, any sort of independence -- economic, social, intellectual, or spiritual -- becomes all but impossible. A man who wants to take the lead from something other than fashion or government cannot do so today so in a way that seems publicly meaningful, because in the absence of a recognized objective moral order he can appeal to nothing but willfulness. To his fellows, he can only be a rebel without a cause.

    As an established public view, technocracy appears utterly triumphant. In spite of all appearances, however, its dominance is an illusion. It is an impossible attempt to replace the universal and transcendent order to which tradition points with one men have invented, convincing enough to deceive and destroy but not real enough to build on. Technocracy fails to provide a functioning pattern of human life, because it does not deal with the world realistically, as something we can neither dominate nor fully understand. It exists parasitically, with the aid of understandings alien to it that it denies and undermines. To deal with things as they are men must be spiritual, moral and rational as well as appetitive. Technocracy has no room for such qualities because they require men to have moral character as well as desire and technical skill. Its final victory would destroy the honesty and public spirit a tolerable society needs, putting an end even to the mutual trust required to maintain technology as a human institution.

    Antitraditional ideals do affect conduct. There are fewer marriages, fewer children, and more divorces today. Juvenile well-being has declined radically in the midst of vastly increased wealth and expenditures. Fraud is a growing problem in intellectual life. The armed forces are unable to retain members or take casualties. Nonetheless, it is not the ideals publicly declared that order and maintain society today. Now as always, loyalty, sacrifice and mutual love are what make social life possible; it would fall apart if the new order were as pervasive and well-established as it appears to be. While technocracy is accepted in all respectable public discourse, actual attitudes and conduct are at odds with it.

    Mutual dislike and suspicion between populace and ruling elites manifests a fundamental division between the principles publicly accepted and the actual life of the people. Elites consider the people ignorant and bigoted while the people think their rulers self-seeking and mendacious. Those judgments reflect actual human qualities less than social role; the elite stands for public principle, the populace for day-to-day life, and their opinions of each other display the relation between accepted theories and real-life morality. The latter remains what it was. Men and women continue to marry and have children, and to sacrifice themselves for their families, even though such conduct is thought sentimental at best and blameworthy at worst -- sexist, abject, codependent or whatever. Women still look after the babies and men bring home most of the bacon. Honesty and loyalty are admired, no-one knows why. There are still soldiers willing to risk their lives for their country, even though such conduct has become incomprehensible and even somewhat frightening. Recent war monuments tell the story: they have to do with suffering or presence at an event rather than a heroism that no longer makes public sense.

    Willingness to do what is very difficult for the sake of loyalty or principle is still necessary for social survival, as are other ordinary virtues, but such things can no longer be justified or explained and have almost become secret vices that men are ashamed to mention. They continue to exist through unacknowledged attachment to tradition and the transcendent. Men do not know how to talk about that attachment, and their practice of the virtues is less complete than it might be if public principles were different, but life cannot go on without it and so it remains.

    Liberal society has always been a combination of explicit secularism and an implicit transcendentalism that is now in hiding. In spite of the progress of the former the latter can still be seen, starved of intellectual content, in the nostalgia liberalism warns against, in ecological mysticism, in continued churchgoing, in the interest in spirituality, the occult, angels, flying saucers and so on, and in the inarticulate consciousness popular cynicism manifests that there is something seriously lacking in current ideals. The conflict between the two sides of liberal society has progressed to the point of threatening its long-term survival. It has made the old virtues into the new vices, and vice versa. The greatest virtue today is acceptance and approval of all ways of life consistent with the reign of money and bureaucracy, a habit of mind not far from what was once called simple immorality. In contrast, attachment to tradition and the transcendent is inseparable as a practical matter from the reverence for standards not based on desire, and the loyalty to one's people and their ways, that are now classified as bigotry. Political correctness, the insistence on the demonic evil of non-liberal ways and imposition of a comprehensive system of thought control and re-education to stamp them out, displays liberal consciousness of the power of the hidden implicit opposition to technocracy.

    The appearance of success has a variety of causes. Irreconcilable conflicts are depressing, and it is easier to pretend one side does not exist. Men see what they want to see, and the technocratic point of view flatters them. It makes them gods while transferring all responsibility to a system designed to accommodate their desires and eliminate the discipline to which they would otherwise have to submit. The conquest of nature has been spectacularly successful, and men expect methods that solve some problems so well to solve all. The prestige of modern natural science makes it difficult for discussions on any issue to take non-technocratic approaches seriously. Common sense must put on technocratic form to get a hearing; even traditionalists feel compelled to adopt the jargon of the age. Further, technocracy has the support of social technocrats, a powerful class called into being by modern communications and organizational technology, that includes media people, academics, politicians, civil servants and lawyers. Control of communications and public life generally by that class means that technocracy is treated publicly as the sole legitimate approach to social life. Finally, technocracy is by nature explicit, while the virtues inconsistent with it can act without show.

    The effect is that technocracy is presumed without question, facts and perspectives inconsistent with it denied, ignored or trivialized. Whatever happens is given a technocratic explanation. Traditional ways are presented as the simple negation of whatever the New Order thinks virtuous, exaggerated evils attributed to them and treated as characteristic. Destruction of gender and ethnicity as ordering principles are presented as supremely good and necessary goals, no matter what disorders result, obvious declines in civility, morality, family life, artistic achievement, and so on ignored or denied. Growing violence is said to be the fault of sex roles, theft of social injustice, suicide of stereotyping; the clear tie between such conduct and the disintegration of traditional standards is not discussible and is treated as nonexistent. Even the standards by which decline might be measured are driven out of public discourse as racist, sexist or whatever -- essentially, as leading to the wrong conclusions, and so inconsistent with the new order.

    So what is to be done? Basic matters like following traditional morality in daily life are clear enough. More and more the world enforces other demands as the price of integrity. The situation of traditionalists is becoming that of religious minorities in Europe before 19th century emancipation. Technocracy makes traditional beliefs on matters such as relations between the sexes and the place of the transcendent in social life hopelessly opposed to the understandings now demanded. Official insistence on commitment to antitraditional views has begun to make it difficult for a traditionalist to accept a responsible job in a mainstream institution, or permit his children to be educated by the public system. In the coming years such difficulties are likely to affect more and more of life.

    A radical traditionalist movement has thus become necessary. The immediate function of such a movement would be to make life as a traditionalist easier for those so inclined; the ultimate function to restore tradition to public life. The first goal can be pursued piecemeal and as occasion offers; the second is mostly a matter of maintaining principle. Pragmatic success on any large scale is likely to be slow, because the traditionalist outlook is so deeply at odds with modern public understandings. Nonetheless, the views of even a tiny minority can be influential, especially if they express durable aspects of human life that established views ignore, because they change the setting in which men act.

    That effect can be cumulative; if the public outlook has gone radically astray steady maintenance of an alternative can eventually transform what views seem plausible. The traditionalist outlook has great long-term advantages. To say values are human creations, as technocrats do, is to reduce morality to a statement of what others want and make it utterly ineffectual. Rational hedonism can motivate only what is self-serving, and formal liberal principles like utility or the categorical imperative are insufficient for the concrete demands of life. Effective common action requires faith in something that encompasses and transcends us, so lasting success goes to those who care about something more substantive than winning. Traditionalism connects morality to the nature and tendencies of things, and so grounds the trust in the world needed to motivate a comprehensive system of action.

    In any event, grand public success is ultimately not the point. Honesty and maintenance of principle is itself victory. Traditionalism means that politics depends on things more important than itself, that our purpose in life is not pragmatic success but living in accordance with spiritual and moral order. We must give our lives a footing in what is real; from that all else follows. At a time when good and evil are proclaimed the offspring of desire, and all the means of publicity and tricks of rhetoric are used to foreclose discussion, it requires thought, effort and independence of mind to do so.

    Independence does not mean denial of our surroundings and connections; the world would have ended long ago if good were not more pervasive and enduring than evil. The point of tradition is not to fabricate anything but to secure and foster the good everywhere implicit. The means are at hand, since we learn to live well in attempting to do so. Natural feelings lead us toward right patterns and understandings. Living memory and recent history tell us of a way of life, much of it still available to us, that is far more explicitly at odds with technocracy than the one that now prevails. Formal study also helps: the history of modernism shows how we got where we are, and the classics put us in touch with what preceded. Discussions with others, those sympathetic and those opposed, help clarify and broaden our thoughts and provoke thought in others.

    The current situation demands something different from each of us. The traditionalist movement is an alliance of traditions, each with its own doctrines and authorities, working together against a pervasive common enemy that would destroy humanity as such. Such a movement has its strains and paradoxes, since traditions oppose each other, but its necessity is clear. As it evolves it will come to have its own standards, although each tradition will see what is needed somewhat differently.

    On some points unified action is called for. We are social beings, and as such must confront the new order together and publicly. Its nature tells us what weapons to use against it. The power of technocracy comes from an unquestioned acceptance that is not well-founded and in some ways is difficult to maintain. Nonetheless, the language and habitual assumptions of public discussion make it hard for those sympathetic to traditionalism even to articulate a position different from the one dominant. Objections stutter and fall silent before the confidence and seeming coherence of the technocrats.

    The political battle today is therefore in men's minds rather than the legislative chamber, the polls, or the streets. Men naturally revert to tradition unless it is continually disrupted and suppressed. What is necessary is less to enforce particular traditions than to weaken antitraditionalism. Those who are not against us are for us; our job is not to overcome our fellow citizens but to bring them to realize where their fundamental sympathies lie.

    The overwhelming public success of the technocratic outlook makes it an easy target. The ability to break its spell by forceful and repeated questioning and by providing an articulate alternative is an enormous power, one possessed by traditionalists right now if they would only use it. In spite of New Class dominance, Western polities allow anyone to participate in public discussion. There are ways of suppressing discussion , but also a thousand forums -- dinner table conversations, local meetings, letters to editors and public officials, Internet discussions, little magazines, campaigns of minor political parties -- that permit any of us to present almost any view he thinks right. A few intelligent and forthright voices in each forum arguing against the new order and for traditional ways would have a powerful effect on the balance of intellectual forces and eventually the social order itself.

    The language of public discussion must therefore be contested. Technocratic rhetoric must be deflated, modernism deprived of the appearance of moderation and its brutal implications displayed. The possibility of social technology must be disputed, the failures of the new order driven home, and traditional understandings justified. Man must be shown to be a creature that lives by blood loyalties and transcendent goods, human life a compound not only of impulse and appetite but of essences -- man and woman, Confucian and Christian, Turk and Jew.

    Confronting technocracy, of course, is only preparatory. As men our main goal must be to put our own lives in order, and for that something more definite is necessary than clearing obstacles and indicating general directions. Truth exists for us in concrete forms, one of which each of us must accept as authoritative. To establish a life better than the one offered by individualistic liberal choice -- in practice, by experts, advertisers and popular entertainers -- it is necessary to accept and submit to a specific community and its traditions. That is not easy when social practice is too diffuse to make the authority of any tradition a given, but in times of dissolution each of us has no choice but to find his way to something to which he can give himself wholly.

    At bottom, the answer to today's confusions lies in faith, the realization that we do not make the world, that we recognize rather than create the Good, Beautiful, and True, and that to do so adequately we must draw on a wisdom greater than our own. Our acts can be fruitful only as part of an order for good founded in the nature of things. In spite of its apparent strength technocracy is based on fear of anything greater than ourselves and refusal to face obvious human limitations. It must fail because it has no way to deal with realities. Success is far more likely than appears. The world is ours: we need only throw off the chains of illusion.

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    Post The Global Rise of Ethnic Nationalism

    http://www.dixienet.org/spatriot/vol2no2/member4.html

    The Global Rise of Ethnic Nationalism
    contributed by Franklin Sanders
    Eads, Tennessee



    No modern nation so perfectly embodies homogenized modernist culture than Japan. But is the monolith cracking? In an October 1994 interview, Nobel Laureate Kenzaburo Oe, one of Japan's leading writers, painted an astonishingly different picture. "The Japanese, from the prime minister on down, claim that being a single race and culture strengthens the nation. That is not at all my feeling. There are various cultures in different regions, and each region has its own culture."

    Toting up secessionist movements today, you quickly lose count: Basques, Bretons, Scots, Quebecois, Welshmen all clamor for independence or home rule. Even Schwabs and Bayers aren't too enthusiastic about Greater Germany. Ethnic realities have already dismembered World War I gerrymanders like Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, and the Great Eater of Nationalities, the USSR, has vomited up its captive nations. Northern Californians suspect they'd be better off rid of Los Angeles, while Idaho and Montana know they'd rather be free.

    We are witnessing a historic change of secular trend from centralization to decentralization, from "inclusion" to "exclusion." For two centuries and more the trend of social events has been concentrating power, but now that trend is reversing. Power is flowing away from centers (such as federal states) to regions and localities, from governments to individuals. While inclusionist events like NAFTA steal headlines, they are only paroxysms of the dying trend which point to the cycle's top, not its continuation.

    Who has noticed the trend change? Analysts from all disciplines. Social observers and market technicians Robert Prechter and Dave Allman of Elliott Wave International, for example. Military strategist Martin van Creveld in his Transformation of War (New York: The Free Press, 1991). Journalist Robert D. Kaplan in "The Coming Anarchy" (Atlantic Monthly, 2/94). Philosopher and social critic Ed Veith in Postmodern Times (Wheaton, Illinois: Crossway Books, 1994). And of course, the American Establishment whose seat of power has already been rattled by the changing trend.

    For Southern patriots, the outlook couldn't offer more hope.

    In Postmodern Times Dr. Veith sets the backdrop for these changes:

    In nearly every sphere, from academic fields to new social phenomena, the assumptions that shaped 20th century thought and culture are being exploded. As we enter the 21st century, it seems clear the Western culture is entering a new phase, which scholars are calling "postmodern."

    Postmodernism both levels and exaggerates the differences between them. Postmodernism fragments society into contending and mutually unintelligible cultures and subcultures. Even within a single society, people are segmenting into self-contained communities and contending interest groups. Christianity itself is ghettoized. From Bosnia to American universities, we see the emergence of a new tribalism.

    What is producing this fragmentation? In part centralization's excess of success, in part technology, and in part the failure of old ideologies. IBM became just too big to manage, like the U.S. government. The computer revolution has decentralized decision making and work stations and exploded data access.

    The demise of communism has robbed its artificial dialectical opponent, the anti-Communist West (a.k.a. "capitalism" or "democracy"), of all reason to live. For over 40 years the old formula of "closing the ranks before the Red threat" silenced the voices of diversity and dissent, but no longer.

    Today ideological identity has wilted while ethnic identity (always as deeply rooted as life itself) has blossomed. In a world where all the religion-substitutes (from "anti-communism" to Shirley MacLaine-ism) have demonstrated irredeemable failure, ethnic identities return to religion to draw their strength.

    Robert D. Kaplan took a trip to West Africa to watch fragmentation in action. The picture he paints in the 2/94 Atlantic Monthly isn't rosy.

    West Africa is becoming the symbol of worldwide demographic, environmental, and societal stress, in which criminal anarchy emerges as the real "strategic" danger. Disease, overpopulation, unprovoked crime, scarcity of resources, refugee migrations, the increasing erosion of nation-states and international borders, and the empowerment of private armies, security firms, and international drug cartels are now most tellingly demonstrated through a West African prism. A pre-modern formlessness governs the battlefield, evoking the wars in medieval Europe prior to the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, which ushered in the era of organized nation states.

    Kaplan foresees that refugees and peasants crowding into cities will rob national borders of their meaning and shift power into "less educated, less sophisticated groups" who know only one border: "culture and tribe." Refugees will bring cultural disputes to weaken the U.S. and Europe. Altogether disregarding present national borders, these population shifts will remake the identities of civilizations after the image of religion and ethnicity. Bristling with gloomy adjectives, Kaplan denounces the future:

    The political and cartographic implications of postmodernism will be an epoch of themeless juxtapositions in which the classificatory grid of nation-states is going to be replaced by a jagged-glass pattern of city-states, shanty-states, nebulous and anarchic regionalisms.

    Ethnic identification, Kaplan predicts, will form the most cohesive social force in the immediate future. How will these trends affect the U.S.?

    Many factors will make the U.S. less of a nation than it is today, even as its gains territory following the peaceful dissolution of Canada. Quebec, based on the bedrock of Roman Catholicism and Francophone ethnicity, could yet turn out to be North America's most cohesive and crime-free nation-state. (It may be a smaller Quebec, though, since aboriginal peoples may lop off northern parts of the province.) "Patriotism" will become increasingly regional as people in Alberta and Montana discover that they have far more in common with each other than they do with Ottawa or Washington, and Spanish-speakers in the Southwest discover a greater commonality with Mexico City. As Washington's influence wanes, and with it the traditional symbols of American patriotism, North Americans will take psychological refuge in their insulated communities and cultures (emphasis added).

    Military historian Martin van Creveld teaches history at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. In The Transformation of War he predicts the end of war as we have known it. His thesis is simple. Technology has made war waged by nation states so costly that conventional warfare is now obsolete. The massive technospasm that pulverized Iraq may be the dinosaur's last lunge. Conventional military organization offers no protection against the terrorist army that strikes and then melts into the populace, leaving no target for technology. The U.S. looked great in Kuwait, but a bit ragged in Mogadishu. The same military machine that incinerated Iraqis by the thousands lurched helplessly from side to side when facing hit-and-run Somalis in "technicals," pick-up trucks with machine guns welded to their beds.

    The wars of the future will be "low-intensity conflicts" (LICs). In developed countries LICs may be called "terrorism" or "police work." They rarely involve regular armies on both sides, but usually regulars on one side and guerrillas--including civilians, women, & children--on the other. Most of all, LICs do not rely on high-technology collective weaponry, "the pride and joy of any modern armed force."

    The trend toward decentralization has not escaped notice of the American Establishment. In the Council on Foreign Relations' influential policy journal, Foreign Affairs, various articles in recent years have addressed international fragmentation. As the old ideologies crumble, ethnicity and irredentism threaten Establishment control. Meanwhile the Insiders have been considering the best ways to hijack the trend and preserve their power.

    "The Clash of Civilizations?" (Summer '93 Foreign Affairs) claims, "The clash of civilizations (i.e. culture) will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future." The author of this piece, Samuel P. Huntington, is Eaton Professor of the Science of Government and Director of the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard. Huntington writes,

    World politics is entering a new phase, and intellectuals have not hesitated to proliferate visions of what it will be--the end of history, the return of traditional rivalries between nation states, and the decline of the nation state from the conflicting pulls of tribalism and globalism, among others. Each of these visions catches aspects of the emerging reality. Yet they all miss a crucial, indeed a central, aspect of what global politics is likely to be in the coming years.

    The fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural (emphasis added).

    According to Huntington the clash of civilizations is the latest phase in conflict's evolution. From the Peace of Westphalia until the French Revolution, Western conflicts arose largely among princes trying to expand power and territory. From the French Revolution until the end of World War I, nations fought rather than princes. From World War I until the Cold War's end came the wars of ideology with their transnational superpowers. As international conflict moves out of its Western phase, civilizations will face off, the West against the non-West and non-Western civilizations against each other.

    What interests us here is not Huntington's shifting the focus from West to non-West, but from ideological and political goals to cultural clashes. He defines a civilization as "the highest cultural grouping of people and [their] broadest level of cultural identity. . .short of that which distinguishes humans from other species." Both objective elements (language, history, religion, customs) and the people's subjective self-identification define civilizations.

    These differences [among civilizations] are the product of centuries. They will not soon disappear. They are far more fundamental than differences among political ideologies and political regimes. Religion reinforces the revival of ethnic identities.

    What will this mean for multicultural empires?

    In the future, as people differentiate themselves by civilization, countries with large numbers of peoples of different civilizations, such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, are candidates for dismemberment. Some other countries have a fair degree of cultural homogeneity but are divided over whether their society belongs to one civilization or another.

    While admittedly Huntington focuses his eyes on non-Western countries, he misses what's right under his nose in the West. The same centrifugal cultural forces that drive Kenzaburo Oe away from Tokyo and Armenians away from Moscow drive Southerners away from New York, Washington, and Hollywood. As the U.S. government and Yankee culture has become more and more self-consciously pagan, their assault on the South's Christianity and identity has sharpened. This only reinforces our other cultural differences: "history, language, culture, tradition, different views on the relations between God and man, the individual and the group, the citizen and the state, parents and children, husband and wife, as well as differing views of the relative importance of rights and responsibilities, liberty and authority, equality and hierarchy . . . the product of centuries" in Huntington's words.

    Over 125 years of Reconstruction has failed to erase Southern identity. Day by day kindred national feelings grow around the globe, reflecting a secular trend to decentralization and fragmentation that will continue for centuries. Whether this will enable the South to make a better bargain for autonomy within a U.S. framework, or enable us to form our own nation, is a tactical question yet to be answered. What is clear, however, is that this time, the trend is our friend.

    Franklin Sanders is a noted scholar, author of several books, publisher of the "Moneychanger" newspaper, and a well-known conference speaker.

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    On James Kalb's 'Radical Traditionalism and the New World Order'.

    1
    Kalb is right to point to the loss of political faith, the rise in hedonism, rationalism and the rest.

    However, is it correct to say that morality "vanishes" with the decline in religious faith?
    Are religion and morality the same? - I think not.

    Even here in north-west Europe, where active and organised religious observance amongst Europeans is dwindling, the moral assumptions of Christianity remain.

    2
    Kalb is essentially attacking all forms of humanism, and regards racialism as illegitimate because it is "arbitrary" in giving its prime value to Race.
    To Kalb, it is necessary always to have a transcendent value [i.e., God, or the Platonic 'Good'] that is above the physical, the biological.
    Indeed, to religionists of Kalb's type, Racialism is pagan and wicked.

    3
    While he is right to point to the domination of Capitalism, and Technocracy, he falls into the trap of defining 1989 [the beginning of the end for Soviet Communism] as 'the end of history'.
    This was said by those who were unable to forsee the fall of the Soviets prior to 1989. They are doubly embarrassed in also not forseeing the acts of Sept 11th before 2001!

    The anti-Modernist opposition of Islamism is that very Traditionalism for which Kalb yearns.

    Of course, this Islamism is a non-Western Traditionalism.

    4
    But what of Western Traditionalism itself?
    Does it not contain within itself the seeds of Humanism?
    If one could return to those ancient ways, how would we prevent that self-same evolution that led to the Renaissance and therefore to Humanism?

    Can we make Tradition ... static?

    Again, look to Islamism for answers to this.

    5
    Also, there seems to be basic flaw in Kalb's out-look; his tendency to posit human nature as a 'good' in itself. As if by sweeping away the Modern world, mankind would return to its supposedly natural 'goodness'.

    6
    When he talks of "a radical traditionalist movement", how 'radical' is 'radical'?

    Does he want to return to the Absolutist Monarchies?
    Or to Universal [pre-Protestant] Christendom?
    Or to the slave-owning days of the Roman Empire?
    Where are the concrete proposals of what a Radical Traditionalist Order would look like?
    Or are abstractions like 'Faith', and 'The Good', all he can offer?
    Why are there beings at all, & why not rather nothing?
    [Leibniz/Heidegger]

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    Post T.Sunic;The Global Village/ N.Lowell;The Threat Of Globalization

    http://www.euroknowledge.net/article...Tomislav+Sunic

    A Global Village and the Rights of the Peoples?
    by Tomislav Sunic


    The great conflicts of the future will no longer pit left against right, or East against West, but the forces of nationalism and regionalism against the credo of universal democracy. The lofty ideal of the global village seems to be stumbling over the renewed rise of East European separa*tism, whose aftershocks may soon spill over into the Western hemisphere. Already the dogma of human rights is coming under fire by the proponents of peoples' rights, and the yearning for historical community is making headway into atomized societies deserted by ideologies.

    With the collapse of communist internationalism the clock of history has been turned back, and inevitably the words of the 19th-century conservative Joseph de Maistre come to mind: "I have seen Poles, Russians, Italians, but as to man, I declare never to have seen him." Indeed, this paradigmatic universal man, relieved from economic plight and from the burden of history, this man on whom we pattern the ideology of human rights, is nowhere to be seen. He appears all the more nebulous as in day-to-day life we encounter real peoples with specific cultures. If he resides in Brooklyn, his idea of human rights is likely to be different from somebody who lives in the Balkans; if he is a fundamentalist Moslem his sense of civic duty will be different from somebody who is a Catholic. The rise in nationalist sentiments in Eastern Europe should not be seen as only a backlash against communist economic chaos; rather, it is the will of different peoples to retrieve their national memories long suppressed by communism's shal*low universalism.

    All of Europe seems to be undergoing a paradoxical and almost ludicrous twist of history. On the one hand Western Europe is becoming more and more an "americano-centric" anational meta-society, while post-communist Eastern Europe threatens to explode into a myriad of mini-states. Conversely, whereas Western Europe is experi*encing an unparalleled wave of foreign immigration and the inevitable surge of racism that must follow, the racial homogeneity of East Europeans has made them today more "European" than West Europeans-the East's own multi*ethnic turmoil notwithstanding.

    In view of the disintegrating state system in Eastern Europe, Woodrow Wilson's crusades for the right of national self-determination and global democracy must seem contradictory. Home rule as envisioned by the archi*tects of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 may have suited the demands of Poles, Czechs, and those European peoples who benefited from the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, but it had little appeal for those who were forced to exchange one foreign ruler for another. For the Germans stranded in, a newly emerged and bloated Poland or Romania in 1919, or for the Slovaks in a hybrid Czechoslo*vak state, the right to home rule meant nothing less than the creation of their own separate nation-states.

    Yugoslavia, too, has owed its relative longevity more to Western liberal well-wishers that to the true consensus of its disparate peoples. For the last seventy years the Yugoslav experience has been an exercise in civil wars and constant ethnic strife among four of its major ethnic groups. Natural*ly, in light of the present salvos being exchanged between the Croats and the Serbs, the question that comes to mind is why does the artificial blending of different peoples always lead to instability and ethnic chaos? The answer seems to be rather obvious: that the rights of peoples are incompatible with universalism. Ethnic particularities cannot coexist in a state that places abstract principles of human rights over the real principles of peoples' rights.

    It would be impossible to chronicle with precision who is right or wrong in the present ethnic turmoil that besets Yugoslavia. A litany of grievances can be heard today among Croats, Serbs, Slovenes, and ethnic Albanians, of which each group is tirelessly trying to outdo the others with its own impressive victimology. As Yugoslavia demonstrates, in multiethnic countries the notion of justice depends solely on the constantly shifting inter-ethnic balance of power, as well as the perception that each ethnic group may have of its neighbor. Both Serbs and Croats, the two largest ethnic groups in Yugoslavia, are today utterly disappointed with their country; the former, on the grounds that Yugoslavia is not centralized enough to allow the consolidation of the Yugoslav state; the latter, on the grounds that Yugoslavia is already too centralized. The lesson to draw today from the Yugoslav experience is that in multiethnic states democracy can only function when the national question has been resolved.

    Moreover, democracy can take root only within the ethnographic frontiers of various peoples, who will define that word in accordance with their genius loci and their own history. Just as it was foolish some time ago to talk about Yugoslav anticommunist dissidence, so it is foolish now to anticipate the emergence of the all-out "Yugoslav" democ*racy. What seems good for a Croatian democrat today may be seen as a direct threat by somebody who styles himself a Serbian democrat tomorrow. Even America, because of its erratic immigration policy and the declining birthrate among whites, may soon find itself in a similar situation of having to redefine the concept of democracy. The legacy of the Founding Fathers, in the years to come, may be interpreted differently given the changing racial fabric of America. Voting preferences are likely to hinge on skin color, which could lead to a Balkanization worse than the one presently threatening Yugoslavia.

    Democracy in any multiethnic state, at least as the global democrats would like to see it, is semantic nonsense; the liberal principle of "one man, one vote" is inapplicable in a country of diverse ethnic groups. Consequently, the genu*ine democratization of Yugoslavia, or for that matter the multiethnic Soviet Union, would require the disintegration of the country and the establishment of new nation-states. The German Holy Empire was an example of a rather stable confederal system that lasted for almost one thousand years, although at one point it was divided into three hundred sovereign principalities.

    Paradoxical as it may seem, the ideology of global democracy seems to parallel closely the failed communist Utopia, with one exception: it is presently more successful in the pursuit of its goals. What we are witnessing in the West is a liberal transposition of the Christian ideal of one world into a post-industrial society-a civitas dei in an age of cable TV and Michael Jackson. Everything presages, how*ever, that this brand of universalism can be as dangerous for the peoples of Eastern Europe as the now moribund communism. From the point of view of a globe-trotting merchant a centralized and unified Yugoslavia, or Soviet Union, organized into giant free markets, would be the best solution insofar as that would facilitate the free movement of capital, and thus better ease the strain of ethnic animosity. Indeed, the prospects of having to deal with an additional twenty states on the Euro-Asian continent is a nightmare to a businessman more interested in the free flow of capital than in the self-determination of ethnic groups. The political liberal will surely endorse a global village that includes different ethnic parades-so long as they do not turn into military marches. Such a line of thinking, that "economics determines politics," clearly points to the Marxian morphology inherent in liberalism, confirming, once again, that communism is nothing else but its pesky brainchild.

    But will the free bazaar in the global village dissolve ethnic passions? Although the masses in franchised Eastern Europe are today mimicking every move of the West, nothing indicates that their honeymoon with the global village will last long. Ethnic intolerance will only worsen once the peoples of Eastern Europe realize that the global village promises a lot but delivers little.

    What makes a people? A people has a common heritage and a will to a common destiny. A people exists despite superficial cleavages such as parties, interest groups, and passing trends in ideologies. As Georges Dumézil, Mircea Eliade, and Carl G. Jung have demon*strated, a people shares a "mythe fondateur"-a communal myth that gives birth to original cultural endeavors. The culture of a people, recalls Alain de Benoist, is its identity card and its mental respiration, and "it is the passport for a future that takes the shape of destiny."

    When a people becomes oblivious of its founding myth it is doomed to perish. Worse, it may turn into an aggregate of happy robots whose new dictum of universal human rights could be just another cloak for mindless hedonism. Western Europe is already experiencing this kind of ethnic and cultural oblivion. Paris in August resembles Oran or Marrakesh, and wide stretches of Berlin, at noon, have the distinct flavor of Anatolia. To many foreigners France is becoming more a synonym for its famous goat cheese and less a symbol of Corneillian heroism, and if one decides to go to Florence it is for a good bottle of Chianti rather than the mystic transcendence experienced through Botticelli's paintings. Yugoslavia, founded on similar principles of multiculturalism, is a product of the Russian 19th-century pan-Slavism combined with the Wilsonian dream. This experiment has not resulted in perpetual peace. In times of great crises host nations no longer look at aliens as purveyors of exotic folklore, but rather as predators snatching bread from their host's mouth. Peoples are not the same; they never have been and never will be. Ethnic groups can be compared to the inmates of large American prisons, who usually begin to respect each only when their turf is staked out and when their cells are separated by massive stone walls. Thrown into one cell they are likely to devour each other in a perpetual conflict over "territorial imperative."

    The best way, therefore, to resolve the Yugoslavian multiethnic crisis is not by appealing to the spirit of "brotherhood and unity" but rather by dismantling the country into a loose confederal state. Blood and soil will forever determine the life of nations. "Scratch the skin of any globalist, goes the proverb in Croatia, and you will find beneath a passionate Croat, Serb, German, or Jew."

    With the end of communism, the end of history will not follow, as some would wish us to believe. Had the Euro*peans in the 13th century conjured up the "end of history," the Mongol khananat would have been transferred to the Iberian peninsula. Had the Germans and the Poles preached the liturgy of affirmative action in 1683, Vienna would shine today as the capital of the Turkish sultans. The endless power game among nations and ethnic groups, the constant shifts in demographic trends, teach us that life goes on in all its "creative" hatred-Hitler, Stalin, or Saddam not with*standing.

    Today, more than ever before in the history of mankind, it is the specificity of peoples that is threatened by the universalist credo. Whether one travels to Warsaw or Sarajevo, or lands in Bucharest or Berlin, the blaring of rock music and the iconography of junk culture have become the new lingua franca, of the global village. One could spend days in the Budapest Hilton without ever knowing one had left the suspended bridges of the hotel complex of down*town Atlanta. The new universalism, in order to enforce its creed, no longer needs to resort to genocide and depopula*tions, to the frigid climate of Kolyma or Katyn, to which Stalin, in the name of a paradigmatic global proletarian, carted off Volga Germans, Kalmuks, and Chechens. The new universalism need only turn to a tepid universe of Kentucky Fried Chicken, a society in which everybody equals everybody, and where ethnic identities, therefore, mean nothing.

    This "cool Stalinism" strips peoples of their souls by creating a Homo economicus-dollaricus. The end results of both brands of universalism are pretty much the same, except that the veiled violence of liberal universalism can now be more dangerous than the blunt violence of communism. It is an irony of history that naked violence often preserves regionalism and ethnic roots; each persecution has its cathartic virtue, and each sacrifice invariably strengthens a peoples' historical memory. Communist violence has triggered a hitherto unseen ethnic pride from the Balkans to the Baltic lands. In an air-conditioned hell of cool universal*ism, by contrast, regionalism and the love of one's country do not need to be openly crushed; instead, they can be turned into a commodity, and thereby rendered superflu*ous, if not outright funny. If ever the ethnic pride disappears from Eastern Europe it will not be as a result of communist repression, but rather as the outcome of a new infatuation with capitalist gadgetry. The global village knows how to enslave Ulysses' lotus eaters without even making them realize the peril that they face.

    In a system in which everything has become a commodity, ethnic identity is viewed as an expendable triviality too-a triviality that may at best arouse some culinary interest or a tourist's curiosity. If necessary, universalism will even do good business from the hammer, sickle, and swastika-as long as they sell well. For a globe-trotting merchant, home is where he hangs his hat, and where he makes a big buck. Montesquieu was, after all, not wrong when he wrote that commerce is the vocation of equal people.

    Until recently, the concepts of egalitarianism and global democracy were strictly limited to Western peoples. Today, in a spasm of masochism, and because of the so-called "white guilt," the West has extended these princi*ples to the antipodes of Earth. The bon sauvage has been transformed in our postmodern age into the therapeutic role of white man's superego. Not long ago it was the white man who had to teach the nonwhites the manners of the West. Today the roles are reversed; now it is the non-European, with his pristine innocence, who grafts himself onto the ailing consciousness of the Westerner, pointing out to him the right path to the radiant future.

    The very concept of "the West" has been stripped of its original geopolitical and geographical significance, becom*ing instead a metaphor for a meta-system that encompasses Alaska, the Philippines, South Korea, and any nook or cranny where the idea of the mercantile global village thrives.

    With the end of its competing ideology the philosophy of the global village has taken hold in many countries, eulogiz*ing those who support it, vilifying those who don't. What the future holds is not difficult to guess. It may well happen that inter-ethnic troubles will eventually subside in Eastern Europe, but this is not likely to happen in the West, where racial turmoil looms large. We may soon see replicas of the Berlin Wall erected in New York and Philadelphia in order to contain the multiethnic violence of the global village. The lesson of artificial Yugoslavia should not be forgotten. Our "promiscuous altruism," as Garrett Hardin writes, may lead us against our will into a war of all against all.

    The cult of the global village appears today as a political response to theological and ideological battles that have rocked the West for more than a century. But it remains to be seen how the singular principle of human rights can be implanted in a world that remains eminently plural. "We invoke human rights," continues Hardin, "to justify interfering in another nation's internal affairs. Thereby we risk making enemies of that nation . . . The intentions behind the fiction of "human rights' may be noble, but insisting on such rights poses grave dangers." Global democracy is the last twilight dream of those who are spiritually homeless and physically uprooted. It is a doctrine that eloquently masks the ethnic and racial reality behind the theology of universalism.

    Tomislav Sunic is a former professor of European politics at Juniata College in Pennsylvania.

    He is the author of Against Democracy and Equality: The European New Right (Peter Lang Publishing, Inc. 1990).

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    Post Re: A Global Village and the Rights of the Peoples?

    Interesting article. I wonder how long before they find some kind of pre-text and a complaint leadership to attempt flooding Eastern Europe with immigrants. They could even now attempt the guilt trip BS saying well, Poles have ten times more than Bangladeshis (of course, ten times almost nothing still is not much) and use that as a wedge to get them in the door. Hope it never happens and the East learns from the follies of the West.
    Turman found a copy of The Graduate, and thought highly enough of the story that he made a movie he considered to be 90-percent faithful to the book.

    But Turman and director Mike Nichols made one key adaptation, changing the Braddocks from WASP-y blonde characters into a dark-haired, more ethnic-looking family.

    From NPR's Present at the Creation

    http://www.npr.org/programs/morning/features/patc/graduate/

    http://www.norcalmovies.com/TheGraduate/tg11.jpg

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    Post Re: Radical Traditionalism and the New World Order

    Just as a brief note more on Traditionalism can be found on these sites:

    http://www.geocities.com/integral_tradition

    http://www.rosenoire.org

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