I was thinking about The Nine Noble Virtues and their relation to Orlog and Wyrd from a Nietzschien perspective where virtues could be considered as Wyrd kept by Orlog, when I stumbled upon this. I found it interesting..

I looked up the author and it seems he is some kind of teacher at a Catholic school of some sorts, nevertheless..

Here is some of it...

Nietzsche, Nihilism, and the Virtue of Nature

To impose upon becoming the character of being
—that is the supreme will to power. (WP 567)[1]

Nietzsche’s view of nature and his attack on the platonic tradition has given him a reputation as a nihilist, a label he himself acknowledged. Yet what does Nietzsche mean by nihilism? and to what extent is he a nihilist? This article explores Nietzsche’s use of the term as it relates to modernity, his own postmodern project, and how it is connected with what Nietzsche calls “virtue.”

Nietzsche’s virtues

Nietzsche’s break with modern morality and modern standards for philosophy means that we must look elsewhere to determine how he should be evaluated. We need not look far for such a standard, for Nietzsche himself presents one: Nietzsche too has his virtues. Of course Nietzsche’s virtues are neither Christian nor Aristotelian; Nietzsche’s virtues are those of a philosopher, a philosopher of the future.
Nietzsche lists four key virtues of a new philosopher: solitude, insight, courage, and sympathy.[54] The first, solitude, is the most explicit in Nietzsche. Solitude is a virtue because it is the means by which camel spirits, those individuals most burdened by the decadence of modern society, can save themselves. It is in solitude where camel spirits become lion spirits, destroyers of values. And it is through this metamorphosis that the natural creative impulses are revealed. Solitude is contrasted with society, the mass who value what is low in man, those who have no ambition, no goal, and indeed no god, whether they know it or not. Solitude is a virtue because it saves man from great vice. It is an opportunity for man to know nature, to know himself, and to allow himself to become an agent of nature. In solitude the will dialogues with nature.
The second virtue, insight, accords with the next step in fashioning a philosophy of the future. The destruction made possible by solitude results from appreciating perspective through experience and a newfound sense of will. Christianity and democracy are vices insofar as they hinder the ability to know nature and man’s true self. As a virtue, insight replaces the rigid dogmatism of science and moral philosophy. Insight is a product of experience and an appreciation of perspective.
Perhaps the most important virtue for Nietzsche is the one most lacking in modern society: courage (D 551). Courage is most simply understood as strength. As Nietzsche writes, “the first thing a philosopher needs: inflexible and rugged manliness” (SE 7). Courage is the mark of a strong will, one willing to risk oneself (EH Pr. 3, Wise 5, ‘Wagner’ 4), often to the point of compromising one’s own happiness (SE 4, TI Pr.). Courage, the virtue most similar to the will itself, is present at all three metamorphoses detailed by Zarathustra, and it is required by each. In this sense, without courage, philosophy is not possible. “Even the most courageous among us rarely has the courage for that which he really knows,” Nietzsche claims (TI Maxims and Arrows 2). Nor does philosophic courage simply mean courage on the page (WP 841). Insight, and with it action, both require courage.
The final virtue, sympathy, is the one least likely to be associated with Nietzsche. Of his virtues, it certainly appears the least often. This is the consequence, it would seem, of sympathy already being the most common virtue in modern society. Modern morality is nothing if not an exercise in sympathy. Nietzsche’s sympathy is not altruism or simply being a good neighbor; it is something far more substantial. The eternal return is an act of sympathy in that it demands that we will the past, present, and future in their entirety, warts and all. The eternal return is not possible under conditions of pity, ressentiment, or pessimism, for these are the symptoms of the weak and the world-weary.
For all of Nietzsche’s talk of responsibility, however, it is not right to say that the philosophers of the future will be duty-bound to “ordinary human beings”; rather, “one has duties only to one’s peers” (BGE 260). Nietzsche’s philosophers serve their equals, those of rank who understand the conditions necessary for the spiritual advance of a people.[55] For Nietzsche’s new philosophers, duty is the culmination of a philosopher’s virtue and the greatest source of joy (D 339, SE 5). Sympathy is the highest of Nietzsche’s virtues in that it incorporates the others. Nietzsche’s sympathy is a profound achievement, where the will to power meets a genuine love of humanity. It is an act of “Roman Caesar with Christ’s soul.”
Nietzsche’s virtues are not his own; they are by no means self-serving. He determined them based on what was most needed for modern society, what could save and restore a corrupted society. He writes: “A man’s virtues are called good depending on their probable consequences not for him but for us and society: the praise of virtues has always been far from ‘selfless,’ far from ‘unegoistic’....When you have a virtue, a real, whole virtue...you are its victim” (GS 21). Christianity and modern morality erred in thinking that virtue had anything to do with characteristics other than strength and the qualities needed to found and support a healthy culture (TI Skirmishes 37, WP 255). Nietzsche’s virtues, those of a self-proclaimed immoralist, are those of a philosopher concerned with the future of man. It is these virtues that he exhibits in his books and fosters in his readers.

Conclusion

Will to power is the “essence” of life because it is “the fundamental instinct” of nature. In this sense, it can neither be free nor unfree. The choice available to man is not whether to will, but what to will. Nietzsche’s depiction of solitude makes clear, however, that value-creation is not a wholly internal or arbitrary process, and Nietzsche’s philosophers are compelled to justify their beliefs according to what they advance in man. The will to power may be the heart of Nietzsche’s philosophy, but it is not the whole of it. Nietzsche’s new philosophy is that perspective best able to use the natural order of rank to guide art, science, religion, and politics for the sake of man and culture.
Although Nietzsche views the eternal return as the highest that is attainable, it also reveals the moral and intellectual limits of man. Just as he resists universal morality, Nietzsche presents a philosophic imperative to resist universal truth.[56] Recognizing the limits of the will and of what we can know is the only means of appreciating the new philosophy and founding a healthy politics. The eternal return is an acceptance of man’s limitations: it is the highest expression of man’s will consistent with nature and the order of rank. Nietzsche transcends the nihilism of modernity and deploys the eternal return to bring a modicum of morality and order into what he views as an otherwise chaotic world. Nietzsche diminishes what man cannot know in favor of what man can become. The eternal return was Nietzsche’s definitive statement on the value of life: he loved life more than anything else, and above all else, more than its meaning.[57] We may well expect that Nietzsche’s last thoughts were: “Thus I willed it,” or “Once more..!” Like his Zarathustra, Nietzsche danced with Eternity.
Nietzsche is the first postmodern in that he was the first to comprehend the consequences of modernity, what he called Plato’s “higher swindle” (TI Ancients 2). Insofar as his successors have failed to grasp his message, Nietzsche may be the only postmodern. His meditations may still be “untimely.” What has come to be known as postmodernism, Nietzsche would contend, is merely the fulfillment of the modern project—another straw on the camel’s back. Heidegger and Rorty do not follow Nietzsche’s break, but continue modernity in spite of him. Rorty’s decadence, Nietzsche would argue, is evident in his preference for the rule of diversity and opinion over a respect for nature and the order of rank. Heidegger’s ignorance stems from his inability to think through the consequences of his philosophy, and more specifically, an inability to differentiate between freedom and fascism. For Heidegger, Nazism was just another politics. Nietzsche points away from these men. Nietzsche’s works are an attempt to inspire greatness, redirect philosophy, and revitalize Western culture.
Unlike most of his successors, Nietzsche did not destroy the possibility of philosophy; rather, he sought to reinvigorate it in what he considered to be a superior form. Nietzsche changed both the aims and limits of philosophy, making it less concerned with the love of truth and more concerned with a love of mankind. A Nietzschean philosopher must not mistake wisdom for life or choose a dance with the former over an eternity with the latter. A Nietzschean philosopher loves truth, but it is a truth that is life-preserving and, ultimately, life-affirming. At once Nietzsche makes philosophy dangerous to and responsible for the political. In sum, Nietzsche takes philosophy seriously.
Nietzsche claims that the modern project erred insofar as it sought to overcome the problem of nature. What is now called postmodernity has erred insofar as it has ignored altogether the problem of nature. Nietzsche argues it was appreciating nature as something noble yet unsolvable that drove Greek culture to its heights, and makes the Greeks so worthy of imitation. For Nietzsche, the distance between physis and nous is to be bridged by what he calls philosophy. If nature is the problem for man, then a philosophy in the service of life is the best possible answer and the only likely solution.
Later,
-Lyfing