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Julius
Wednesday, February 4th, 2004, 12:03 PM
Conservative Revolution in Sweden

Nikolai von Kreitor


The Swedish magazine Res Publica, published by Brutus Östlings
Bokförlag Symposium, has made the first substantial presentation of
the historical and ideological phenomenon of German Conservative
Revolution in both Sweden and Scandinavia. (1) The theme issue has
been edited by Göran Dahl and Carl-Göran Heidegren. (2) The issue
contains translations from Carl Schmitt's works Politische Theologie,
Land und Meer and Glossarium, Ernst Jünger's book Der Arbeiter, as
well as theoretical analyses of the concept of Conservative Revolution
by the editors, Eric Bolle, Louis Dupeux and Ellen Kennedy.

Göran Dahl's and Carl-Göran Heidegren's introductory essay The Magic
Zero Hour is the most interesting in the issue. Its reference point is
Armin Mohler's standard work on German Conservative revolution Die
Konservative Revolution in Deutschland 1918-1932. Grundriss ihrer
Weltanschaungen.

Mohler differentiates between three main ideological lines within the
revolutionary conservatism which constitute a development from German
Myth, through German Legal Idea and to a Prussian Principle.

Völkische Rasse, Volk germanisch
Jungkonservative Reich deutsch
Nationalrevolutionäre Bevegung preussisch

The Völkische current can be characterized as an entirely
anti-intellectual and irrational and its influence on the ideological
development during the Weimar-republic is relatively very
limited. However during the Third Reich Himler, Rosenberg and to a
large extend also Hitler, were exponents of the irrationalism of the
Völkische ideology.

The Jung-konservative is the current most closely associated with the
older traditional conservatism which preserves Christian influence and
values. It is the least revolutionary group which does not expose an
irreconcilable opposition to the Weimar Republic. A central
ideological leitmotif in their ideology is the concept of the Reich
(=Empire) as a supra-state formation, different and opposed to both
the nation-state as well as the imperialist state. Their ideal is a
decentralized multi-ethnic empire under German dominance achieved by
virtue of the size of the German population as well as the German
industrial and cultural development and pre-eminence. (3)

The national-revolutionaries are the most radical, anti-Weimar and
anti-capitalist group. Characteristic for their ideological
world-outlook is the anti-West and anti-Civilization orientation
intellectually conceived in a way similar to Thomas Mann's thoughts in
Reflections of a Nonpolitical Man. Civilization-criticism was equated
with criticism of Anglo-Saxon influence and capitalism, disguised as
progress, liberalism and democracy. Or as Thomas Mann wrote:

Whatever the state of Germany's spiritual power of resistance may be
today (May 1917), in 1914 she had recognized as superstition the
belief that the Western ideas were still the leading, victorious and
revolutionary ones; she was convinced that progress, modernity, youth,
genius, and novelty were on the German side; she thought it patently
clear that compared with the conservatism of the immortal principles,
her own psychological conservatism signified something truly
revolutionary. (4)

Thomas Mann noted further that:

Whoever would aspire to transform Germany into a middle-class
democracy in the Western-Roman sense and spirit would wish to take
away from her all that is best and complex, to take away the
problematic character that really makes up her nationality; he would
make her dull, shallow, stupid, an un-German, and he would therefore
be an antinationalist who insisted that Germany become a nation in a
foreign sense and spirit. (5)

The term West was seen as synonymous with Anglo-Saxon and therefore
the anti-West orientation in concrete political terms translated into
corresponding East orientation, toward Russia. (6)

Ernst Jünger, the National-Bolshevik Ernst Niekisch and Otto Strasser,
the anti-capitalist National Socialist and leader of the Black Front,
are the most prominent representatives of the
national-revolutionaries. The capitalism was ideologically perceived
as anti-German, as Anglo-Saxon imposition and a deadly threat to
culture and to the quality of life, note Dahl and Heidegren. The work
of the sociologist Werner Sombart Händler and Helden, published in
1915, had an important influence on the criticism of capitalism: it
contraposed the Hero against the Händler (= the shopkeeper (7)).

In the Fourteen Theses of the German Revolution, published in 1929 as
the manifesto and program of the Black Front, Otto Strasser clearly
defined the extent of his faction's commitment to socialist social
change. The main points of the program were:

nationalist, against the enslavement of Germany by the Versailles
powers: socialist, against the tyranny of money and Volkish, against
the destruction of the German soul. (8)

His first point placed him in the company of Moeller van den Bruck,
for he advocated a foreign policy oriented toward the East, toward
what van den Bruck described as the territory of the young Russian
nation. His second point demanded nationalization of all land and
abolishment of all unearned income. And the third point was directed
against foreign elements and institutions working to undermine and
enslave the German soul and German historical and cultural
traditions. (9)

Conservative revolutionaries were also critical of the political form
of expression of capitalism: the liberalism. The liberalism, built on
an atomistic, individualistic principle, had undermined all organic
Gemeinschaft or as Moeller van den Bruck asserted in Das Dritte Reich
: The liberalism has ruined cultures, it has undermined religions. It
has destroyed nations and fatherlands. The liberalism is the
self-dissolution of the mankind.

Against the liberalism he envisioned a new ethical-political German or
Prussian socialism. Oswald Spengler stated in his book Preussentum und
Socialismus that:

Power belongs to the whole. The individual serves it. The whole is
sovereign... Together Prussianism and socialism stand against the
England within us, against the world view which has penetrated the
whole existence of our people, paralyzed it, and robbed it of its
soul. (10)

The basic mood of the ideology of Conservative Revolution is best
summarized by the distinction between Culture and Civilization as well
as between organic unity and economic liberalism.

A Culture, to recall Oswald Spengler's words, has a soul, whereas
Civilization is the most external and artificial state of which
humanity is capable. The acceptance of Culture and rejection of
Civilization meant for many people and end to alienation from the
society. The word rootedness occur constantly in their
vocabulary. They sought this in spiritual terms, through an inward
correspondence between the individual, the native soul, the Volk and
the universe. In this manner the isolation they felt so deeply would
be destroyed. The external was equated with the present,
disappointing society; the state was opposed to the Volk, and the
divisive parliamentary politics contrasted with that organic unity for
which so many Germans longed. Moreover, the external signified a
society which had forgotten its genuine, Germanic purpose. (11)

Following Armin Mohlers thoughts Dahl and Heidegren concentrate on the
Nietzschean elements in the ideology of the Conservative Revolution:
the dichotomy between linear versus cyclical (Nietzsche,
Spengler)-without beginning or an end - concept of history and the
notion of the Return of the Eternal, the contraposition of progress
versus inner and outer organic development, the conviction that the
fall, the destruction are at the same time a rebirth. Those irrational
elements have a certain historical significance, but they are neither
generally representative nor decisive for the ideology of the
Conservative Revolution.

More interesting is the discussion of the relationship between
cultural pessimism, the feeling of doom, and decisionist voluntarism,
a relationship similar to that of illness and medicine. According to
Loius Dupeux the decisionist voluntarism became the intellectual
foundation of a new optimism, a conservative optimism as Moeller van
den Bruck called it, centered on notions of national rebirth,
resurrection and self-affirmation, on assertion of a new national
identity as a trans-individual subject of history. Therefore in his
book Die Entscheidung Christian Graf von Krockow correctly calls Carl
Schmitt, Ernst Jünger and Martin Heidegger the prophets of decision
during a historical period which already Oswald Spengler had described
as The Hour of Decision.


Lebensphilosophie

The Weltanschauung of the Conservative Revolution, its vitalistic and
decisionist approach to society, human being as well as to
international relations, can not be understood without the reference
to the concept of life identified with experience, central in the
German tradition of Liebensphilosophie, the latter, in the words of
Georg Lukacs, using the intuition as its organom and the irrational as
its natural object (12), conjured up the necessary elements of a
vitalistic world-view. The epistemological rationale of
Lebensphilosophie proceeded from the thesis that experiencing the
world is the ultimate basis of knowledge and that an epistemological
solution to man's relationship with the objective external world could
only be elucidated by way of praxis.

Louis Dupeux asserts in his contribution to the issue (13) that the
most important ideological characteristic of the Conservative
Revolution - is the emphasis on the concept of life which, after
Nietzsche, takes the roll of the Right-wing antagonist to the Left's
concept of reason, a concept of life which Thomas Mann defined as key
concept of every modern Weltanschaung.


Glossarium

The translation of part of Carl Schmitt's book
Glossarium-Aufzeichungen 1947-1951, first published in 1991 in Germany
and consisting of short philosophical and existential reflections,
contains several interesting observations, written with aphoristic
clarity, concerning Carl Scmitt's criticism of neo-Kantian legal
positivism, American political theology - the Wilsonian
pseudo-universalism - used as a ideological vehicle for imperialist
expansionism, notes dealing with Schmitt's high esteem for Georg
Lukacs and his intellectual affinity with Heidegger, as well as the
juridical interpretation of the existential theme of the trowness in
history.

Schmitt compares his own criticism of legal positivism with the young
Hegel's rejection of
positivism. Positivism=Legality=Judaism=Despotism=th e cramp of the
Duty and the Norm. On the split between legality and legitimacy
Schmitt notes The jurist's and the legal profession's fate on the
Continent: since the French Revolution 1789-1848 the law is split in
legality and legitimacy, it ends with the jurist falling in the
pitfall of mere legality, in pure positivism. After this split
followed after 1848 a split of legitimacy. The tendency appeared first
during the Restoration, from 1815 to 1850, as a pure historical,
dynastic and restoration legitimacy. Against it appeared a new
revolutionary legitimacy which finally prevailed and was
victorious. The criterion is: good conscience in respect to legality
and legitimacy. The manifesto of the victory as well as its authentic
legal philosophy is Georg Lukacs History and Class Consciousness.

The political ideology of the American imperialism and expansionism-
the Wilsonian pseudo-universalism - is compared with the dogmas of the
Catholic Church. This ideology reconstructs and totalizes the world in
a mold for American domination and hegemony. Thus the ideology of
universalism is not only dogmatically-ecumenical to its essence, it is
above all totalitarian. American political ideology is compared with
political theology and as such it is not only totalitarian but also
totalizing in Hegelian sense. (14)

On the relationship between theology and technique he observes that
both are totalitarian preserves. The theology is out of necessity
totalitarian to both its substance and its consequences; the technique
is totalitarian in its methods, out of its functionality. The result
is always totalization. On the subject of the existential fate of man
Schmitt remarks that the human being of today is exposed to the same
fate as Kaspar Hauser. Several months latter he notes: The beautiful
Nietzschean though: With wide shoulders the Room resists the
Nothingness. Where Room exists, exists the Being.

I disagree with Ellen Kennedy's assertion that Carl Schmitt created an
expressionistic concept of the political in his book The Concept of
the Political (15). I mention that only because also Jürgen Habermas
advances a similar notion in his essay The horrors of autonomy: Carl
Schmitt in English, published in the book The New Conservatism. (16)
The political manifests itself in the collective organized
self-assertion of a politically existing people against external and
internal enemies... A people welded together in a battle for life and
death asserts its uniqueness against both external enemies and
traitors within its own ranks. The political extreme case is
characterized in terms of the phenomenon of defining one's own
identity in the struggle against the alienness of the enemy who
threatens one's very existence, and thus in terms of the situation of
war between people or civil war, writes Habermas and concludes that
thus Schmitt created an expressionist concept of the political.

Habermas, however, is misstaken. Rather, as Georg Lukacs has noted,
Schmitt created an existentialist concept of the political, the nature
of the state sovereignty and of the international la. (17) and if so
only because the Versailles system was perceived by him as a threat to
the national existence and the national substance of
Germany. Therefore a concept of international law, preserving and
defending the national existence was necessary, and that concept had a
very strong Hegelian influences.

A discussion on similarities between Hegel's and Schmitt's concepts of
international law is clearly beyond the scope of this short
review. However a few brief observations are necessary. Hegel defines
the individuality of the sovereign state in the state's existence as a
unit in a sharp distinction from other states. Only in preserving its
uniqueness can a state maintain and preserve its sovereignty. Since
the sovereignty of a state is the principle of its relations to other
states, the rights of sovereign states are actualized only in their
particular wills and not in an universal will with constitutional
powers over them.

Hegel rejected Kant's idea of an early League of Nations, a formalized
Holy Alliance in the post-1815 Restoration Europe. Hegel claimed that
the nature of the sovereignty was the right of a sovereign state to
create and oppose an enemy. And whenever war breaks out because two
sovereign states oppose each other, it is because two sets of rights,
each legitimate in its own way, clash. Wars to Hegel are always
clashes between two rights, not between right and wrong. Hence the
outcome of a war never proves one side right and the other wrong. It
only regulates which right will yield to the other. (18)

Agness Heller has noted that Lukacs, Heidegger and Schmitt all focus
on the concept of existential choice.

The idea of collective existential choice thus emerged almost
naturally in their closely similar visions and theoretical
interests. The political appeared to them to identify the essence and
existence in community. When a collective entity chooses itself and
thus its own destiny, the political act par excellence has already
been accomplished. In Lukacs it is the empirical proletariat, this
merely economic class, which is bound to choose itself and thus its
own destiny. The moment of proletarian revolution is the very moment
of constituting the political. In Heidegger it is the nation, the
empirical German nation, which is bound to become fully political in
the gesture of self-choice. This is what happens in the German
revolution which is a quintessential political gesture. (19)

For Carl Schmitt it is also the empirical German nation as a
collective entity, surrounded by alien entities, which must become
political and thus emancipate itself from the dictates of
Versailles. In History and Class Consciousness Georg Lukacs quotes
Karl Marx words in Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right :

When the proletariat proclaims the dissolution of the previous world
order it does no more than reveal the secret of its own existence, for
it represents the effective dissolution of that world order. The
self-understanding of the proletariat is therefore simultaneously the
objective understanding of the nature of society. When the proletariat
furthers its own class-aims it simultaneously achieves the conscious
realization of the objective aims in society, aims which would
inevitably remain abstract possibilities and objective frontiers but
for this conscious intervention... The proletariat makes its
appearance as the product of the capitalist social order. The forms in
which it exists are the repositories of reification in its accutest
and direst form and they issue in the most extreme
dehumanization. (20)

In a sort of a paradoxical way one may compare the reificatory,
dehumanizing effects of the commodity fetishism on the proletariat as
a collective subject, as well as on the society, in the marxian
tradition, with the dehumanizing effect of the Versailles system and
its dictates on the German nation as a collective subject in Carl
Schmitt's jurisprudence. (21)


The Swedish model

What I would have liked to see in the magazine is a discussion on two
important issues: the historical tradition of the ideology of the
Conservative Revolution in Sweden (22) as well as the relevance and
actuality of that ideology today.

The so called Swedish model was not only the most successful
implementation of the ideology of the Conservative Revolution, but
also the world's most advanced implementation of corporativist state,
a model of political-economic organization known as
corporativism. Sweden perfected the essential elements of the economic
strategies employed in Italy and Germany in the interwar years. The
particular type of society the Swedish social democracy created -
Folkhemmet (Peoples Home,Volksstaat, a corporativist organic
gemeinschaft) - was heralded as The Third Way, a social formation
between liberal capitalism and Marxist socialism; a Swedish socialism
analogous to the concept of Prussian socialism. (23)

The concept of Folkhemmet was originally developed by the Swedish
geopolitician Rudolf Kjellen in 1910 and it included two components -
Realm (Reich) - the geographical component -, and Folk, the racial
component. Folkhemmet was both a racial as well as a geographical
concept, i.e. a racial existence of Volk in geopolitical space. In his
book Kjellen The State as a Live Form (Staten som livsform )
conceptualized the People's Home (Folkhemmet, Volksstaat) as a
geopolitical construct.

The foundation of the People's Home (Volksstaat) was laid after the
Saltsjöbaden Agreement of 1938, concluded between the trade unions and
the employer's association, which outlawed strikes and created the
institution of centralized wage bargaining for the entire nation. The
most obvious effect of the Saltsjöbaden agreement was the entrenchment
of industrial peace, but the most profound consequence was the
establishment of the corporative State. Through the Saltsjöbaden
agreement, unions and employers, labor and capital, coalesced into a
single corporate structure.

Per Engdahl, the most prominent Swedish fascist and a personal friend
of leading Social-Democratic politicians, such as the long-time Prime
Minister Tage Erlander and the Finance Minister Gunnar Sträng,
asserted in his memoirs Fribrytare i Folkhemmet that the creation of
the People's Home has been the most successful realization of the
political idea of corporativism.

The ideology of the Swedish Social Democracy incorporated also many
ideological völkisch components. The national substance of the
Folkhemmet was a racially defined Folkgemenskap (Volksgemeinschaft,
People's Community). (24) A nationalistic overtone was attached to the
membership in the Folkgemenskap, members were exclusively those
belonging to Den Svenska Folkstammen (Volkstum, Swedish Racial Group),
minorities on the territory of Sweden, like the Tornedal Finns, were
on the other hand excluded by virtue of not being members of the
Volkstum. (25)

The social democratic slogan of national and political unity became
staten, rörelsen, folket (Staat, Bewegung, Volk (26); State, Movement,
People), the organic totality of the state, the movement-the
social-democratic party-, and the people. Sweden even constructed
Scandinavia, and above all Finland and Norway, as a Swedish Grossraum,
a small one but nevertheless a Grossraum. (After Karl XII The Great's
Russian misadventures a Swedish Grossraum could not be anything but a
miniature one.)

The Swedish leading socialdemocratic jurist and the most prominent
theoretician, Axel Hägerström, can be seen as a Swedish equivalent of
Carl Schmitt. The criticism of Swedish legislation during the 70-ties
stressed the non-normative, decisionist substance of the legislation,
the use of the so called general clause as a legislative technic
conferring to the legislation the character of promisses imperecta;
attached to the law it served as a conduit of the decisionist free
will of the civil servants, it had the function of a general exception
to the normative use and substance of the legislation.

Axel Hägerström equated power with law asserting that the structure of
power is the structure of law. The state and the power are identical
with the persons who exercise permanent, real power in such a way that
their collective will becomes acknowledged as the will of the
State. Upper bureaucracy, in Swedish ämbetsmän (higher civil servants)
is identical with power and, consequently, also with the State. In
consistency with this view Axel Hägerström wrote in Rätten och viljan
(The Law and the Will) that: (27)

The constitutional laws which regulate the actions of the highest
holders of power and the limits of their sphere of power, should be
regarded as standardization of declarations of will and thus the
constitutional laws express the common will of those same power
holders as having the actual power. Then, if one of them doesn t want
to follow the laws in one aspect or another, the laws cease to have
legal validity. An unconstitutional procedure by such holder of power
(makthavare) is thus impossible. The constitution then also becomes,
as far as it regulates the power holder's actions and sphere of power,
without any legal meaning. It can also be said that the constitution,
like every rule of law, ceases to have any legal meaning when it is no
longer in use. In my opinion the constitutional laws are not
applicable to the highest holders of power. They can proceed in any
way they like and as far as they like, arbitrarily breaching the
established law - this would not be against any of the provisions of
the constitution from the viewpoint of the constitution's own meaning.

According to the Carl Schmitt's maxim that sovereign is he who decides
on the exception (28) the omnipotent sovereign in the Swedish People's
Home became the ämbetsmän, resulting, as critics claimed, in an
absolutist civil servant state. (29)

Folkhemmet, the Swedish People's Home, in now, during the 90-ties
gone, replaced by an American style economic liberalism. The new
liberal-economic universalism turned however in reality to be an
accelerated economic Thatcherism, resulting in a sharply lowered
living standards for the majority of the Swedish population, in
dismantling of the protective social security and labor legislation,
in economic destabilization, decline of culture and increase of
criminality. The Swedish economy, once a prototype for many countries,
is now in shambles.

The prominent Swedish economist Professor Rudolf Meidner defines the
demise of the Peoples Home as a System Shift. The economic
consequences of this system shift are the dismantling of the welfare
state, privatization of state monopolies, abandoning of the policy of
full employment, upsurge of non-productive speculative investment,
resulting in destabilization of the economy and substantial loss of
jobs in manufacturing. The system shift required an assault on the
core institutions sustaining wage earner solidarity, especially the
system of nationwide collective bargaining through which the unions
had pursued their solidaristic wage strategy. (30)

Decentralization of the collective bargaining, which has obtained
since the Saltsjöbaden Agreement, led to a gradual destruction of the
institution through which wage solidarity had been pursued. The system
shift-the counterrevolution of universalism-has led to assault on
labor unions, labor laws, labor movement and social welfare, in short
on all that traditionally has been associated in Sweden with
substantive human rights.

Rudolf Meidner states that deregulation of currency flows and
regulations pertaining to investments abroad has resulted not only in
substantial capital outflow abroad and transferal of Swedish companies
abroad in the name of multinationalism, with sharp decrease of job
opportunities and employment in Sweden, but also in a virtual
deindustrialization of the country and pauperization of large segments
of the population. Should the tendencies emanating from the system
shift continue the institutional underpinnings of working class
solidarity and, more broadly, the alliance of wage earners (i.e. blue
and white collar workers) will have been demolished. In other words,
what are at stake are the very political foundations of the
model. (31)

In retrospect the omnipotence and fiats of the concrete social
democratic ämbetsmän - the Swedish Nomenclatura - appear as very
benevolent in comparison to the omnipotence and fiats of the abstract
capital.

In a way one may say that after the fall of the Berlin wall of the
People's Home and the intrusion of Americanism, the resulting
experience of life is that of allmänt förjävligande, an expression
which is difficult to translate but corresponds to a general backlash,
a decline and worsening of the structures of the Life-World, a sort of
a ground-zero. That is why Göran Dahl and Carl-Göran Heidegren write
at the end of their introduction that:

Our time, in similarity with the Weimar epoch, is a time of conflict,
crisis and transition. The optimism from 1989 has, confronting the
development in Russia and Yugoslavia, been substituted with a total
pessimism. In turbulent epochs the old concepts no longer can grasp
the reality. And the perception of an unstructured reality is a
fertile soil for new or old-new ideas to sprout. Whatever one thinks
about the idea of the Conservative Revolution, we believe it is an
idea to take into account in the future.

And that brings us to the relevancy of the idea of Conservative
Revolution in the post-Cold War period, the epoch after the D-Day of
the American pseudo-universalism.

The ideological and above all political phenomenon of Conservative
Revolution can not be correctly understood without taking into account
the three historical traumas: the trauma of The God is dead, which
Nietzsche heralded, the trauma of the W.W.I and the trauma of the
Treaty of Versailles and the world order, tailored after Anglo-Saxon
dominance, it created.

In many aspects Carl Schmitt's jurisprudence, his criticism of the
Wilsonian pseudo-universalism and his definition of the enemy, can be
seen as an ongoing polemic against the Versailles Treaty, its prodigy-
the League of Nations-, and the inner England - seen outward as an
Anglo-Saxon world domination and inward in the political institutions
as well as in the cultural values of the Anglo-Saxon liberal
capitalism: liberal democracy and parliamentarianism.

The resurgence of the ideological tendencies in Europe now, similar to
the Conservative Revolution in the past, can in many respects be seen
as a reaction to a similar trauma of the American New World Order,
perceived as a threat to existing state sovereignties, national
identities and national culture. What was once defined as rejection of
the inner England is now a rejection of the inner America.

One can paraphrase Oswald Spengler's words in Preussentum und
Socialismus: Europe as political and cultural entity stands against
America within us, against the world view which has penetrated the
whole existence of people's in Europe, paralyzed it, and robbed it of
its soul. All that being said, its is obvious that one can not talk
about American Conservative Revolution because the original
Conservative Revolution was anti Anglo-Saxon then and is anti-American
now.

In this context, as a political as well as an ideological alternative
to the New World Order, the concept of Europe as a New World has been
constructed in above all French debate. The substance of this concept
is the notion of reversal of historical roles: when the original
Monroe Doctrine was pronounced in 1823, America was conceived as a New
World in opposition to Europe of the Holly Alliance - the Old
World. In the 90-ties the positions have become reversed.

United States is the interventionist world of old values, of the
past-the Old World; the New Europe on the other hand, Europe from the
Atlantic to the Urals, and further, to Vladivostok, is the New World,
the world of the future. And it is an existential imperative for the
New World to reject and oppose the interference and interventionism of
the Old World, which by necessity leads to a formulation of a Monroe
Doctrine for Europe. Because if the New World is not the negation of
the Old World, but to a great extend integrated in it, then the new
political forms and national entities are confronted with a situation
where authentic expression of national life exists but can not be
attached to a particular form of ideological resistance, political
expression and national substance.

In the intellectual climate of the post-Cold War Europe not only the
ideas of Europe as a New World, but also elaborations of the ideology
of the Conservative Revolution, by virtue of their otherness, can
stand against the homogenizing, neutralizing impact of the Old World,
against the American managers of ideological oppression and their
clients and customers. The threatening ideological homogeneity of the
American totalitarian political theology and its prodigy - the
American universalism - has been loosening up, and alternatives are
beginning to break into the repressive continuum.

The notion of Europe as a New World and alternative ideologies such as
the ideology of the Conservative Revolution, are therefore not only a
firm rejection of the American jargon of universalism but also an
expression of growing opposition to the global domination of the
American New World Order.

Francis Fukuyama recently asserted in a deeply apologetical book (32)
that Americanism constituted the end point of mankind's ideological
evolution and the final form of human government and as such
constituted the end of history. The historical actuality of the
contemporary resurgence of the ideology of the interwar Conservative
Revolution is then situated in the existential necessity to recapture
the history - the powerful humanizing and liberating force of its
continuing evolution. In a critical historical period in Europe when
the old is no more but the new is not yet, the recapturing of the
history is possible only if one follows the old Nietzschean maxim
expressed in the Genealogy of Morals: No American Future. (33)


Endnotes

(1) Carl Schmitt's book The Concept of the Political has also been
translated into Swedish and published as a part in Sven-Erik Lidman
(ed) - Från Machiavelli till Habermas (Bonniers, Stockholm, 1991).

(2) Göran Dahl, who is a professor in sociology at the University of
Lund and responsible for the Carl Schmitt's part in the issue, has
written works in the tradition of the German so called Hannover School
of Socialization which in many respects build on and develop the
Lukacs tradition of subjectivist Marxism. One of his most interesting
papers is Individ och Kapital. Till begripandet av den subjectiva
faktorn under kapitalismen (Tekla, 6/1979, Lund) which is a
presentation of Alfred Crovoza's ideas on the political dimension of
societal socialization and the interrelationship between commodity
fetishism and socialization (Alfred Crovoza-Production und
Socialization, EVA, 1976). Other books written by Dahl are Begär och
kritik (1986) and Psykoanalys och kulturkritik (1992). Carl-Göran
Heidegren has published Filosofi och revolution. Hegels väg till
visdom (1984) and Hegel. Behovet av filosofin (1992)

(3) Göran Dahl and Carl-Göran Heidegren - Den magiska nollpunkten,
ResRublica - at p. 7. Derived from the idea of Reich is Carl Schmitt's
concept of Grossraum and a world order build on a plurality of
Grossräume. see Grossraum versus Universalismus in Positionen und
Begriffe - p.p. 295-302. Carl Schmitt defines the empire as the
leading and supporting powers whose political idea is radiated over a
specified major territory and which fundamentally exclude the
intervention of extra-territorial powers with regard to this
territory. see Der Reichsbegrif im Völkerrecht in Positionen und
Begriffe - p. 303. It is also interesting to note the resurrection of
the concept of Empire in Russia in contemporary Russian Conservative
Revolutionary debate. see for example the Chairman of the
National-Republican Party Nikolaj Lysenko's work Nasha celj sozdanie
velikoj imperii - in Nash Sovremennik, Nr 9, 1992 (Moscow)
p.p. 122-130, Alexander Dugins contributions on the subject in the
Journal Ele! menty and also the program of the Russian
National-Bolshevik Party. Recently the concept of The Third Russia,
reminiscent of Moeller van den Bruck's Das Dritte Reich, has been
advanced in the National Conservative debate in Russia.

(4) Thomas Mann - Reflections of a Nonpolitical Man (Frederick Ungar
Publishing, Co., New York, 1983) at p. 256.. Thomas Mann quotes
Dostoevski who wrote that The most characteristic, most essential
trait of this great, proud, and special people has always been, since
the first moment of its appearance in the historical world, that it
has never, neither in its destiny nor in its principles, wanted to be
united with the far Western World - ibid. p. 26

(5) Thomas Mann - ibid. p. 36

(6) the anti-West and pro Russian orientation had many supporters
within the German General Staff-General von Seeckt is the most
prominent representative-, and within the Foreign Ministry - the so
called group of Osterners, the architects of the Rappalo Treaty. One
may recall that already Nietzsche in the Genealogy of Morals had
envisioned a political union between Germany and Russia.

(7) England was ideologically conceived as a nation of shopkeepers.

(8) Vierzehn Thesem der Deutschen Revolution in Wilhelm Mommsen and
Günther Frantz Die Deutschen Partej-Programme (Leipzig and Berlin,
1931), p. 118.

(9) George L. Mosse - The Crisis of German Ideology (Closet & Dunlap,
New York,1964) p.288.

(10) Here a quote from Peter Gay Weimar Culture (Harper Torchbooks,
New York, 1970) p.86

(11) George L. Mosse - The Crisis of German Ideology (Closet & Dunlap,
New York, 1964) p.6,7

(12) Georg Lukacs - The Destruction of Reason (Humanities Press,
Atlantic Highlights, 1981) - at p.402

(13) Louis Dupeux - Conservative Revolution and Modernity in
ResPublica - p.p. 140-169

(14) Totalitarianism can be defined from the point of view of what is
the constituting, totalizing principle of society: Race (Nazism),
Class (Marxism), Abstract Capital (Liberal capitalism, American
universalism.) On the political aspects of the American
totalitarianism Carl Schmitt has written in Grossraum gegen
Universalismus.


(15) Ellen Kennedy - Kulturkritiska och metafysiska källor till
begreppet det politiska hos Carl Schmitt - in ResPublica -
pp. 96-116. Carl Schmitt's jurisprudence could be possibly called
expressionistic only in a context of Wilhelm Worringer's theories
developed in his book Formprobleme der Gotic (1911) in which he
counterpoised the rebellious, governed by a metaphysical restlessness
German Geist, best expressing itself in the form of Gothic, to the
balanced Roman Geist, expressing itself in the form of Classicism, in
the form of the Renaissance. Different late interpretation of Wilhelm
Worringers theories tended to see the Expressionism in the same way
Wilhelm Worringer saw the style of Gothic﷓ as an expression of
metaphysical restlessness immanent in the German Geist.

(16) Jürgen Habermas-The New Conservatism (The MIT Press, Cambridge,
1990) - pp. 128-139

(17) see Georg Lukacs-The Destruction of Reason (Humanities Press,
Atlantic Highlands, 1981) - at p. 658.

(18) see G.W.F. Hegel - Philosophy of Right (Oxford University Press,
London, 1967) - at p.p. 208-216; also Sclomo Avineri - Hegel's Theory
of the Modern State (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989) - at
p.p. 194-207

(19) Agnes Heller - The Concept of the Political Revisited in David
Held (ed) - Political Theory Today (Stanford University Press,
Stanford, 1991) - at p. 334.

(20) Georg Lukacs - History and Class Consciousness (The MITT Press,
Cambridge, 1985) - at p. 149.

(21) it is interesting to note that the reception of Carl Schmitt as
well as the ideology of the Conservative Revolution in Russia are
focused on the existential predicament of Russia - with the post-Cold
War settlement compared to a Second Treaty of Versailles-, and the
necessity of decision to repeal the dehumanizing impact and aliennes
of the American New World Order.

(22) the elements of the predominant Swedish Völkische ideology during
the 20-ties are discussed in Rolf Torstendahl - Mellan nykonservatism
och liberalism (Uppsala, 1969)

(23) Oswald Spengler defined the Prussian Socialism build on alliance
of conservatives and socialist toward a common aim - a corporativism
as a truly German form of government. Politische Schriften
(Munich,1932) p. 64

(24) see also Rudolf Kjellen Staten som livsform (Hugo Gebers Förlag,
Stockholm, 1916).

(25) In the Swedish government's bill in the Rikstag (Parliament)
introducing the 1927 Immigration Law it was stated that the value of
the homogenous and pure race of the people of our country can not be
overestimated (see Thomas Hammar-Sverige åt svenskarna, Stockholm
1964, at p. 367; also Hans Lindberg - Svensk flyktingpolik under
internationellt tryck 1936-1941, Allmäna förlaget, Stockholm, 1973, at
p. 37) The main function of the 1927 Immigration Law was to protect
the racial purity of the Swedish Volkstum.

How strong those sentiments remained can be illustrated with the
following conversation about the status of minorities in Sweden I had
with Gunnar Myrdal in 1974. He had written An American Dilemma,
dealing with the minority question in the United States. I, on the
other hand, had published in 1974 a longer essay Invandrarfrågan-ett
svenskt dilemma (The Minority Question. A Swedish Dilemma). During the
course of the conversation I suggested that in similiarity and analogy
with the Finland-Svenska Folkpartiet i Finland (Finnish-Swedish
Peoples Party in Finland), representing the Swedish minority in
Finland, the minorities in Sweden and above all the Tornedal-Finns (a
large Finish minority in Sweden) should form their own party. Gunnar
Myrdal became red in the face and exclaimed: Minorities can and must
exist only in total integration in the majority society. God protect
them if the minorities will start organizing their own party. That
will be a suicide for them.

And even today Swedish law does not recognize the concept (and
existence) of minorities in Sweden. (see Gustaf Petren-Minoriternas
rättsställning i Sverige in David Schwarz - Identitet och minoritet,
Almquist&Wiksell förlag, Stockholm, 1971, at p. 28)

(26) see Carl Schmitt - Staat, Bewegung, Volk: Die Dreigliederung der
politischen Einheit (Hamburg, 1933)

(27) Axel Hägerström - Rätten och viljan (Lund, 1961) - at p. 71

(28) Carl Schmitt - Political Theology (The MIT Press, Cambridge,
1988) - p. 5

(29) see Nikolaj-Klaus von Kreitor - Beamtendiktatur - auf Schwedisch
(Demokratie und Recht 4/1979, Pahl-Rugenstein Verlag, Köln, 1979);
Nikolaj-Klaus von Kreitor-Das Ausnahmegesetz - das schwedische Model
der repressiven Gesetzgebung (Democratie und Recht 4/1979);
Nikolaj-Klaus von Kreitor - Schweden bricht das Abkommen von Helsinki
(Frankfurter Hefte 9/1980, Frankfurt, 1980); Nikolaj-Klaus von Kreitor
- Das schwedische Model... der Zenzsur (Blätter für deutsche und
internationale Politik 10/1978, Pahl-Rugenstein Verlag, Köln, 1978);
Nikolaj-Klaus von Kreitor - Berufsverbot en Suecia (Argumentos
27/1979, Madrid, Spain 1979); Nikolaj-Klaus von
Kreitor-Undantagslagen: Skyddar högre ämbetsmän. Kränker fri - och
rättigheter (Jusek, 4/1980, Stockholm, 1980); Nikolaj-Klaus von
Kreitor-Undantagslagen och rättsstatens kris (Svensk rättsforum, 18,
1979, Lund, 1979); Nikolaj-Klaus von Kreitor - Målsägandetalan mot
höga ämbetsmän upphävd (Oikeus 2/1979, Helsinki, 1979 and
Medborgarrättsrörelsen 4/1979, Stockholm, 1979); Nikolaj-Klaus von
Kreitor-Folkhemsmytens nedgang och fall. Charta 79 och den
demokratiska oppositionen i Sverige (Soihtu 5/1980. Helsinki, 1980);
Nikolaj-Klaus von Kreitor -Undantagslagen - ett exempel på repressiv
lagstiftning (Retfaerd-Scandinavian Law Review 11/1979, Arhus 1979,
Denmark); Nikolaj-Klaus von Kreitor-Kansankodin
kuokavieras. Omaelämäkerralinen ruotsalaisen yhteiskunnan
korporativismen kritiikki (Gummerus Förlag, Jyväskylä, Finland, 1980).

see also the recently published book by Stephan Wehowsky (introduction
by Christian Graf von Krockow)-Schatten Gesellschaft (Hanser Verlag,
München, 1994)

(30) Rianne Mahon and Rudolf Meidner - System Shift ; or What is the
Future of Swedish Social Democracy, Socialist Review at p. 65 (31)
Rianne Manon and Rudolf Meidner - System Shift - ibid. p. 63 (32)
Francis Fukuyama-The End of History (Avon Books, New York, 1992)

(33) The Philosophy of Nietzsche (Modern Library, New York, 1954)
p. 802

Glenlivet
Wednesday, February 4th, 2004, 01:37 PM
I like your posts about Sweden. Thanks for all the time you take to increase our knowledge. Keep up the good work by posting all these interesting articles and essays!