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Oskorei
Tuesday, February 8th, 2005, 06:02 PM
During history, a cyclic view on various phenomena has been very common. Our Indo-European ancestors believed that history moves through the yugas/eras, going from the Golden Age to the Iron Age, and then back to the Golden Age after some sort of cataclysm/final war. Civilizations have been viewed as living entities as well, going through the stages of birth, youth, senility and finally death. And the same perspective can be found in political sociology, concerning the rise and fall, or birth and death, of elites. The area is interesting for two reasons: 1. Is the current elite on the final stage, and soon to die? Have it lost all its virtues, both intellectual and moral? I think so, and in that case it will soon be replaced by a new elite. And that will either be Muslim, or Nationalist. 2. How do we deal with the rise and fall of elites after a Machtübernahme? If elites naturally grow soft and corrupted, what should be done against it?

We will start with the North African scholar ibn-Khaldun (1332-1406). Khaldun is known for his use of the concept "group solidarity", and his description of cycles of conquest and decay. At first there is the bedouins/nomads, with a strong group solidarity. These then conquer the weaker city-dwellers, and instate their own dynasty. But given time, the dynasty looses its group solidarity and is corrupted by power and luxury. And then a new wave of nomads conquer again.

It can easily be argued that the current West has lost group solidarity, both on a national, a pan-racial and on a local level, and that this has enabled various strangers to invade and immigrate. It can also be argued however, that group solidarity is reborn among the "inner barbarians", the Nationalists. Who will replace the corrupted elite, Nationalists or Muslim new-comers, is an open question, to be decided by action.

More on ibn-Khaldun can be found here:
http://www.humanities.mq.edu.au/Ockham/y67s17.html
A good introduction. It has a definition on the concept of group solidarity: - "the state of mind that makes individuals identify with a group and subordinate their own personal interests to the group interest. Without willingness to subordinate self to the group, peace and social development are not possible. Ibn Khaldun expects the sense of solidarity to be based originally and normally on kinship. A sense of solidarity can be powerfully supported by religion, and conversely no religion can make an impact unless its members have a strong sense of solidarity."

http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/ik/klf.htm
An in-depth introduction.

http://www.georgetown.edu/faculty/oweissi/ibn.htm
Claims that Khaldun came up with the Labor Theory of Value before Adam Smith.

Oskorei
Tuesday, February 8th, 2005, 06:41 PM
Machiavelli and the concept of virtú


Italian thinker and diplomat Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527) wrote along similar themes as Khaldun. Today he is best known for The Prince, in which he gave various advice based on Realpolitik and stripped from morality, to leaders of state.

But Machiavelli also wrote the work Discorsi, in which he comments upon the history of the early Rome. In that book, he is a Republican.

The most important value for Machiavelli is virtú (Latin virtus), which is related to our word, "virtue." Machiavelli means it more in its Latin sense of "manly," but individuals with virtú are primarily marked by their ability to enforce their will on volatile social situations. They do this through a combination of strong will, strength, and brilliant and strategic calculation. His thesis is, that what made early Rome so strong and expansive, was the virtu of the people, a people who took active part in the State. Conflicts make a people strong, in that they keep the qualities of virtu alive (it should be added that some of the classic virtues are not central to Machiavelli, among them honesty).

It can be argued that the modern West has lost the quality of virtu. The people is no longer really part of the State, they are instead ruled by a political elite that is not even of their own blood. As a result, virtu has abandoned them, and instead of expansive and manly individuals, we have a mass of pacified, cowardly and obese consumers. With the erosion of security and welfare, virtu is however reborn.

A couple of good pages with information on elite studies, from political sociology, would be the following:
http://www.crab.rutgers.edu/~goertzel/polsoctheories.htm
http://husky1.stmarys.ca/~evanderveen/wvdv/Political_sociology/political_sociological_theories.htm

Oskorei
Tuesday, February 8th, 2005, 06:47 PM
A very interesting article along the lines of Khaldun and Machiavelli, but from a Conservative perspective, is the following (this is an exerpt of the best part):

http://www.antiwar.com/stromberg/pf/p-s051500.html
REPUBLICAN VIRTUE, ABSENT REDNECKS, AND FREE SOCIETIES

This brings me to what could be called the Absent Red-Neck Problem – but first, some deeper historical background. The great historian William Hardy McNeill points out "an alternating rhythm in Mespotamian political history. A conqueror from the margins of civilized life, like Sargon, might indeed establish an effective central authority; but after a few generations, the conquering group was likely to abandon its military habits in favor of the softer and more luxurious ways of the cities. In turn, relaxation of military discipline and decay of the warrior spirit opened a path for either revolt from within or fresh conquest from the margins."2 (http://www.antiwar.com/stromberg/pf/p-s051500.html#ref)

Well, it’s not our job, here, to cry for former conquerors, anymore than Argentina should cry for Evita, and the whole cycle was likely a bit awkward for the civilians – members of the third estate – who got caught in the crossfire. This sort of thing might take only three generations to unfold, as is sometimes the case with the great American fortunes. That very sharp fellow Ibn Khaldn (1332-1406), the founder (after Aristotle) of political sociology, wrote of a similar cycle in Arab history.3 (http://www.antiwar.com/stromberg/pf/p-s051500.html#ref)

The key seems to be that devil-term "luxury" and bringing it up puts us back into the running debate between classical liberalism and classical republicanism, which has been haunting us since at least the 18th century. This is true, even this side of the water, since the ideology of the American Revolution drew heavily on both political "languages." Over here, we like to think that we achieved a stable and lasting synthesis.4 (http://www.antiwar.com/stromberg/pf/p-s051500.html#ref) Maybe not.

FREEDOM, VIRTUE, HIGHLANDERS, KLEPHTES, AND REDNECKS

One little republican doubt hung around in liberal circles into the 19th century. It broke out in the debate between French liberals Benjamin Constant and Charles Dunoyer in the 1820s. Constant questioned Dunoyer’s thoroughgoing utilitarianism, which imagined there were economic solutions to all problems. As Ralph Raico writes, Constant threw light on "a certain inner contradiction in the free society, which can only be compensated for by bringing into play anti-utilitarian forces, such as religious faith...." The problem was that freedom’s very success in bringing about prosperity tended to lessen the number of those – Greek Klephtes, Scottish highlanders – who have the skills and personal virtù with which to defend freedom and the free society.5 (http://www.antiwar.com/stromberg/pf/p-s051500.html#ref) The Klephthes, of course, were mountain bandits, whose role in liberating Greece from the Turks was fresh in the memory of European liberals; and in the early 19th century, the British Establishment still worried overtime about the highlanders’ Jacobite leanings. I suppose I should at least mention the "wily Pathans," other mountaineers who gave the Brits no end of trouble on the northern frontiers of India.

Here we have what I call the "absent redneck problem," but Constant, of course, put it much more elegantly. Republicanism set it up as "luxury" versus republican "virtue." As Raico puts it: "For Constant, the growing possibility of participating in the enjoyments offered by modern society was a powerful attractive force. But recent experience showed that certain sacrifices had been necessary to fight tyranny. Who had fought Napoleon tooth and nail? Was it the bourgeoisie of Paris, who even under Napoleon were not deprived of their search for pleasure? Or was it the peasants of Russia and Spain, who, having nothing to lose, risked their lives to throw off foreign domination?"6 (http://www.antiwar.com/stromberg/pf/p-s051500.html#ref)

SOCIOLOGY, STRATEGY, AND MOUNTAINS

In the American heartland there are many who fear that a dramatic assault on our freedoms might find many of the "conservative" literati AWOL, if not actually helping the wrong side. They could be wrong, I guess, and the Mothers may march all they wish, but the heart of the Second Amendment debate is here. Mountaineers, as people experiencing practical independence, take on symbolic importance in the present context. And imagine living in such an environment without firearms.

It may be that highlanders, rednecks, and their sociological equivalents – drawn, one imagines, from the peasants and petty bourgeoisie – are needed to preserve liberty. Someone told me as far back as 1978, "Libertarians have a lot of theory, but the rednecks have the practical skills." It follows that the scholars and the rednecks should be friends. Second Amendment and (certain) flag issues might be central in building a "coalition to end coalitions" – to paraphrase Hank Junior, himself a bit of a social theorist. And, speaking of social theory, there is – though some would hesitate to name in polite company – Jim Goad’s The Redneck Manifesto (http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0684838648/antiwarbookstore/) (1997).

Certainly, the poor demonized bubbas have no reason to turn to Al Gore and little enough to support George Dubbya. Here is a non-Marxist "historical bloc" the Left doesn’t even want. Someone has to rally them. Why not libertarians and antiwar conservatives?

MOUNTAINS MAY NOT BE ENOUGH

But to return briefly to those mountains alluded-to earlier, historical experience suggests that when one is up against a determined and patient enemy, mountains by themselves may not be enough. In time, the enemies of local freedom – including, surprisingly enough, our own Uncle Sam – can put their people in the mountains, on the ground, in sufficient numbers to overcome the mountaineers’ geographical advantage. But for a while, at least, the "peculiar" people on the Wasatch Front did things their way. D.W. Meinig writes that the "Mormon region took on a human geographic quality unlike anything in surrounding areas. It was a homeland in a much more profound sense, with a homogeneity, unity, order, and self-consciousness unequaled in any other North American region and rivaled only by that other peculiar self-conscious nation of North America along the lower St. Lawrence."7 (http://www.antiwar.com/stromberg/pf/p-s051500.html#ref)

This may slight the status of the South as a captive nation within the federal plantation, but no matter. Certainly, Utah wasn’t for everyone – and still isn’t, I suppose. Those who prate of villages and communities seldom like actually existing ones. They think of them as bastions of reaction in need of kindly but firm reconstruction by the usual suspects. Faced with people who believe in something and who act on their beliefs, the poor ACLU works overtime in Utah to bring their benighted neighbors into the 20th, soon to be the 21st, century.

This is doubtless why Utah "public" TV was so goggled-eyed last month, when it presented a series on the changing – more lovable, more "diverse" – Utah now unfolding under the watchful eyes of the international/national elite. Still, some of the older order remains. In Utah, even the ACLU quotes Brigham Young – if only as a provocation.

Huzar
Tuesday, February 8th, 2005, 07:07 PM
NICCOLO MACCHIAVELLI. good politician. Surely a good strategist. I remember some of his scripts. He was modern, although 500 years separate him from us. United states culture dislikes him for his amoral concept of power.

I admit to be fascinated by his "cruelty":D

"The best way to eliminate quickly your enemies, is assembling all them in the same place (with some excuses), then, killing them altogheter in the same time......" :thumbup

Appalachian
Tuesday, February 8th, 2005, 08:34 PM
SOCIOLOGY, STRATEGY, AND MOUNTAINS

In the American heartland there are many who fear that a dramatic assault on our freedoms might find many of the "conservative" literati AWOL, if not actually helping the wrong side. They could be wrong, I guess, and the Mothers may march all they wish, but the heart of the Second Amendment debate is here. Mountaineers, as people experiencing practical independence, take on symbolic importance in the present context. And imagine living in such an environment without firearms.

It may be that highlanders, rednecks, and their sociological equivalents – drawn, one imagines, from the peasants and petty bourgeoisie – are needed to preserve liberty. Someone told me as far back as 1978, "Libertarians have a lot of theory, but the rednecks have the practical skills." It follows that the scholars and the rednecks should be friends. Second Amendment and (certain) flag issues might be central in building a "coalition to end coalitions" – to paraphrase Hank Junior, himself a bit of a social theorist. And, speaking of social theory, there is – though some would hesitate to name in polite company – Jim Goad’s The Redneck Manifesto (http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0684838648/antiwarbookstore/) (1997).

Certainly, the poor demonized bubbas have no reason to turn to Al Gore and little enough to support George Dubbya. Here is a non-Marxist "historical bloc" the Left doesn’t even want. Someone has to rally them. Why not libertarians and antiwar conservatives?


This is a fair summation of my entire agenda. :)




MOUNTAINS MAY NOT BE ENOUGH
But for a while, at least, the "peculiar" people on the Wasatch Front did things their way. D.W. Meinig writes that the "Mormon region took on a human geographic quality unlike anything in surrounding areas. It was a homeland in a much more profound sense, with a homogeneity, unity, order, and self-consciousness unequaled in any other North American region and rivaled only by that other peculiar self-conscious nation of North America along the lower St. Lawrence."7 (http://www.antiwar.com/stromberg/pf/p-s051500.html#ref)

How dare he ignore America's real Mountain Heartland?!?!?!? ;)

Seriously, though, I found myself agreeing with this guy, but he stopped quite abruptly and left me wondering where he was going with all of this.
Still, I think he was on the right track.

We here in the mountains have held on to certain traditions and cultural artifacts and even a certain degree of homogeneity longer than most lowland places, but starting in the 1970s, the television networks began airing "exposés" on what they said was our shameful poverty. Of course, to us it was in many cases not shameful poverty, but simply our preferred way of life. Strangers started showing up wanting to "lift us up," but all they really succeeded in doing was making us ashamed of who we are. We were richer before, when we were connected to the land, than we are now that we are divorced from it, even though we now have plenty of fast food to stuff ourselves with and endless hours of infotainment on the 'tube.

There is still much resistance to the encroachment of the Hollywood-Industrial Complex here in the hills (consider the mere fact that the National Alliance located its headquarters here), but it is eroding quickly.

When we Highlanders have lost ourselves, what hope then for the Nation? Little at all, as far as I can see. I will work to my dying day to see that it does not come to that.

Oskorei
Tuesday, February 8th, 2005, 08:56 PM
This is a fair summation of my entire agenda. :)
Nice to hear. I was kind of thinking about you when I copied that text :)

When I think healthy virtu and group solidarity, rural areas come to mind, not unusually Appalachian and Southern (and some Swedish that most of the good people of Skadi wouldn't be able to pronounce ;)).


NICCOLO MACCHIAVELLI. good politician. Surely a good strategist. I remember some of his scripts. He was modern, although 500 years separate him from us. United states culture dislikes him for his amoral concept of power.
Probably because he exposes the way they think ;)

Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923) was an Italian aristocrat, economist, sociologist, and socialist eventually turned conservative. He was therefore celebrated as a source of inspiration by the Italian Fascists, and did not seem to mind.

Pareto used his time at Céligny to write his Trattato di sociologia generale, which was finally published, after wartime delays, in 1916. This was his great sociological (http://cepa.newschool.edu/het/schools/optimist.htm#sociology) masterpiece. He explains how human action can be neatly reduced to residue and derivation. People act on the basis of non-logical sentiments (residues) and invent justifications for them afterwards (derivations). The derivation is thus just the content and form of the ideology itself. But the residues are the real underlying problem, the particular cause of the squabbles that leads to the "circulation of élites". The underlying residue, he thought, was the only proper object of sociological enquiry.
Residues are non-logical sentiments, rooted in the basic aspirations and drives of people. He identifies six classes of residues, all of which are present but unevenly distributed across people -- so the population is always a heterogeneous, differentiated mass of different psychic-types. The most important residues are Class I the "instinct for combining" (innovation) and Class II, the "persistence of aggregates" (conservation). Class I types rule by guile, and are calculating, materialistic and innovating. Class II types rule by force and are more bureaucratic, idealistic and conservative.

Pareto's theory of society claimed that there was a tendency to return to an equilibrium where a balanced amount of Class I and Class II people are present in the governing élites. People are always entering and leaving the élite thereby tending to restore the natural balance. On occasion, when it gets too lopsided, an élite will be replaced en masse by another If there are too many Class I people in a governing élites, this means that violent, conservative Class II's are in the lower echelons, itching and capable of taking power when the Class I's finally make a mess of things by too much cunning and corruption (he regarded Napoleon III's France and the Italian "pluto-democratic" system as an example). If the governing élite is composed mostly of Class II types, then it will fall into a bureaucratic, inefficient and reactionary mess, easy prey for calculating upwardly-mobile Class I's (e.g. Tsarist Russia).
http://cepa.newschool.edu/het/profiles/pareto.htm

The current situation can probably be described as an example of a Class I "pluto-democratic" elite, corrupted but desperately trying to hold on to power, but threatened by Class II elites-to-be from all directions. Probably the current elite started as Class II, being more idealistic, but since lost that quality.

More on Pareto is to be found here:
http://management.about.com/cs/generalmanagement/a/Pareto081202.htm
Pareto's Rule states that 20% of the population usually owns 80% of the wealth, and apparently it is often true.
http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/it/pareto.htm

Huzar
Tuesday, February 8th, 2005, 09:26 PM
Nice to hear. I was kind of thinking about you when I copied that text :)

When I think healthy virtu and group solidarity, rural areas come to mind, not unusually Appalachian and Southern (and some Swedish that most of the good people of Skadi wouldn't be able to pronounce ;)).


Probably because he exposes the way they think ;)

Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923) was an Italian aristocrat, economist, sociologist, and socialist eventually turned conservative. He was therefore celebrated as a source of inspiration by the Italian Fascists, and did not seem to mind.

Pareto used his time at Céligny to write his Trattato di sociologia generale, which was finally published, after wartime delays, in 1916. This was his great sociological (http://cepa.newschool.edu/het/schools/optimist.htm#sociology) masterpiece. He explains how human action can be neatly reduced to residue and derivation. People act on the basis of non-logical sentiments (residues) and invent justifications for them afterwards (derivations). The derivation is thus just the content and form of the ideology itself. But the residues are the real underlying problem, the particular cause of the squabbles that leads to the "circulation of élites". The underlying residue, he thought, was the only proper object of sociological enquiry.
Residues are non-logical sentiments, rooted in the basic aspirations and drives of people. He identifies six classes of residues, all of which are present but unevenly distributed across people -- so the population is always a heterogeneous, differentiated mass of different psychic-types. The most important residues are Class I the "instinct for combining" (innovation) and Class II, the "persistence of aggregates" (conservation). Class I types rule by guile, and are calculating, materialistic and innovating. Class II types rule by force and are more bureaucratic, idealistic and conservative.

Pareto's theory of society claimed that there was a tendency to return to an equilibrium where a balanced amount of Class I and Class II people are present in the governing élites. People are always entering and leaving the élite thereby tending to restore the natural balance. On occasion, when it gets too lopsided, an élite will be replaced en masse by another If there are too many Class I people in a governing élites, this means that violent, conservative Class II's are in the lower echelons, itching and capable of taking power when the Class I's finally make a mess of things by too much cunning and corruption (he regarded Napoleon III's France and the Italian "pluto-democratic" system as an example). If the governing élite is composed mostly of Class II types, then it will fall into a bureaucratic, inefficient and reactionary mess, easy prey for calculating upwardly-mobile Class I's (e.g. Tsarist Russia).
http://cepa.newschool.edu/het/profiles/pareto.htm

The current situation can probably be described as an example of a Class I "pluto-democratic" elite, corrupted but desperately trying to hold on to power, but threatened by Class II elites-to-be from all directions. Probably the current elite started as Class II, being more idealistic, but since lost that quality.

More on Pareto is to be found here:
http://management.about.com/cs/generalmanagement/a/Pareto081202.htm
Pareto's Rule states that 20% of the population usually owns 80% of the wealth, and apparently it is often true.
http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/it/pareto.htm

I studied Pareto, too. Interesting, balancment class theory.

Oskorei
Tuesday, February 8th, 2005, 11:42 PM
I studied Pareto, too. Interesting, balancment class theory.We only read a very short introduction, elite theory is not that popular in Swedish academia.

I think my first encounter with the cyclical view on elites, was the Byzantine historian Procopius' account of the rise and fall of the Vandals. It is a more or less three-generational model, that seems to be true in many cases.

First there is the original generation. It is filled with a will to power, and at the same time grounded in the virtues and traditional worldview of the tribe. In the case with the Vandals, this was king Gaiseric. "In 406 the Vandals advanced from Pannonia by way of Gaul, which they devastated terribly, into Spain, where they settled in 411. From 427 their king was Genseric (Gaiseric), who in 429 landed in North Africa with about 80,000 of his followers. Peace was made between the Romans and Vandals in 435 but it was broken by Genseric in 439, who made Carthage his capital after he had thoroughly plundered it. During the next thirty-five years with a large fleet he ravaged the coasts of the Eastern and Western Empires. In 455 he plundered Rome itself during two weeks." (source: http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15268b.htm) Say what you will about Gaiseric, but he wasn't a coward. The first generation seizes power through virtu and personal characteristics, gained in battle or struggle.

Then comes the second generation. This one is born into privilege, but still has some of the martial and personal virtues of the first. The second generation usually is able to keep the spoils, but rarely expand them very much. And then comes the third generation, that is born into luxury, spoiled, and weak. Neither the virtues nor the will to power is left. This generation looses power, and the cycle begins anew.

This model can be applied rather well on Swedish Social Democracy (idealists-> bureaucrats -> corrupted and mentally bancrupt), on the USSR, and on many self-made millionaires.

The Italian scholar Gaetano Mosca had the following to say on the rise and fall of elites and nations:

These two causes seem almost inevitably to go together. Nations die when their ruling classes are incapable of reorganizing in such a way as to meet the needs of changing times by drawing from the lower and deeper strata of society new elements that serve to give them new blood and new life. Then again, as we have already seen (chap. XIV, §3), nations are also marked for death when they suffer a dwindling of those moral forces which hold them together and make it possible for a considerable mass of individual efforts to be concentrated, disciplined and directed toward purposes related to the collective interest. In a word, old age, the forerunner of death, comes upon political organisms when the ideas and sentiments which make them capable of the collective effort that is required, if they are to maintain their group personality, lose inflence and prestige without being replaced by others.

http://users.cyberone.com.au/myers/mosca.html

I would say that the current ruling class is doing its utmost to recruit new members from minorities, but is doing very little to draw from the deeper strata of their own kinfolk. And they are definitely causing a decline of the moral forces that hold society together. It is not a recipe for succes.

Huzar
Wednesday, February 9th, 2005, 09:26 AM
We only read a very short introduction, elite theory is not that popular in Swedish academia.

I think my first encounter with the cyclical view on elites, was the Byzantine historian Procopius' account of the rise and fall of the Vandals. It is a more or less three-generational model, that seems to be true in many cases.

First there is the original generation. It is filled with a will to power, and at the same time grounded in the virtues and traditional worldview of the tribe. In the case with the Vandals, this was king Gaiseric. "In 406 the Vandals advanced from Pannonia by way of Gaul, which they devastated terribly, into Spain, where they settled in 411. From 427 their king was Genseric (Gaiseric), who in 429 landed in North Africa with about 80,000 of his followers. Peace was made between the Romans and Vandals in 435 but it was broken by Genseric in 439, who made Carthage his capital after he had thoroughly plundered it. During the next thirty-five years with a large fleet he ravaged the coasts of the Eastern and Western Empires. In 455 he plundered Rome itself during two weeks." (source: http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15268b.htm) Say what you will about Gaiseric, but he wasn't a coward. The first generation seizes power through virtu and personal characteristics, gained in battle or struggle.

Then comes the second generation. This one is born into privilege, but still has some of the martial and personal virtues of the first. The second generation usually is able to keep the spoils, but rarely expand them very much. And then comes the third generation, that is born into luxury, spoiled, and weak. Neither the virtues nor the will to power is left. This generation looses power, and the cycle begins anew.

This model can be applied rather well on Swedish Social Democracy (idealists-> bureaucrats -> corrupted and mentally bancrupt), on the USSR, and on many self-made millionaires.

The Italian scholar Gaetano Mosca had the following to say on the rise and fall of elites and nations:

These two causes seem almost inevitably to go together. Nations die when their ruling classes are incapable of reorganizing in such a way as to meet the needs of changing times by drawing from the lower and deeper strata of society new elements that serve to give them new blood and new life. Then again, as we have already seen (chap. XIV, §3), nations are also marked for death when they suffer a dwindling of those moral forces which hold them together and make it possible for a considerable mass of individual efforts to be concentrated, disciplined and directed toward purposes related to the collective interest. In a word, old age, the forerunner of death, comes upon political organisms when the ideas and sentiments which make them capable of the collective effort that is required, if they are to maintain their group personality, lose inflence and prestige without being replaced by others.

http://users.cyberone.com.au/myers/mosca.html

I would say that the current ruling class is doing its utmost to recruit new members from minorities, but is doing very little to draw from the deeper strata of their own kinfolk. And they are definitely causing a decline of the moral forces that hold society together. It is not a recipe for succes.

Well, i know less or more all authors you cite(i'm a political science student), although, some elites have survived for several centuries : you can see longbards ruling class in north east italy, survived to longbardian state collapse (around 790 a.c.); the french nobility, descendent from ancient franks, ruler af French reign for many centuries ; normands noble-class in british isles. Last, scandinavian and germanic influx in the great Russia, their dominant and determinat role for almost 1000 years in developing of imperial ruling class of Zarist state. I think, the stability or not of a ruling class, originate from the solidity and stability of the same nation they created centuries ago. I mean, a physiological replecement of ruling class inside the same ethnic group, is normal (natural change); there is stability until exists a solid CORRELATION between rulers and ruled people. This correlation is the COMMON origin (ethnicity). The common origin gives to the ruling class a strong popular platform of support (in general sense),through decades and centuries. Without a BASILAR community of blood there will be a "RACIAL GAP" between the ELITE and popular mass. A deadly discordance on the long term ( many times even on middle or less). There is this risk in actual white societies.

NOTE : probably Elite theory is much more common in Italy and generally in all neo latin countries like france spain or at least england (celtic-germanic-latin nation, in my opinion), because there is an historycal tradition to rule other people (see spanish or British empire) or be ruled (see italic peninsula domination through history).

Oskorei
Thursday, October 13th, 2005, 10:14 PM
A nice review on a book that deals with much the same issues as this thread.



Nobilitas A study of European Aristocratic Philosophy from Ancient Greece to the Early Twentieth Century by Dr. Alexander Jacob University Press of America lanham, U.S.A. 114pp $18 50)

THIS IS A LUCID WORK. Its purpose is clearly laid out by the author in his preface.

"The purpose of my brief study, which is devoted to the ideal political constitution of nations, is to survey the philosophical arguments for monarchial and aristocratic government from Greek antiquity to the early twentieth century. It is hoped that the exercise will awaken the reader to the incontestable excellence of this form of government, at the same time as it exposes the disturbing deficits of democracy."

This is a short guided tour of European aristocratic theory, starting with Francesco Guicciardini and finishing with National Socialism. Crucial to an understanding of genuinely aristocratic thought is that the state is not seen as an expediency but as a necessity. Hobbes and Machiavelli, although often admired by conservative writers, are therefore considered, only to be rejected by Dr. Jacob as being not of this tradition at all. Central to the authority aristocracy and the state is the authority of tradition. A perfect democracy according to Burke, is "the most shameless thing in the world." Crucial in every case to the harmonious functioning of civil society are two things: aristocracy and religion. Both aristocracy and religion are the physical demonstration in human societies of the spirit. Moving on from his consideration of the writers of what is here called "the age of revolution" (Burke, Maitre and Vico) Dr. Jacob examines the German idealistic philosophers, beginning with Kant and Fichte. For those who are not very familiar with the writings of Fichte and retain only an awareness of him as the man who made the famous address to the German nation at the time that Germany was occupied by Napoleon’s forces, the quotations from him may come as something of surprise. for example Fichte is quoted from The Vocation of a Scholar, that the aim of all society is, "the ever increasing ennoblement of the human race, that is, to set it more and more at liberty from the bondage of Nature." Fichte was also, we learn, one of the first philosophers to formulate a philosophy of history. Whereas Kant, Fichte, Hegel and Marx, formulated philosophies of history including a paradigm according to which progress was the march of the rational through the history of institutions, so to speak, Platonic and monotheistic religious ideas of history fundamentally reject the notion of an interior logic to historical development. For them history is the "human story" written and read by God. Most forms of conservatism side with revealed monotheistic religion on this point. Consequently conservative thought tends to dovetail with the preaching of an established theology. Aristocratic radicalism emphatically does not.

For the conservative, as indeed for the pragmatists generally, history has no system to it, which does not mean that we cannot learn from history but which does mean that we should be reluctant either to be fatalistic on the basis of what is "historically inevitable" or that we should impose systems on the basis of an interpretation of providence, inevitability or idealistic necessity. For the conservative, it is ideology, understood as a kind of rational religion or a religion without the temperance of tradition to make it wise to human failings and foibles, which destroys the fabric of truly civil society, opening the way for the beast among, about us and within us. So far as aristocracy is concerned and the belief that aristocracy is "good" for society, this is a key point. It is possible to argue for the restoration of an aristocracy and it is possible to argue for the creation of an aristocracy. The two are radically different. One is conservative and the other is revolutionary. More importantly still, the notion of restoring an aristocracy is born of a belief in making the best of the world that we can in which the part played by aristocracy is a natural one, a time proven one, opposed to the uncivilized, undisciplined fury of radical rationalism as expressed in the French revolution. But when Dr. Jacob describes the ideas of Fichte, he points out that it was in the name of a universal idealistic rationalism that Fichte hoped that an aristocracy would be created, not restored, constituting the fulfilment of historical destiny.

Dr. Jacob informs us that for Fichte, the course of human history is a record of the various stages in the development of the self from unconsciousness to full self-consciousness. Like Herbert Spencer, Fichte even lays down stages of human development in which this evolution is said to be taking place. 1) the epoch in which man is governed by his instinctual life; 2) the epoch in which external authority is substituted for instinct as the ruling principle of social life; 3) the epoch in which men revolt from authority in a time of individualism; 4) the epoch in which men begin to understand the rules of reason and voluntarily submit to them; 5) the epoch in which reason becomes fully conscious in men as complete moral freedom. This leads to the affirmation that the individual should forget him/her self as individual and place the one life in the service of the greater manifestation of life of which the individual life is only a part. The concept of aristocracy based on this paradigm of human history is radically different from the aristocratic philosophy of someone like Edmund Burke and this is a distinction which Dr. Jacob glosses over, apparently in an attempt to portray the purveyors of the aristocratic ideal here given as a harmonious whole. The book argues the case for the "superiority of aristocratic government" in a manner such as to suggest that "aristocratic government" is a category which requires neither analysis nor discussion as such, as though the belief in aristocracy is not itself subject to major and arguably quite incompatible conceptions of the meaning and sense of human social organization, of the state and of God.

There are parallels between Marx and Fichte, notably in the insistence by both that the state is created out of a conquest by one race/class of another. Underlying Fichte’s concept was a belief that each people should develop in its own way. The people are gathered in the nation and represented by the state and there are inferior and superior peoples/nations, according to Fichte. An important distinction between Hegel and Fichte which the writer does indeed point out is that Hegel’s morality was not a priori, that is to say Hegel believed that historical change created more perfect moral orders, whilst for Kant or Fichte, there is an absolute right which man is striving towards. The lack of idealism in Hegel’s system has the fault, in Dr. Jacobs' view, that any system can be defended morally on the ground of its being created by historical necessity or as being a manifestation of the cycle of history. Similarly in orthodox Marxism, much can be and has been justified on the grounds of historical necessity which overrides a universal moral dictum. For Hegel, the state was not an instrument of domination or materialisation of power, it was the acme of human progress, the embodiment of freedom. Hegel advocated a restrictive system of voting rights, under which the franchise would only be granted to those gifted with learning, knowledge of public affairs and property.

There is an interesting chapter on Giuseppe Mazzini, who outside Italy is not well known as a thinker, but known mostly as a republican, revolutionary and Italian patriot. Mazzini was however an elitist political theorist, who divided history into two major periods, the period before and the period after the French Revolution. The French Revolution was the watershed of history, indicating the switch to a more rational understanding of the world. But the revolution was for Mazzini "inadequate" because it was individualistic and materialistic. (This reviewer would argue that the French Revolution was very anti-individualistic in the sense that all individuals had to subscribe to the general will of the nation in the people.) Mazzini did not believe that the end of human existence is material well-being. Liberty loses its importance once it is agreed that the purpose of social order is to create optimal circumstances for the improvement of material well-being.

Mazzini sought to stress social duties at the expense of rights and it can be argued (and Dr. Jacob does argue) that the philosopher Giovanni Gentile was a successor to these ideas. Gentile was the house philosopher of the Italian fascist state. He was an idealist, who believed that through the state, men would one day reach a perfect condition of social awareness of their fellow citizens in which a separation of private interest from public commonweal not longer existed. Dr. Jacob quotes Gentile that all human cruelty is a result of imperfect knowledge, exactly as it is in Plato and Plotinous." The basis of evil is matter, or nature, which is opposed to spirit and represents "not merely moral and absolute nullity: the impenetrable chaos of brute nature, mechanism, spiritual darkness, falsehood and evil, all the things that mankind is forever fighting against." this quotation highlights the point at which liberalism and fascism share a certain view of the world in opposition to conservatism. It is a pity that Dr. Jacob does not examine this highly interesting issue. But it is useful that he has pointed to Gentile at all. Gentile seems to be largely forgotten and perhaps the (temporary?) oblivion in which he currently finds himself is unjustified.

Treitschke I suspect is better known to Anglo Saxon readers. Dr Jacob tells us that Treitschke’s views expressed a deep admiration for the elitism of military Prussia but he was less inclined to accord tolerance, even in religious matters, on the grounds that nothing should be allowed to undermine the unity and strength of the state. Interestingly, Treitschke concedes that "with difficulty" a state may tolerate differences of religious ritual among its citizens. In a religious sceptical society such as that of the West today, it may well be considered that religious differences are not much more than differences of ritual. Religion is tolerated by the state to the extent that it is ineffective and keeps silent on the issues which really matter. This only does not apply it seems, where the state and the established religion are united as one political source of legitimacy. At that point religious tolerance ceases.

Treitschke was deeply anti-semitic and urged the German, whom he considered superior to all other peoples, to speak his mind out against Jewish influence in German society, in the arts as much as in the press. Treitschke’s was the principle of a greater Germany, the centralised state which would not tolerate small or minority cultures disrupting the harmony of the united whole. Unlike Hegel however, he did not consider that the state as such was the acme of human development; he argued that the state was only the "external construct of the nation" as Dr. Jacob puts it. However, Treitschke was not a Machiavellian, since he believed that the state should pursue a moral purpose and he condemns Napoleon for not having done so, for seeking power only for power’s sake.

Dr Jacob then comes to Nietszche and points out that Nietszche did not share Hegel’s and Treitschke’s hope that the state continue and indeed strengthen its role as educator and improver. Dr. Jacob points out that the writers he has considered up to this point have not based their political ideas principally on race, although all of them admitted to or hinted at the significance of race in political theory. The writings of Arthur de Gobineau are significantly discussed in the same chapter as Houston Stewart Chamberlain, Rosenberg and Hitler. Dr. Jacob writes, "Gobineau was the first thinker to relate the rise and fall of nations to the racial purity of their populations. When the racial constitution of an Aryan society became diluted, it led inevitably to the fall of the state. This is true of both the Greek states and the Roman republic. As for the modern anti-aristocratic movements, such as the French Revolution, they constitute a crime against blood, since they result in a decimation of a large majority of pure-blooded aristocrats." (p.72) This paradigm of racial struggle as the driving force of history is parallel to the Marxist doctrine that all history is the history of class struggle. It is the key doctrine of national socialism. Dr. Jacob makes no attempt to refute the argument and by not doing so implies that when he is discussing "aristocracy" he really means the aristocracy of blood.

While liberal commentators and certainly Jewish commentators, tend to lose a sense of balance when discussing racial theorists, the writer of this book has gone so far in the opposite direction as to appear at times wickedly relaxed about the ethical questions which must arise from any issue involving social exclusion or worse, of unwanted groups.

"..the objective idealistic systems of Hegel and his followers with its glorification of the state, lent itself more easily to tyrannical excesses during the Third Reich, such as the systematic extermination of all peoples not conducive to the regeneration of Aryan society. While these excesses were partly due to the exigencies of war, they were also in part due to the gradual substitution of the external reality of the State for the metaphysical norms of the inner, moral law." (p.80)

This is understatement taken to ludicrous, even grotesque, lengths. It reminds me of the Monty Python cheese sketch: "You people are not conducive to the regeneration of Aryan society. I’m afraid I shall have to shoot you." "Rightiho then, sir."

To what extent is the author pleading the case for the philosophers he describes? Dr. Jacob does not negatively criticise his subjects and the sympathy appears to be considerable. This would also explain why Dr. Jacob chooses not to discuss the figures presented as representative of aristocratic thought but only to briefly describe and elucidate them. It is impossible, from the writing alone, to distinguish between Dr Jacob’s description of a point of view and his own point of view. When we read, for example, that Carl Gustav Carus "was one of the first, after Gobineau, to establish the philosophical reasons for the intellectual discrimination between races." the assumption seems to be that this is an established fact that such a discrimination should be effected. Established orthodoxy, needless to say, insists on something wholly different, namely that all discrimination between races originates in ill-informed prejudice at best and downright malevolence at worst, all right thinking people knowing that racial differences are only skin deep. True, this book is not intended as an argument or plea but as a brief history. Nevertheless, there is not even a mention as to how the philosophers described in this book faced criticism in their own day.

What is an aristocracy? The scholar Philippe Mairet in his essay on Aristocracy and the Meaning of Class Rule published in England in 1931, points out that it is an elite which unlike a plutocracy, insists that its members should possess and exhibit excellence in the function of government itself. Aristocracy must stand for a higher type of man.

A higher type of man. That is what those who seek the aristocratic society seek to arrive at and this is truly Nietszchean as well, seeking the improvement of man, the transcendence of man, his overcoming of himself. For Dr Jacob and the thinkers he discusses here, democracy is responsible for a radical shift in the opposite downward direction, away from the transcendence of man and into the time of his great down going, his degeneration, his return to the primitive state from which he once emerged, his loss of consciousness of his own will, and his submission of the will to the technical forces of a materialist elite. Aristocracy is raised on the irreplaceable values, as Dr Jacob calls them, which universalist democracy is destroying: spiritual awareness, tradition and race. Precisely those three values are being constantly weakened in the West. Dr Jacob has provided a useful set of milestones giving some of the names of thinkers who hoped that Western society would take the anti-democratic path. Gone from our world are the qualities which made an aristocracy possible. They are: piety, wonder and distance. When and how will they regain, if ever, their lost authority among us?

Michael Walker

http://thescorp.multics.org/22jacob.html

Slå ring om Norge
Saturday, October 15th, 2005, 03:42 PM
One hitherto a little overlooked black horse in playing the redneck card is the present, unknown in the past, technological and propagandistic sophistication of the security system of the present elite.

Besides, the rednecks themselves, at least those with a modicum of political ambition, are no desperado-hungry lot, yet. There may be high limits for their level of sacrifice-preparedness. Not to mention the average urban redneck – with sufficient affluence to have “to much to lose” and yet – in reality – a slave.

The libertarian intellectuals are there, of course, but how many of them will be ready to go all the way. I have a grim suspicion that many can choose the zog side, after all, being of their own blood in fair proportion.

Do the intellectuals have enough appeal to a redneck? How can one unite them (I’m afraid that Internet contacts or leaflets don’t give enough confidence, without some physical and intellectual proximity.


Take into account that the zog kind of elite is unlike any other. The difference being their unique high intelligence (I think this point does not need further deliberations), constant boosting of their group-solidarity and their geographical spreading to all nerve-points of the whole Western civilization.

Their weakness is of course their meagre numbers, but even here they have been able to conscript a large army of shabesgoyim everywhere, who have their stake in the present system. A knecht like Clinton is the kind of assets they can and do lay hands on.

My feeling that, not least because of these peculiarities, their power is not faltering; we are not experiencing their cyclical evening. Throughout centuries we have seen a constant growth of this power, taking place even now – and accelerating, only with occasional setbacks (Spain, England, and many other – before and after).

The recent one – NS attempt to free themselves, and us, failed, and instead of weakening zog it gave it a new life and influence. Plus – a brand-new, own tribal territory, important for various reasons, not least symbolic.

The new influx of fresh and greedy material from Eastern Europe and USSR has made them even stronger and more determined (both straight into elite and through back door – as a powerful Red Mafiya).
Here we have precisely the aforementioned ability to incorporate lower strata into power: “Nations die when their ruling classes are incapable of reorganizing in such a way as to meet the needs of changing times by drawing from the lower and deeper strata of society new elements that serve to give them new blood and new life.”

One note about aristocracy: IMO aristocracy is a class able, due to various reasons, to maintain a high standard of conduct and leadership.
What are these reasons?
IMO it’s not race per se. It’s more the possession of (landed) property and a frequent need to defend it against invasions and against peers through own physical sacrifice with an indbuilt risk of individual destruction.
All this coupled with a unique ability to incorporate new blood, thus securing against inbreeding.


The present ruling class possesses certainly most of the attributes:
Large property and the need to defend it (even though not predominantly landed and not through personal physical sacrifice, the propagandized experiences of WW2 certainly boost morale in this spirit);
A constant need to defend and expand their possessions and the ability to incorporate now, yet- own blood.

So, in the final analysis, the elite shows no signs of weakening (o the contrary), and the potential incumbents semm to me not determined or powerful enough to BE A REAL CHALLENGE, at least today.

Ps. IMO Machiavelli was not amoral. The ethics of his advices was, on the contrary, absolutely sincere and reflected the ralpolitik of his times (after all, he was no fringe contestator but a, let’s say, an unofficial adviser for realpolitik, coupled with high skills in spin-doctorship).

infoterror
Saturday, December 3rd, 2005, 11:17 PM
Elites and Masses
By Tim Stillwell, NatParUSA (http://www.nationalistpartyusa.com/)

The political spectrum is irretrievably divided into left and right not from a sense of utility, but because it is useful to the powers that be that we be so divided by identity. Those on the right can roughly be described as traditionalists, and those on the left, reformers. The traditionalists believe that the fundamentals of society, morality and culture have not changed, and thus we should uphold the values of our ancestors. The reformers, on the other hand, believe the past is a horrible nightmare and it is somehow obsolete, and thus we must repeal the traditions of past, and remove the "elites" that uphold them.

To engage in right-left rhetoric is pointless, but it is useful to give the idea of "elites" some context. When revolutionaries - or progressives, or liberals, or reformers; the terms are roughly convertible - talk about "elites," they mean a small group that's in power and rules the rest for its own benefit. To hear them talk of it, the same few people have been ruling the world for centuries, concentrating strength and wealth, all at the expense of the rest of us. In fact, they see a diametrical opposition between the "elites" and the "workers," where the former live off the work of the latter because the elites own the means of production.

It's a bit simplified in civilized liberalism, which is not quite as blatant as communism, but everything on the left (like everything on the right) is a matter of degrees of the same idea. Where they're right is that elites definitely form, and because they own things, they compel others to work for them. Where they're wrong is the composition of these elites, and what keeps them in power. In this crucial distinction we can see where right and left not only agree, but could work together to build a better future.

Elites exist because in any power structure, someone needs to make the decisions. In a system based on ownership, someone is going to own the whole mess, and other people will work for them. Now, in a traditional system, ownership is not the primary goal, because culture and heritage take precedence over something as trivial as money. Such systems find their elites by ability, and usually have some form of aristocratic caste of the most able people. This is an actual elite by ability, a "meritocratic" elite, where in ownership-only societies, the elite is picked by wealth as its sole factor. This is why traditional conservatives, while they favored individual ownership over some abomination like Communism, were not gung-ho about unchecked capitalism. Culture, heritage, and the best interests of the people - as interpreted by capable leaders - came first.

In our modern society, elites exist because of the purchasing and voting power of the masses. These elites are relatively new, and have nothing in common with the old European aristocracy, the previous "elite" that the left targeted during revolutions in France and Russia, among other places. These elites occur because they created a product that the vast majority of people wanted. These products do not necessarily correspond to what is best for the population; in fact, there seems to be an inverse relationship. Coca-cola, McDonald's, wasteful SUVs, cigarettes, plastic junk, pornography... all of these make millionaires, and those millionaires are our elites.

So while the left is correct that elites swing us around by the nose, what they fail to understand is that these elites exist because most of us make poor decisions in purchasing products, and thus make wealthy power mongers out of fools. The elites are created by the needs of the masses. Thus it is hard to say who is actually "in control," since the elites get to their position by interpreting the desires of the masses, and if they do not gain approval by the vast majority of people, will not make enough money to be elites. In the traditional leftist view, the elites command the rest of us; in this more detailed view, we see how the elites are given the right to command us: through the lowest common denominator behavior of the masses.

What rational society, after all, would allow unchecked growth (including reckless immigration which introduces competing cultures), unless it benefited business? The interest of business is selling products, preferably, cheaper ones, and the widest segment of society wants that regardless of collateral damage or long-term costs. The wiser among us might caution that cheap, disposable products and reckless immigration are destructive, but to the average person, all that matters is the bottom line. And cheaper products enable those with less money to live as if they had more. The people want it and because of that, the elites provide it.

As humanity grew, it moved from smaller communities to large centralized ones, and began to use options such as democracy and the "invisible hand" of market economies to govern itself, since it could no longer rely on a system of wise elders in every local area. It is this very tendency, the cornerstone of modernity, to rule by proxy that has made our societies grow distant from reality and reach a stage where consumption demands by the least-capable segment of society, its broadest mass section, is the primary guiding force, and the elites, instead of ruling over this horde, are in fact ruled by it and gain their elite position from its favor. This is modernity, and while traditionalists outright oppose it, liberals (reformers) loathe its effects.

From a leftist position, this society oppresses its masses by keeping them as virtual slaves to its corporations and economy. This much is true. Despite the cheaper products, the plight of the worker has not improved at all under modernity, and in exchange for the "freedoms" of consumerism and economic competition, the worker has lost a guaranteed place in a hierarchy that provided for his or her basic needs and restrained silly impulses that today displace many through gambling, drug addiction, bankruptcy and neurosis. From a rightist position, this society oppresses all of us by holding us hostage to the preferences of the masses, both through democracy and our choice of products.

After all, in a society where people cannot tell the difference between quality and garbage, no one will make money selling quality, or at least, will find their market so reduced that they cannot compete on a broad scale. There is no longer a reward in doing things the right way, but there is always reward in doing things the lowest common denominator way. Our old elites, who specialized in doing things the right way, have given way to a new elite, whose goal is to satisfy whatever urge the broadest spectrum of society thinks it has. Unlike the old elites, the new elite do not care about consequences. Their only goal is their personal wealth, accruing.

The consequence of this pattern over the past two thousand years has been a steady migration toward an acephalous society. We no longer have leaders; we have public image experts, who seek to pacify the broadest spectrum of society and quash dissent. They do not lead in the sense of choosing the best decision, regardless of its popularity, but they "lead" in the sense that they find what is popular and do it. Thus the least capable, en masse, lead us and the capable are shouted down. Luckily for our new "leaders," there is no accountability. At some point, they throw up their hands and say "we ran out of money" and that is the end of the issue. It's a far cry from the accountability leaders faced under traditional reign.

If there is a solution to this mess it lies in returning to localized rule. When one human encounters a problem, a decision is always rendered. Add more humans, and the chance of finding a course of action is proportionately less likely. If a room full of executives, a committee, cannot come to a clear decision in most cases, what is the prognosis for a virtual room of 300 million? We are holding each other hostage by our lack of leadership, and in the meantime, the lowest common denominator prevails. Perhaps leftists and rightists alike can learn from traditional societies, where local groups were bound to land and spoken for by elders of the community. If that is the case, it is a good time for convergence, as clearly both groups desire and end to the rule of the elite masses.

http://www.nationalistpartyusa.com/VP/Elites%20And%20Masses.htm