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Aethrei
Thursday, December 4th, 2003, 12:52 PM
Is it only me or does not anyone else see Myatt's outlook on Honour and Race as a reworking of Nietzsche's, What is Noble?

While I appreciate his views, frankly speaking, I cannot grasp what is novel here.

Thanks for any comments.

Nietzsche's chapter 'What Is Noble?' [from the book 'Beyond Good and Evil'] online link;

http://www.geocities.com/thenietzschechannel/bgept9.htm

http://www.glynhughes.btinternet.co.uk/squashed/nietzsche.jpg

rhadley
Thursday, December 4th, 2003, 06:29 PM
Is it only me or does not anyone else see Myatt's outlook on Honour and Race as a reworking of Nietzsche's, What is Noble?

While I appreciate his views, frankly speaking, I cannot grasp what is novel here.

Thanks for any comments.


OK here goes.

1) Myatt has produced a clear, concise, philosophy which can be understood by all.

2) Nietzsche produced quite good aphorisms and a complex system which requires some effort to understood - qv. the notion of will to power.

3) Myatt defines all his terms in a clear, easily understandable way.

4) Nietzsche has no concept of the following: (a) the folk as a living being; (b) the folk-homeland as a living being; (c) the Cosmic Being; (d) the acausal.

5) Myatt gives a clear ethics and system of law based upon honor. Nietzsche does not. This goes far beyonf N's conception of "what is noble".

6) There is really very little about real race - the folk - in Nietzsche; just vague references. For Myatt, race is an expression of Nature, the Cosmos, of order.

And so on :)

Moody
Friday, December 5th, 2003, 07:48 PM
Aethrei's reference to Nietzsche's 'What Is Noble?' [9th chapter of his 'Beyond Good and Evil'] is an interesting one, and I found rhadley's response to it useful.

However, it prompted me to quickly re-read 'What Is Noble?'[WIN?], and then to try and take those ideas towards Myatt's.

Generally, I would say that Nietzsche's work in its raw state is not always 'user friendly' - it is volatile, and yes, extreme.

However, going through all the sections of WIN?, I found some excellent parallels with Myatt.

WIN? section 295 refers to Dionysos.
Nietzsche claims that this god is also a philosopher and is at the root of Nobility.
He says here that this god wants to make man "stronger, more evil, more profound and more beautiful".

These are the Noble virtues - strong will, master morality, profundity and beauty.
Compare this to Myatt who says that Beauty is the result of Honour; see also that Dionysos for Nietzsche is the aesthetic god, the ecstatic god.

In Twilight of the Idols Nietzsche says;
"What did the ancient Hellene [i.e., Aryan Greek] guarantee to himself in these Dionysian mysteries? - ETERNAL LIFE, the eternal recurrence of life; the future promised and consecrated in the past; the triumphant 'Yes' to life beyond death and change; TRUE life as collective continuation of life through procreation, through the mysteries of sexuality".

This is very near Myatt's conception of Nature, and brings Dionysos close to Myatt's Cosmic Being. In both cases, we see that Nobility/Honour springs from the god Dionysos/the Cosmic Being, and the product is Beauty.

WIN? 257 Describes 'Aristocratic Values', or the 'Noble Ideal'; again, comparable to Myatt's 'Honour'.
Nietzsche's contention is that society MUST be led by a Nobility/Honour Guard; to Nietzsche there must be a hierarchy or 'Order of Rank', as he calls it.
While Myatt is not so insistent on this, we can see from his Constitution that he believes in an hierarchy, albeit a self-regulating one, to be necessary.
Also, he adheres to the Leadership Principle; likewise, Nietzsche [in WIN? 261] says that while the master always defines himself, others wait to be defined by the master race.
Nietzsche also says that only the Noble have an "instinct for rank"; where such a thing is missing, then so too is nobility missing.
Allied with this is the ability to REVERE; only the Noble are capable of reverence - another reason why nihilists and anarchists can never be Noble/Honourable.

Where Nietzsche and Myatt depart is in Nietzsche's call for Slavery; however, it must be remembered that 'slavery' can be viewed relatively - even Myatt asks that citizens do their DUTY for the State, and thereby SERVE it.
As we see from the anarchists on this forum, to serve your nation is for them, an anathema - a form of slavery.
We know better, and regard it an Honour to serve a great Leader.

WIN? 260 Expands on Master Morality vs. Slave Morality. Nietzsche aligns the former with Aryan Ideals and the latter with Semitic resentment. In Myatt we might compare Honour [master morality] and Dishonour [slave morality].
Going back to 'evil' as mentioned above - to the perverse slave/semite/dishonourable person, the Aryan master is 'evil'.

WIN? 262 Delineates the notion that one becomes Noble in adverse conditions only; this fits in well with Myatt's ascetic outlook.
Also, Nietzsche says that an aristocratic state is a means to BREED humans.

WIN? 264 This is where Nietzsche broaches what he calls the "problem of Race".
This hinges on his assertion that we are all what our ancestors have made us - and that this heritage CANNOT BE WIPED OUT. Again, Myatt would agree here, I hope.

WIN? 265/266/271/287 Talk of the Noble Soul; it is egoistic/self-reverencing, expansive and complex. It attaches great importance to the quality of "purity".
Here we are talking of the type of man who would be a Leader of Myatt's nation - a rare, honourable, ascetic type of man; albeit, with a triumphant Will.

WIN? 268 Nietzsche does here touch on what constitutes a Folkish nation; an ancestral evolving of self-understanding over thousands of years.

So, it is possible to read Nietzsche and Myatt in concert, always understanding that Nietzsche stands PRIOR to N-S, and Myatt AFTER N-S.

Aethrei
Saturday, December 6th, 2003, 12:40 PM
Thanks Rhadley.

I fully agree with your first three points, which is why it would be useful to tackle your remaining three points.


4) Nietzsche has no concept of the following: (a) the folk as a living being; (b) the folk-homeland as a living being; (c) the Cosmic Being; (d) the acausal.
5) Myatt gives a clear ethics and system of law based upon honor. Nietzsche does not. This goes far beyonf N's conception of "what is noble".
6) There is really very little about real race - the folk - in Nietzsche; just vague references. For Myatt, race is an expression of Nature, the Cosmos, of order.


Nietzsche's What is Noble? works on three concepts mostly - Honour (which includes self-honesty), Justice, and Innocence of Becoming(i.e. the rejection of the concept of Guilt, Sin, etc.). Let me present some of his views and when you compare it with the recently discussed views of Myatt on Honour and the Criminal System and Beauty, hopefully you'll see Nietzsche and Myatt are not far off.


1."To give men back the courage to their natural drives-
To check their self-underestimation (not that of man as an individual but that of man as nature-)" [Will to Power, 124]

2. "The concept of honour" : resting on the faith in "good society," in chivalrous basic traits, in the obligation continally to maintain poise. Essential: that one does not think one's life important; that one insists unconditionally on good manners on the part of everyone with whom one comes in contact (at least when they do not belong to 'us");... that one always maintains poise." [Will to Power, 948]

3. "Honour as recognition of the similar and equal-in-power." [Will to Power, 255]

4. "It is richness in personality, abundance in oneself, overflowing and bestowing, instinctive good health and affirmation of oneself, that produce great sacrifice and great love: it is strong and godlike selfhood from which these affects grow, just as surely as did the desire to become master, encroachment, the inner certainty of having a right to everything. What according to common ideas are opposite dispositions are rather one disposition; and if one is not firm and brave within oneself, one has nothing to bestow and cannot stretch our one's hand to protect and support." [Will to Power, 388]

5. "The rotted ruling classes have ruined the image of the ruler. The "state" as a court of law is a piece of cowardice, because the great human being is lacking to provide a standard of measurement." [Will to Power, 750]

6. "What is noble? - Care for the most external things, in so far as this care forms a boundary, keeps distant, guards against confusion. Apparent frivolity in word, dress, bearing, through which a stoic severity and self-constraint protects itself against all immodest inquisitiveness." [Will to Power, 943]

7. "Virtue (e.g. in the form of truthfulness) as our noble and dangerous luxury; we must not refuse the disadvantages it brings with it." [Will to Power, 945]

8. "The ability and obligation to exercise prolonged gratitude and prolonged revenge both only within the circle of equals,--artfulness in retaliation, raffinement of the idea in friendship, a certain necessity to have enemies (as outlets for the emotions of envy, quarrelsomeness, arrogance--in fact, in order to be a good friend)a: all these are typical characteristics of the noble morality, which, as has been pointed out, is not the morality of "modern ideas," ..." [BGE, 260]

9. "...every aristocratic morality is intolerant in the education of youth, in the control of women, in the marriage customs, in the relations of old and young, in the penal laws (which have an eye only for the degenerating): it counts intolerance itself among the virtues, under the name of "justice". [BGE, 262]

10. "At the risk of displeasing innocent ears, I submit that egoism belongs to the essence of a noble soul, I mean the unalterable belief that to a being such as "we," other beings must naturally be in subjection, and have to sacrifice themselves. The noble soul accepts the fact of his egoism without question, and also without consciousness of harshness, constraint, or arbitrariness therein, but rather as something that may have its basis in the primary law of things:--if he sought a designation for it he would say: "It is justice itself." He acknowledges under certain circumstances, which made him hesitate at first, that there are other equally privileged ones; as soon as he has settled this question of rank, he moves among those equals and equally privileged ones with the same assurance, as regards modesty and delicate respect, which he enjoys in intercourse with himself... he honours himself in them, and in the rights which he concedes to them, he has no doubt that the exchange of honours and rights, as the essence of all intercourse, belongs also to the natural condition of things." [BGE, 265]

11. "The noble soul has reverence for itself." [BGE, 287]

12. "Duel. It can be said in favor of all duels and affairs of honor, that if a man is so sensitive as not to want to live if so-and-so said or thought this-and-that about him, then he has a right to let the matter be settled by the death of one man or the other. We cannot argue about his being so sensitive; in that regard we are the heirs of the past, its greatness as well as its excesses, without which there can never be any greatness. Now, if a canon of honor exists that allows blood to take the place of death, so that the heart is relieved after a duel according to the rules, then this is a great blessing, because otherwise many human lives would be in danger.
Such an institution, by the way, educates men to be cautious in their remarks, and makes associating with them possible." [Human, All Too Human, 365]

13. "Punishable, never punished. Our crime against criminals is that we treat them like scoundrels." [HH, 66]

14. "Justice as a party's lure. Noble (if not exactly very insightful) representatives of the ruling class may well vow to treat people as equals, and grant them equal rights. To that extent, a socialistic way of thought, based on justice, is possible; but, as we said, only within the ruling class, which in this case practices justice by its sacrifices and renunciations. On the other hand, to demand equality of rights, as do the socialists of the subjugated caste, never results from justice but rather covetousness.
If one shows the beast bloody pieces of meat close by, and then draws them away again until it finally roars, do you think this roar means justice?" [HH, 451]

15. "We do not need forcible new distributions of property, but rather gradual transformations of attitude; justice must become greater in everyone, and the violent instinct weaker." [HH, 452]

16. ""Man always acts for the good." We don't accuse nature of immorality when it sends us a thunderstorm, and makes us wet: why do we call the injurious man immoral? Because in the first case, we assume necessity, and in the second a voluntarily governing free will. But this distinction is in error. Furthermore, even intentional injury is not called immoral in all circumstances: without hesitating, we intentionally kill a gnat, for example, simply because we do not like its buzz; we intentionally punish the criminal and do him harm, to protect ourselves and society. In the first case it is the individual who does harm intentionally, for self-preservation or simply to avoid discomfort; in the second case the state does the harm. All morality allows the intentional infliction of harm for self-defense; that is, when it is a matter of self-preservation!" [HH, 102]

17. "A rewarding justice. The man who has fully understood the theory of complete irresponsibility can no longer include the so called justice that punishes and rewards within the concept of justice, if that consists in giving each his due. For the man who is punished does not deserve the punishment: he is only being used as the means to frighten others away from certain future actions; likewise, the man who is rewarded does not deserve this reward; he could not act other than as he did. Thus a reward means only an encouragement, for him and others, to provide a motive for subsequent actions: praise is shouted to the runner on the track not to the one who has reached the finish line. Neither punishment nor reward are due to anyone as his; they are given to him because it is useful, without his justly having any claims on them. One must say, "The wise man rewards not because men have acted rightly," just as it was said, "The wise man punishes not because men have acted badly, but so they will not act badly." If we were to dispense with punishment and reward, we would lose the strongest motives driving men away from certain actions and toward other actions; the advantage of man requires that they continue..." [HH, 105]

18. "History teaches us that that part of a people maintains itself best whose members generally share a vital public spirit, due to the similarity of their long-standing, incontrovertible principles, that is, of their common faith. In their case, good, sound custom strengthens them; they are taught to subordinate the individual, and their character is given solidity, at first innately and later through education. ...To this extent, the famous theory of the survival of the fittest does not seem to me to be the only viewpoint from which to explain the progress of strengthening of a man or of a race. Rather, two things must coincide: first of all, stable power must increase through minds bound in faith and communal feeling; and secondly, it must be possible to attain higher goals when degenerating natures partially weaken or wound the stable power; it is precisely the weaker nature, as the more delicate and free, that makes progress possible at all. If a people starts to crumble and grow weak at some one place, but is still strong and healthy in general, it can accept being infected with something new, and can incorporate it to its advantage. The task of education is to make the individual so firm and sure that, as a whole being, he can no longer be diverted from his path. But then the educator must wound him, or use the wounds that fate delivers; when pain and need have come about in this way, something new and noble can also be inoculated into the wounded places." [HH, 224]

19. "Beauty no accident. -- The beauty of a race or a family, their grace and graciousness in all gestures, is won by work: like genius, it is the end result of the accumulated work of generations. One must have made great sacrifices to good taste, one must have done much and omitted much, for its sake--seventeenth-century France is admirable in both respects--and good taste must have furnished a principle for selecting company, place, dress, sexual satisfaction; one must have preferred beauty to advantage, habit, opinion, and inertia. Supreme rule of conduct: before oneself too, one must not "let oneself go." The good things are immeasurably costly; and the law always holds that those who have them are different from those who acquire them. All that is good is inherited: whatever is not inherited is imperfect, is a mere beginning..." [Twilight of the Idols, Skirmishes, 47]


Regarding your 4a), 4b), and 6, I understand these notions in Nietzsche when he goes after Christianity that he says is Jewish and a product of the Jews who have infected the "soil" itself and "detrimental to our life" -so he does see the folk homeland as a living being. Elsewhere too in BGE, he speaks of the necessity of Europe to unite with distinction against the Semitic communities. Nietzsche was a guardian of Tradition and traditional values, and his polemic was against those who tried to deteriorate all this that had taken ages to slowly build and perfect itself - his passionate Rome versus Judea in the Antichrist for instance.
Regarding 4c) and 4d), ah no way! Nietzsche was Heraclitean in affirming Order; he upheld the great Goddess Dike/'Justice' as synonymous with Nature.

I agree Nietzsche was not too explicit about all these things, but what Myatt says is there in him. (See point 12. for instance that was discussed here recently.)



So, it is possible to read Nietzsche and Myatt in concert, always understanding that Nietzsche stands PRIOR to N-S, and Myatt AFTER N-S.

Yes, that is what I meant. Thanks for your comments.

Moody
Saturday, December 6th, 2003, 05:19 PM
> So, it is possible to read Nietzsche and Myatt in concert, always understanding that Nietzsche stands PRIOR to N-S, and Myatt AFTER N-S.

Yes, that is what I meant. Thanks for your comments.

No, thank you.

It strikes me that one of Myatt's most controversial ideas, his rejection of punitive measures against wrong-doers, is prefigured in Nietzsche.

While some may think it 'liberal' of Myatt to throw out 'punishment' in favour of 'compensation', they could not be more wrong.

It was Nietzsche who questioned the rationality of punishment, opining that it derived not from the desire to 'right wrongs', but from the festivals of cruelty.

In other words, public executions and tortures had no causal connection to the punishment of criminals, but were rather spectacles in their own right.
It was only later that the two became connected and eventually criminal punishment became punishment per se.

If we recognise that punishment naturally belongs to the impulse to cruelty, then we can separate it once more from our justice system.

Only then can we go back to the ancient system of compensation, and then also allow back the Noble duel and trial-by-combat systems.
The whole culture of the 'champion' can also reappear.

rhadley
Sunday, December 7th, 2003, 06:54 AM
Thanks Rhadley.

I fully agree with your first three points, which is why it would be useful to tackle your remaining three points.

>4) Nietzsche has no concept of the following: (a) the folk as a living being; (b) the folk-homeland as a living being; (c) the Cosmic Being; (d) the acausal.
>5) Myatt gives a clear ethics and system of law based upon honor. Nietzsche does not. This goes far beyonf N's conception of "what is noble".
>6) There is really very little about real race - the folk - in Nietzsche; just vague references. For Myatt, race is an expression of Nature, the Cosmos, of order.


Nietzsche's What is Noble? works on three concepts mostly - Honour (which includes self-honesty), Justice, and Innocence of Becoming(i.e. the rejection of the concept of Guilt, Sin, etc.). Let me present some of his views and when you compare it with the recently discussed views of Myatt on Honour and the Criminal System and Beauty, hopefully you'll see Nietzsche and Myatt are not far off.


1."To give men back the courage to their natural drives-
To check their self-underestimation (not that of man as an individual but that of man as nature-)" [Will to Power, 124]



Here, as I understand it, you state one clear and essential difference between Myatt and Nietzsche. For Nietzsche, his "honor", ethics and so on are a means to return us to our "natural drives" and so on. For Myatt, honor, ethics and so on are a means whereby we control ourselves using our will and reason - undergoing or achieving a personal Triumph of the Will. That is, we judge ourselves, and others, according to clear, rational, ideals and not according to our instincts, our desires, or even our own "individual will to power". This is why Myatt emphasis Honor, Loyalty, and Duty to the folk and Nature. These give us a higher, supra-personal, perspective while still based on the ideal of personal honor.


2. "The concept of honour" : resting on the faith in "good society," in chivalrous basic traits, in the obligation continally to maintain poise. Essential: that one does not think one's life important

Here there is difference, and proof of just how annoying Nietzsche can be. First, contra Nietzsche, one's life is important - as a nexus to the folk, to honor, to the Cosmic Being. Second, we can and have to argue here as to what Nietzsche really means about "one's life is not important" by refering to elsewhere where he states, implicit or otherwise, that it is - qv. his will to power for a start. Third, even admitting for translation, we have undefined, in this passage, terms like "one does not think". What is thinking (to mis-quote Heidegger)? And so on. Fourth, what is meant by "society" and "good society"? Again, we have to assume, or deduce from other places. What is chivalry?

I argue that in contrast Myatt is quite clear, precise - even simple and simplistic sometimes. Honor he defines by reference to a Code of Honor, which he gives. There is no vagueness. It does not involve "society" - only loyalty, duty to the folk and Nature, both of which are defined.




4. "It is richness in personality, abundance in oneself, overflowing and bestowing, instinctive good health and affirmation of oneself, that produce great sacrifice and great love: it is strong and godlike selfhood

Contrast this with the "one does not think one's life is important...." quoted above.


from which these affects grow, just as surely as did the desire to become master, encroachment, the inner certainty of having a right to everything. What according to common ideas

What are "common ideas"? What does "master" mean? Here again we have one of Nietzsche's recurring themes - master and common, which are pejorative terms, hardly in accord with the basic concept of true personal honor. As often, there appears - please note, appears - to be something of a contradiction in Nietzsche. he wants it both ways - a master-morality, the herd which the master "rules over" and rises above; and yet, he sometimes, as in your quote about honor, seems to sense the real meaniong of honor itself. Plus, of course, a great contempt for "the herd".

In contrast, there is in Myatt a genuine socialism - a desire to raise the people, "the massess", up; to evolve them through honorable guidance and idealism. Myatt accepts as a fundamental principle that the vast majority of people have the potential to change, to evolve.

This, from Myatt:


"Why do I admire - why have I steadfastly admired, for thirty-five years - National-Socialist Germany? Because I found, and find, in it an intimation of beauty - a desire to bring beauty, joy, back into the lives of ordinary people; a desire to raise them up from the ugly. And what was wonderful, inspiring, remarkable was that this was done within the confines, within the constraints, of a modern nation with its cities, towns, industries: and that it involved all of the people, not a minority, not an elite. National-Socialism was a means whereby the beautiful could be felt and known - a means whereby beauty was once again presenced in the lives of ordinary people. A means whereby a connexion was made to those things which can and do elevate and evolve us, and which thus create an inner beauty. This is the simple, profound, beautiful message of National-Socialism."



5. "The rotted ruling classes have ruined the image of the ruler. The "state" as a court of law is a piece of cowardice, because the great human being is lacking to provide a standard of measurement." [Will to Power, 750]

Ruler, and the ruled... the great human being. Here are other recurring themes in Nietzsche, which point once again to a division within humanity.





12. "Duel. It can be said in favor of all duels and affairs of honor, that if a man is so sensitive as not to want to live if so-and-so said or thought this-and-that about him, then he has a right to let the matter be settled by the death of one man or the other. We cannot argue about his being so sensitive; in that regard we are the heirs of the past, its greatness as well as its excesses, without which there can never be any greatness. Now, if a canon of honor exists that allows blood to take the place of death, so that the heart is relieved after a duel according to the rules, then this is a great blessing, because otherwise many human lives would be in danger.
Such an institution, by the way, educates men to be cautious in their remarks, and makes associating with them possible." [Human, All Too Human, 365]




Yes, indeed - but not in his view as the basic, the only, law, of society. Myatt in contrast insists that all the implications of honor - of which the duel is one - are applied to all, to society, and form the basis of all laws.



13. "Punishable, never punished. Our crime against criminals is that we treat them like scoundrels." [HH, 66]

Again, who is a "criminal"? How is crime defined? Who makes the law and why? Myatt gives clear simple answers - there are, and should be, only honorable and dishonorable deeds. That is, there should be no such thing as "crime" and thus no "criminals" - only honorable or dishonorable people.

Once again, Nietzsche has part of the insight - but only part, and not very clear.

Kudos to Myatt surely for making a clear, practical, unambiguous system.




14. "Justice as a party's lure. Noble (if not exactly very insightful) representatives of the ruling class may well vow to treat people as equals, and grant them equal rights. To that extent, a socialistic way of thought, based on justice, is possible; but, as we said, only within the ruling class, which in this case practices justice by its sacrifices and renunciations. On the other hand, to demand equality of rights, as do the socialists of the subjugated caste, never results from justice but rather covetousness.
If one shows the beast bloody pieces of meat close by, and then draws them away again until it finally roars, do you think this roar means justice?" [HH, 451]



Quite insightful analysis - but the solution? The clear, simple, human and honorable solution? Again, Myatt verses Nietzsche. The simple - I would venture to even say vis-a-vis his The Numinous Way of Folk Culture - the gentle, tolerant, evolutionary and very human solution of Myatt, applicable to all, in contrast to the rather forceful often ambiguous solution of Nietzsche, applicable at best to some.




16. ""Man always acts for the good." We don't accuse nature of immorality when it sends us a thunderstorm, and makes us wet: why do we call the injurious man immoral? Because in the first case, we assume necessity, and in the second a voluntarily governing free will. But this distinction is in error. Furthermore, even intentional injury is not called immoral in all circumstances: without hesitating, we intentionally kill a gnat, for example, simply because we do not like its buzz; we intentionally punish the criminal and do him harm, to protect ourselves and society. In the first case it is the individual who does harm intentionally, for self-preservation or simply to avoid discomfort; in the second case the state does the harm. All morality allows the intentional infliction of harm for self-defense; that is, when it is a matter of self-preservation!" [HH, 102]


Here we see the limits of Nietzsche again. What is "immoral"? What is "criminal"? What is "society"? And so on.

But the greatest error is in the last sentence. Honor, correctly defined, is very different. It is not self-preservation - it is honor. Self-preservation often belongs to the coward, the person of dishonor, and often leads to a person being dishonorable to "save themselves".

The problem is, Nietzsche here as so often expresses a partial insight without clearly using a clear standard to judge all what he is discussing, as is evident in his use of the term "criminal" for instance.



18. "History teaches us that that part of a people maintains itself best whose members generally share a vital public spirit, due to the similarity of their long-standing, incontrovertible principles, that is, of their common faith. In their case, good, sound custom strengthens them; they are taught to subordinate the individual, and their character is given solidity, at first innately and later through education. ...

This seems to assume some type of organized State which the individual must somehow to subserviant to. Again, lack of clearness; lack of a moral principle which is applied absolutely.





I agree Nietzsche was not too explicit about all these things,

Which is to Nietzsche's disadvantage. Without clearly defining things; without certain principles clearly stated and applied in all instances, there is no complete Way of Life - just, perhaps, a "philosophy".

This, for me is the crux. Myatt presents a Way of Life; Nietzsche, a "philosophy".



but what Myatt says is there in him.


I disagree. Certain things may be prefigured in Nietzsche - but not much. The differences are great, especially in relation to the individual and The State - in applying honor; in relation to the potential of the individual; in relation of the individual to Nature and the Cosmos beyond. In relation to the folk, Nature, as living beings - beings which are defined in a rational, easily udnerstandable way, via the concept of the acausal.

As I said above - Myatt presents a Way of Life; Nietzsche presents a philosophy. Or may be I should be more precise, and say Myatt presents two Ways of Life - his The Numinous Way, of Folk Culture, and his new evolutionary vision of National-Socialism.

In respect of the relation between these two new Ways, he says:


"The Numinous Way is the esoteric essence, the inner meaning, of National-Socialism - what National-Socialism is evolving to become and should become, given the ethic of honour. Or, expressed another way, National-Socialism is a more causal manifestation of the acausal apprehension that The Numinous Way manifests. Or, in another, older and less accurate terminology, these are expressions of Lightning, and Sun. As we evolve, we travel toward the acausal aspect, but while the peoples of the world remain as they often are - often ignoble, dishonourable, in ignorance of the truths of The Numinous Way - and while tyranny and oppression exist, there will be a need for a more causal manifestation to redress the balance and begin the process of change, of evolution, toward the numinous..." (From: In Pursuit of the Numinous)

Aethrei
Tuesday, December 9th, 2003, 12:23 PM
For Myatt, honor, ethics and so on are a means
whereby we control ourselves using our will and reason
- undergoing or achieving a personal Triumph of the
Will. That is, we judge ourselves, and others,
according to clear, rational, ideals and not according
to our instincts, our desires, or even our own
"individual will to power".

Nietzsche addresses this too, and Myatt would be in
agreement according to what you say; he says,

""Should one follow one's feelings?" - That one should
put one's life in danger, yielding to a generous
feeling and under the impulse of a moment, that is of
little value and does not even characterize one. ...A
higher stage is: to overcome even this pressure within
us and to perform a heroic act not on impulse - but
coldly, raisonnable, without being overwhelmed by
stormy feelings of pleasure... Blind indulgence of an
affect, totally regardless of whether it be a generous
and compassionate or a hostile affect, is the cause of
the greatest evils. Greatness of character does not
consist in not possessing these affects - on the
contrary, one possesses them to the highest degree -
but in having them under control." [Will to Power,
928]

He states this again - "To create control and
certainity in regard to one's strgenth of will through
asceticism of every kind." [Will to Power, 921]


proof of just how annoying Nietzsche can be

That is a bit unfair; Nietzsche was working under severe strains of the eye and general illness.
I have a tremendous respect for his views and owe him much for opening up a route to a solid and noble and what I believe - an enduring Aryan philosophy.


First, contra Nietzsche, one's life is important -
as a nexus to the folk, to honor, to the Cosmic Being.

No, you see, 'because' one's life is important as you
say as a nexus to the folk and the whole chain of
generations, one does not think one's life important -
in the sense, individuality does not take a priority
before the good of the Volk community.
Because the whole is important, Nietzsche says, the
part must not lord it over the good of the society.
Tradition is upheld over selfish Individualism.


Third, even admitting for translation, we have
undefined, in this passage

Unless Nietzsche thinks something needs to be
revalued, he usually leaves terms and notions
undefined - these are then to be taken in the usual
sense. Chivalry, honour, etc. are understood in the
sense of magnanimity of character, in terms of Noble
taste, honourable views, deeds that confer honour upon
others and upon oneself, with the sentiment that one
acts on behalf of all of one's ancestors or race or
nation. To belittle difference in others and differing
ways of life is a slight on their generosity and
tolerance - this is considered dishonourable.


I argue that in contrast Myatt is quite clear,
precise - even simple and simplistic sometimes.

I agree with this. I never meant to say Nietzsche was
like this as well; just that Myatt's views on Honour
and Beauty and Traditional-feeling was there in
Nietzsche.


There is no vagueness.

Nietzsche is not vague either; its just that he is
speaking to fellow free-spirits, and future
philosophers.


What does "master" mean?

It means a man who has all his conflicting instinctual
drives within him under control and in a certain order
of rank, so that, one sees his taste is noble,
cultured; he is a man of honour, affirms
life-promoting values; he is profound and
vast-hearted; he is generous, self-reverent, and is
loyal to his own code of ethics that he has assigned
to himself. Nietzsche writes something on the matter
here that is comparable both with Myatt and the old
Anglo-Saxon/Nordic/Homeric tradition - the idea of
hospitality :

"There is a noble and dangerous carelessness... the
carelessness of the self-assured and overrich soul
that has never troubled about friends but knows only
hospitality, and practices, and knows how to practice,
only hospitality - heart and home open to anyone who
cares to enter, whether beggar or cripple or king.
This is genuine geniality..." [Will to Power, 939]


Here again we have one of Nietzsche's recurring
themes - master and common, which are pejorative
terms, hardly in accord with the basic concept of true
personal honor.

Not right. Nietzsche is being very honourable in my
view in stating that each one of us must be true to
our own natures. Self-honesty is a virtue. Nietzsche
is actually being just as compassionate as Hitler was
in showing that most people cannot handle the burden
of this life, and so it must be the task of the few to
bear responsibility to uplift this community as a
whole by giving them direction, by freeing them to
pursue their way of life and happiness. His philosophy
therefore, is about (among other things) how best to
allign these moralities of the few and the many so
that the outcome is most fruitful, and life as a whole
ascends, is improved, is justified.
"Never to conclude "what is right for one is fair for
another"" [Will to Power, 921]


Myatt accepts as a fundamental principle that the
vast majority of people have the potential to change,
to evolve.

So does Nietzsche; but he points out that the
people/humanity lack a common aim, and this is to be
shaped and provided by noble leaders and visionaries
honourably. The leader acknowledges and feels the full
power of his people in him, and bears the
responsibility to give them expression.


Ruler, and the ruled... the great human being. Here
are other recurring themes in Nietzsche, which point
once again to a division within humanity.

Not really; this is the same leadership principle in
Myatt as well.


Myatt in contrast insists that all the implications
of honor - of which the duel is one - are applied to
all, to society, and form the basis of all laws.

Thanks for clarifying that.


Again, who is a "criminal"?

Nietzsche distinguishing the petty criminal from the
great one offers the following perspectives :

"Perspective of evaluation:

Influence of the quantity (great, small) of the aim.
Influence of the spirituality of the means.
Influence of manners during the act.
Influence of success or failure.
Influence of the opposing forces and their value.
Influence of that which is permitted and forbidden."
[Will to Power, 779]


How is crime defined?

Nietzsche defines it thus:
"Crime belongs to the concept "revolt against the
social order."" [Will to Power, 740]


Who makes the law and why?

Law is made by those few creative artist-type
individuals whose inherent morality is that of a
law-giver. They are "commanders" who say - "Thus it
shall be!".
"They alone determine the "whither" and the
"wherefore" [Will to Power, 972].
Why? Because the collective consciousness of strength
and reverence is greatest in them.
And because they are clear, confident and certain
about the "why" of their lives.


That is, there should be no such thing as "crime"
and thus no "criminals" - only honorable or
dishonorable people.

Exactly; Nietzsche sees no criminal as such either,
only "good" (honourable) or "bad" (dishonourable) - he
rejects the Semitic mentality of good and evil with
its concept of sin and guilt and upholds the Aryan
view.


Kudos to Myatt surely for making a clear, practical,
unambiguous system.

I'll second you on that.


in contrast to the rather forceful often ambiguous
solution of Nietzsche, applicable at best to some.

Nietzsche says if everyone waited for the majority of
the people to first agree on something, nothing would
be accomplished. Sometimes, the visionary must take
risk to set aims and tasks for them before their unity
itself disintegrates. This is not hybris but to lead
means to take responsibility for the whole.


But the greatest error is in the last sentence.
Honor, correctly defined, is very different. It is not
self-preservation

Nietzsche's foundation of the concept of Honour is
simple; it is self-reverence. That self is the
individual self as well as self as part of a certain
race/community, as well as self as Being -
"I wish men would begin by respecting themselves:
everything else follows from that. ...This is
something different from the blind drive to love
oneself." [Will to Power, 919]
Here, self-preservation is not meant in the crude
Darwinian/Jewish/pure-Materialist sense of preserving
oneself, but in the sense of upholding and maintaining
one's self-respect. Defending one's way of being.


This seems to assume some type of organized State
which the individual must somehow to subserviant to.

Nietzsche's soldier language! Subordination of the
individual = affirming one's place in the whole, as
part of the whole. The natural organic law of
Hierarchy, and knowing when to command and when to
obey before this law.


lack of a moral principle which is applied
absolutely.

That's true, because Nietzsche belives in
perspectivism.


Which is to Nietzsche's disadvantage. Without
clearly defining things; without certain principles
clearly stated and applied in all instances, there is
no complete Way of Life - just, perhaps, a
"philosophy".

Well, Nietzsche says become who you are -
he does not think it right to coerce one truth for
all. Everyone is an expression of their moralities and
their will to power, but this does not mean there
cannot be an overarching unity - an Aryan way of life
is possible through the natural law of hierarchy and
rank-ordering. This confers a coordinated unity and stability to the
whole.


As I said above - Myatt presents a Way of Life;
Nietzsche presents a philosophy.

I would rather say, while Nietzsche presents N-S TO the Few,
Myatt presents N-S FOR the People; i.e. Nietzsche
addressed his works to the Few so that they could be
trusted with the task of giving a noble and honourable
direction. Myatt speaks to the Volk as a whole and
sees his task as the awakening of these people, to
evoke their self-reflection that they may value our
Aryan path - the Numinous way as you say. Both
emphasize importance on Nature and the Natural way of
being - this I cannot help but see in them both.

When Myatt writes, "National-Socialism was a means
whereby the beautiful could be felt and known - a
means whereby beauty was once again presenced in the
lives of ordinary people.", I see this sentiment in
Nietzsche's expression, Apollonianism of the Dionysian
will [in Will to Power, 1050], where beauty is
presenced and won by struggle, through bravery and
courage and will, a certain warrior way of life -
beauty is victoriously brought into presence by
honourable/noble conquest; Nietzsche says Beauty is
not something that is just given, one feels it alive
because one has willed it.

I did not mean to push Nietzsche at the expense of
Myatt; it only seemed natural to point out
that all Aryanists and Nazis place Honour, Tradition,
Nobility and Justice at the core of their values. That
these 'necessarily' always happen to be the foundation
of their works.
I must however make clear that I see the fact while
Myatt entertains Anarchism [in the other post on the Numinous], Nietzsche specifically does not.

Heil Wotan!

Moody
Monday, May 24th, 2004, 07:22 PM
I would say that Myatt's emphasis on Honour is actually a SHIFT for N-S, where hitherto BLOOD came first;
Blood AND Honour.
Or else Blood and Soil.

Rosenberg's Myth of the 20th century was the Blood Mythos.

Myatt shifts the emphasis; the Myth of the 21st century is the Honour Mythos.

Blood remains, but Honour becomes the most important element.

There is a shift from the biological to the ethical - and here is the connection with Nietzsche.
Nietzsche's 'transvaluation of all values' is essentially an ethical campaign. The re-valuation entails the recurrence of Aryan values; the very values that Myatt explores.

This is why Myatt is important to us NOW.

http://www.dfwarms.com/images/dagger_16_ss_himmler_close_up.JPG

rhadley
Tuesday, May 25th, 2004, 05:43 AM
I would say that Myatt's emphasis on Honour is actually a SHIFT for N-S, where hitherto BLOOD came first;
Blood AND Honour.
Or else Blood and Soil.

Rosenberg's Myth of the 20th century was the Blood Mythos.

Myatt shifts the emphasis; the Myth of the 21st century is the Honour Mythos.

Blood remains, but Honour becomes the most important element.

There is a shift from the biological to the ethical - and here is the connection with Nietzsche.
Nietzsche's 'transvaluation of all values' is essentially an ethical campaign. The re-valuation entails the recurrence of Aryan values; the very values that Myatt explores.

This is why Myatt is important to us NOW.



I agree. Of NS and honor, Myatt writes:


"I have made the ethic of honour, and the laws based upon honour, the foundation of The Numinous Way, the Warrior Way, and thus of National-Socialism itself. This honour was already implicit in both the Warrior Way and National-Socialism, but I have been able to consciously express it, to refine it, to state in words which cannot be misunderstood what such honour means and implies for individuals, for communities and for civilization itself. That is, I have made conscious what was hitherto mostly instinctive, and I believe this is of great importance for our future evolution." (In Pursuit of the Numinous)


What has hitherto not been very well understood in respect of National-Socialism, is that it is not race which defines our humanity - it is honour and reason. Race is our relation to Nature: how Nature is expressed, is manifest, in us. As such race is important and indeed vital; but so is honour. It is the combination of an acceptance of both race and honour which is National-Socialism. An affirmation of race without an affirmation honour is not National-Socialism, just as an affirmation of honour without an affirmation of race is not National-Socialism. It is this living, organic, dialectic of honour and race which defines National-Socialism itself....(From: Esoteric Hitlerism)

Moody
Tuesday, May 25th, 2004, 05:21 PM
This is a very exciting departure, and gives a direction to those who may seem at a loss where to take nationalist philosophy.

As Myatt says, Race is our relation to Nature ... BUT, Honour is our relation to the Human, or rather the Overhuman.
We have grappled with these notions on other threads which may be worth re-reading;

Might Is Right?
http://www.forums.skadi.net/showthread.php?t=5488

Philosophy of the 'Human?'
http://www.forums.skadi.net/showthread.php?t=7219

Here the notion of an Aryan ethics is discussed. I do not believe that the stand-by of a 'might is right' ethics is sufficient for this next ethical stage. We need a a far more nuanced revaluation.


http://www.ruedigersuenner.de/sexualmagie/fidus.jpg

Ventrue
Wednesday, September 7th, 2005, 06:21 AM
Nietzsche is very tedious reading, but he came up with a couple of things that had been absent in philosophy for centuries, even millennia, because of Christian influence. He identified the "will to power" and he exposed "slave morality." For that you have to give him a lot of credit.

I suggest Nietzsche is read by finding the best quotes from him on the internet. If you're intelligent, that's enough. And actually, modern WN writers have some Nietzschean stuff in their writing, but better explained and combined with other things that we need.

Myatt has some nice ideas, but there's a danger there, getting too caught up with what's "noble." Eventually you'll start doing what nearly every White leader in the last centuries have done: give away power and territory to non-Whites because it wouldn't be noble to use force. Result: a fourteen-year-old girl is raped to death by Blacks in the Superdome and your media are owned by Jews, so they ignore it. That's where too much focus on what's noble will take you. Focus on survival instead. I say Dr. Pierce and a few others who are like him are the philosophers you need.

Blutwölfin
Monday, October 10th, 2005, 10:43 AM
From Alfred Baeumler, Studien zur deutschen Geistesgeschichte (Berlin: Junker und Duennnhaupt Verlag, 1937), pp. 283-285, 288-294.

Nietzsche and National Socialism stand on the other side of the traditions of the German bourgeoisie. What does that mean?

The spiritual forces which have formed the German bourgeoisie in the last several centuries have been Pietism, the Enlightenment, and Romanticism. Pietism was the last truly revolutionary religious movement on Lutheran soil. It led men from a hopeless political reality back into their own selves and gathered them together in small private circles. It was a religious individualism which strengthened the inclination toward concern with self, toward psychological analysis and biographical examination. Every apolitical state-alien tendency necessarily had to find support and nourishment in Pietistic Germany.

The wholly different individualism of the Enlightenment also worked in this direction. This individualism was not of a religious-sentimental character. It believed in reason, it was rational, but it was "political" only in that it denied the feudal system; it was unable to erect an enduring political system of its own and was capable only of breaking the path for the economic system of capitalism. Man was viewed as a wholly individual entity, cut off from all original orders and relations, a fictitious person responsible only to himself.

In contrast, Romanticism saw man again in the light of his natural and historical ties. Romanticism opened our eyes to the night, the past, our ancestors, to the mythos and the Volk. The movement that led from Herder to Goerres, to the brothers Grimm, Eichendorff, Arnim, and Savigny, is the only spiritual movement that is still fully alive. It is the only movement with which Nietzsche had to wrestle ....

When we call National Socialism a world view we mean that not only the bourgeois parties but also their ideologies have been annihilated. Only ill-willed persons could maintain that everything that has been created by the past must now be negated. Rather, we mean that we have entered into a new relationship with our past, that our view has been cleared for what was truly forceful in this past but which had been clouded by bourgeois ideology. In a word, we have discovered new possibilities for understanding the essence of German existence. Precisely in this Nietzsche has preceded us. We hold a view of Romanticism that is different from his. But his most personal and lonely possession, the negation of bourgeois ideology as a whole, has today become the property of a generation.

The foundations of Christian morality -- religious individualism, a guilty conscience, meekness, concern for the eternal salvation of the soul -- all are absolutely foreign to Nietzsche. He revolts against the concept of repentance: "I do not like this kind of cowardice about one's own action; one should not leave one's own self in the lurch before the assault of unexpected disgrace and vexation. Rather, an extreme pride is in order here. For, finally, what is the use! No deed can be undone by repentance."

What he means here is not a reduction of responsibility, but rather its intensification. Here speaks the man who knows how much courage, how much pride, is necessary to maintain himself in the face of Fate. Out of his amor fati Nietzsche spoke contemptuously about Christianity with its "perspective of salvation." As a Nordic man he never understood for what purpose he should be "redeemed." The Mediterranean religion of salvation is alien to and far removed from his Nordic attitude. He can understand man only as a warrior against Fate. A mode of thought which sees struggle and work only as a penance appears incomprehensible to him. "Our real life is a false, apostatic, and sinful existence, a penalty existence." Sorrow, battle, work, death, are merely taken as objections to life. "Man as innocent, idle, immortal, happy -- this concept of 'highest desirability' especially must be criticized." Nietzsche turns passionately upon the monastic vita contemplativa, against Augustine's "Sabbath of all Sabbaths." He praises Luther for having made an end of the vita contemplativa. The Nordic melody of strife and labor sounds strong and clear here. The accent with which we pronounce these words today we heard from Nietzsche for the first time.

We call Nietzsche the philosopher of heroism. But that is only a half-truth if we do not regard him at the same time as the philosopher of activism. He considered himself the world-historical counterpart to Plato. "Works" result not from the desire for display, not from the acknowledgment of "extramundane" values, but from practice, from the ever repeated deed. Nietzsche employs a famous antithesis to make this clear: "First and above all there is the work. And that means training, training, training! The accompanying faith will come by itself -- of that you can be certain." Nietzsche opposes the Christian proscription of the political sphere, of the sphere of action altogether, with the thesis that also overcame the contrast between Catholicism and Protestantism (work and faith): "One has to train oneself not in the strengthening of value feelings, but in action; one has to know how to do something." In this way he re-established the purity of the sphere of action, of the political sphere.

Nietzsche's "values" have nothing to do with the Beyond, and therefore cannot be petrified into dogma. In ourselves, through us, they rise struggling to the surface; they exist only as long as we make ourselves responsible for them. When Nietzsche warns, "Be true to the Earth!" he reminds us of the idea that is rooted in our strength but does not hope for "realization" in a distant Beyond. It is not enough to point out the "this-worldly" character of Nietzsche's values if one at the same time does not want to refute the notion that values are "realized" by action. Something inferior is always attached to the "realization" of given values whether these values are of a mundane or extramundane character ....

Nietzsche's Nordic and soldierly valuation opposes that of the Mediterranean world and that of the priests. His critique of religion is a criticism of the priest, and arises from the point of view of the warrior, since Nietzsche demonstrates that even the origin of religion lies in the realm of power. This explains the fateful contradiction in a morality based on the Christian religion. "To secure the rule of moral values, all kinds of unmoral forces and passions have to be enlisted. The development of moral values is the work of unmoral passions and considerations." Morality, therefore, is the creation of unmorality. "How to bring virtue to rule: This treatise deals with the great politics of virtue." It teaches for the first time "that one cannot bring about the reign of virtue by the same means used to establish any kind of rule, least of all through virtue." "One has to be very unmoral to make morality through deeds." Nietzsche replaces the bourgeois moral philosophy with the philosophy of the will to power -- in other words with the philosophy of politics. If in doing so he becomes the apologist for the "unconscious," this "unconscious" is not to be understood in terms of depth pyschology. Here the concern is not with the instinctive and unconscious drives of an individual. Rather, "unconscious" here means "perfect" and "able." And beyond that, "unconscious" also means life as such, the organism, the "great reason" of the body.

Consciousness is only a tool, a detail in the totality of life. In opposition to the philosophy of the conscious, Nietzsche asserts the aristocracy of nature. But for thousands of years a life-weary morality has opposed the aristocracy of the strong and healthy. Like National Socialism, Nietzsche sees in the state, in society, the "great mandatary of life," responsible for each life's failure to life itself. "The species requires the extinction of the misfits, weaklings, and degenerates: but Christianity as a conserving force appeals especially to them." Here we encounter the basic contradiction: whether one proceeds from a natural life context or from an equality of individual souls before God. Ultimately the ideal of democratic equality rests upon the latter assumption. The former contains the foundations of a new policy. It takes unexcelled boldness to base a state upon the race. A new order of things is the natural consequence. It is this order which Nietzsche undertook to establish in opposition to the existing one.

In the face of the overpowering strength of the race, what happens to the individual? He returns -- as a single member in a community. The herd instinct is basically altogether different from the instinct of an "aristocratic society," composed of strong, natural men who do not permit their basic instincts to languish in favor of a mediocre average -- men who know how to curb and control their passions instead of weakening or negating them. This again must not be understood from an individualistic point of view. For a long time emotions will have to be kept under "tyrannical" control. This can be done only by one community, one race, one people ....

If there ever was a truly German expression, it is this: One must have the need to be strong, otherwise one never will be. We Germans know what it means to maintain ourselves against all opposition. We understand the "will to power" -- even if in an altogether different manner than our enemies assume. Even in this connection, Nietzsche has supplied the deepest meaning: "We Germans demand something from ourselves that nobody expected from us -- we want more."

If today we see German youth on the march under the banner of the swastika, we are reminded of Nietzsche's "untimely meditations" in which this youth was appealed to for the first time. It is our greatest hope that the state today is wide open to our youth. And if today we shout "Heil Hitler!" to this youth, at the same time we are also hailing Nietzsche.


Source (http://es.geocities.com/sucellus23/686.htm)

Vingolf
Wednesday, November 15th, 2006, 11:22 PM
The liberal outlook derived ultimately from Locke on your side, and the Faustian Germanic outlook, derived from thinkers like Nietzsche on mine.

Both are fundamentally individualistic (Nietzsche being the most radical), and both are Germanic [I see Locke as almost the 'British Nietzsche']. So I fail to see your point here. Both the German and the Anglo-Saxon cultures and traditions of thought are variations on a common Germanic theme. BTW, I didn’t know that Nietzsche is on “your side” here.

Moody
Sunday, November 19th, 2006, 05:24 PM
Both are fundamentally individualistic (Nietzsche being the most radical), and both are Germanic. So I fail to see your point here. Both the German and the Anglo-Saxon cultures and traditions of thought are variations on a common Germanic theme. BTW, I didn’t know that Nietzsche is on “your side” here.

Both are antipodes to each other.

Nietzsche wrote "I hate Locke", and also said that he didn't think that the English were a "philosophical race" [cf., BGE]

He certainly thought there were great differences between the Germans and English in cultural temperament.

For example;

Locke's 'individualism' is liberal, egalitarian and democratic.

Nietzsche's 'individualism' is aristocratic, hierarchical and anti-egalitarian.

Indeed, Nietzsche's so-called 'individualism' has little in common with the use of the word in England today.

He believed in a caste system; he believed in the necessity of slavery; he believed in a master race and a select few of higher men or Overhumans.

As he wrote;

"My philosophy aims at an Ordering of Rank: not at an individualistic morality".
[Nietzsche, WP 287]

Only the Few deserved 'individuality', according to this view of Nietzsche's.

And yes, Nietzsche was very much the spiritual mentor of National Socialism.

Vingolf
Sunday, November 19th, 2006, 10:00 PM
Both are antipodes to each other.

My statements reflected the view that both English and German culture and traditions of thought are in several respects variations on a common Germanic theme (individualism, for instance). I was not referring to Locke in particular.



Nietzsche wrote "I hate Locke", and also said that he didn't think that the English were a "philosophical race" [cf., BGE]


- This is common knowledge. Do you take everything a philosopher says at face value? Nietzsche said a lot of things, quite often contradicting himself.


And yes, Nietzsche was very much the spiritual mentor of National Socialism.

- A contradictory, brilliant philosopher like Nietzsche have been a spiritual mentor of a variety of different ideologies and people. Any interpretation of Nietzsche will necessarily be fragmentary.

Moody
Monday, November 20th, 2006, 12:28 PM
My statements reflected the view that both English and German culture and traditions of thought are in several respects variations on a common Germanic theme (individualism, for instance). I was not referring to Locke in particular.

I thought that it fits into the present thread which looks at Nietzsche's aristocratic position, which is where he would greatly differ to Locke.

That issue can be discussed in the round here, rather than as a side issue.

Also, the material already posted in the present thread allows others to judge Nietzsche's position in relation to Locke [and not necessarliy Locke "in particular" but the whole liberal tradition which stems from him]. Also, we must remember that the original point of comparison is with another Englishman, Myatt, surely a closer contender for a "British Nietzsche".


This is common knowledge. Do you take everything a philosopher says at face value? Nietzsche said a lot of things, quite often contradicting himself.

Nietzsche never deviated from his aristocratic position - ever.

Of course it is 'common knowledge' that he took up many 'contradictory' positions as a way of "taking sides against himself"; philosophers often do this.

However there is a core of aristocratic thinking that goes through Nietzsche's work from start to finish.
In order to see this one has to seek below "face value" - indeed, the view that Nietzsche was merely a relativist is the superficial and 'common' one.


A contradictory, brilliant philosopher like Nietzsche have been a spiritual mentor of a variety of different ideologies and people. Any interpretation of Nietzsche will necessarily be fragmentary.

If one approaches him as a relativist, of course.
But if one observes the core Nietzschean values of Master Morality, and Aristocratic Radicalism, then one realises that the prophet of the Ubermensch and the Will to Power is particularly important for the spiritual aspects of Fascism and National Socialism.

Vingolf
Friday, November 24th, 2006, 10:08 PM
...indeed, the view that Nietzsche was merely a relativist is the superficial and 'common' one.

It is undoubtedly a 'common' view in our time, yes. Nietzsche is, actually, claimed to be the first postmodernist relativist.


But if one observes the core Nietzschean values of Master Morality, and Aristocratic Radicalism, then one realises that the prophet of the Ubermensch and the Will to Power is particularly important for the spiritual aspects of Fascism and National Socialism.

Nietzsche has undoubtedly been very important in a fascist/National Socialist historical context, but the fascist/National Socialist reading is only one of several possible readings. Nietzsche was not particularly anti-Semitic, for example. He repeatedly expressed a kind of "anti-German-nationalist" point of view.

Moody
Saturday, November 25th, 2006, 04:56 PM
It is undoubtedly a 'common' view in our time, yes. Nietzsche is, actually, claimed to be the first postmodernist relativist.

He certainly did much to destroy the concept of Absolute Truth. However, this done, he then established his own truth, with a small, 't' of perspectivism, and the world as Will to Power.
Most postmodern relativists do not make the latter move but rather remain with an aporia.


Nietzsche has undoubtedly been very important in a fascist/National Socialist historical context, but the fascist/National Socialist reading is only one of several possible readings. Nietzsche was not particularly anti-Semitic, for example. He repeatedly expressed a kind of "anti-German-nationalist" point of view.

True, but the NS reading is closest to his main and unchanging themes themes of Will to Power, Ubermensch, Masters of the Earth etc.,

Also Nietzsche opened up a way of thinking of morality which effectively contrasted Semitic Morality [slave morality] with Aryan Morality [master morality].

So these broad and powerful philosophical themes can be weighed against his remarks on the Jews and Germans which are often tainted by his rejection by his fellow Germans in his own lifetime.

Vingolf
Sunday, November 26th, 2006, 08:13 PM
True, but the NS reading is closest to his main and unchanging themes themes of Will to Power, Ubermensch, Masters of the Earth etc.,

I am not quite sure what you mean by NS (the movement, the leadership, Rosenberg?). Some of the "problem" with Nietzsche is his language, his rhetoric, his aphorisms. He never developed a philosphical system in the traditional sense and he never founded a "school of thought".


Also Nietzsche opened up a way of thinking of morality which effectively contrasted Semitic Morality [slave morality] with Aryan Morality [master morality].

Indeed, I believe his Genealogy of Morals has been some of the most influential of his works. But it seems that posterity has yet to pay sufficient attention to his Jenseits von Gut und Böse. There's still too much talk of "evil" and "evildoers".

Moody
Tuesday, November 28th, 2006, 06:21 PM
I am not quite sure what you mean by NS (the movement, the leadership, Rosenberg?). Some of the "problem" with Nietzsche is his language, his rhetoric, his aphorisms. He never developed a philosphical system in the traditional sense and he never founded a "school of thought".

Nietzsche and NS have that in common, then: they never developed a "system in the traditional sense", nor did they found a single "school", but a plethora of 'schools'.

NS inherited this will to fragmentation from Nietzsche.

The impetus of this will was prior to Nietzsche himself, and was/is due to a counter-movement against the unsurpassed systems of Kant and Hegel in German culture.

A return to the fragment; to the discrete sword-words of the Presocratics on the one hand, and to coded Runic carvings on the other, are not a "problem".
They are part of the heritage shared by Nietzsche and NS.

So by 'NS', I mean it all - in all its unsystematic will to power - as in Nietzsche.

But certain themes rise to the heights, in NS as in Nietzsche.


Indeed, I believe his Genealogy of Morals has been some of the most influential of his works. But it seems that posterity has yet to pay sufficient attention to his Jenseits von Gut und Böse. There's still too much talk of "evil" and "evildoers".

The influence changes with the epoch - once it was Zarathustra, then the Genealogy etc.,
I am currently looking at Derrida's close reading of BGE in his 'Politics of Friendship', which makes some new departures, but they are too literary for my tastes: the philosophers of the future have yet to come.

Martial
Wednesday, November 29th, 2006, 12:55 AM
Nietszche was not a racist or antisemite in any conventional sense of the word; he was assuredly one of the worst misogynists who ever lived. Nothing suggests a belief in a noble people, as opposed to an individual superman. Consider the The Gay Science.

The first two sentences of aphorism 2:

I keep having the same experience and keep resisting it every time. I do not want to believe it although it is palpable: the great majority of people lacks an intellectual conscience.


The first sentence of aphorism 3:

Common natures consider all noble, magnaminous feelings inexpedient and therefore first of all incredible.

This man lived in Germany and had no respect for the common German citizen, whom he considered beneath contempt. Nietszche gives one a great charge whenever he is read, but few, if any, accept his philosophy. Today we are all empiricists in our daily, non-religious lives, whether we wish to admit this or not.

Moody
Friday, December 1st, 2006, 06:34 PM
Nietszche was not a racist or antisemite in any conventional sense of the word; he was assuredly one of the worst misogynists who ever lived. Nothing suggests a belief in a noble people, as opposed to an individual superman.

This is not so; it is unfortunate that in English the word 'Superman' doesn't resonate as 'Superhuman', as it should.

While Nietzsche believed in great individuals [a rare few], he also believed in elites and aristocracies.

His attitude towards women was a reaction against the beginnings of feminism which he saw - quite clearly - had intended to narrow the gap between men and women.
Nietzsche believed that there should always be distances between genders as well as between castes and peoples.

He certainly believed in the conception of race and he associated 'slave morality' with the Semites, as I have already said.

Nietzsche was greatly admired by Hitler who gave generous funding to the Nietzsche Archive while he was in power and visted there frequently.
If Nietzsche had had no racial aspects to his writing I doubt if Hitler would have paid the philosopher any mind.


Consider the The Gay Science.
The first two sentences of aphorism 2:
I keep having the same experience and keep resisting it every time. I do not want to believe it although it is palpable: the great majority of people lacks an intellectual conscience.

This is a good aphorism, as are most of Nietzsche's.

However, Nietzsche was one of the first really 'modern' philosophers, in that he pursued not just one narrative, but many.
Often he subverted and deconstructed not just the ideas of others, but even his own.
This means he must be read in a nuanced fashion.
That Hitler was able to read Nietzsche in this way is clear from the Table Talk.


The first sentence of aphorism 3:
Common natures consider all noble, magnaminous feelings inexpedient and therefore first of all incredible.

This just demonstrates the aristocratic stance that he maintained his whole thinking life.


This man lived in Germany and had no respect for the common German citizen, whom he considered beneath contempt.

Actually he lived a lot of the time in Switzerland and Italy. As an aristocratic thinker he despised the Herd, of course he did. He depised most of all the Christian Herd, whether they be German or no; he also despised liberals and socialists.


Nietszche gives one a great charge whenever he is read, but few, if any, accept his philosophy. Today we are all empiricists in our daily, non-religious lives, whether we wish to admit this or not.

I think you must speak for yourself here. However, Nietzsche himself - while no-one would call him an 'empiricist' - was certainly not a metaphysician!
So he would've agreed with the Empiricists - such as Hume - that metaphysics was so much fiction. However, he found the empiricist philosophers - particuarly Locke, to be ultimately unphilosophical.

His philosophy transformed western thinking from the early 1900s onwards, particlularly on the European Continent, although not so so much on the North American continent and the British Isles, where the ideas of liberalism, empiricism [as you say], materialism, pragmatism and morality still hold sway.

This adverts to my point about the essential Germanic quality of Nietzsche's thought - despite what he thought of the Germans of his own day.